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This special edition of Prison Service Journal focusses
on prison security. Despite the centrality of security to
prison life, this is not a theme that has often been
explicitly explored in PSJ. Indeed, this special edition has
been prompted by a belief that security practices have
been relatively under theorized and researched generally
and in prisons in particular. Instead, there has developed
a set of assumptions and traditions that have guided
thinking and actions. Predominantly, it has only been in
the face of significant failures, such as high profile
escapes, that there has there been prominent and
systematic examination of security. In attempting to
address this gap, this edition of PSJ draws upon expertise
within prisons and the wider field of security in order to
examine some critical areas of practice.
In the opening article, Professor Mark Button
Professor of Criminology at University of Portsmouth, in
which he considers how existing and emerging research
in the wider security field can be applied to prisons in a
strategic way so as to improve practice. This article sets
out an agenda that we are keen to encourage. This is
followed by an interview with Claudia Sturt, Director of
Security Order and Counter Terrorism in HM Prisons and
Probation Service. In this interview, she describes the
security threats faced by prisons and discusses the new
approaches that have been developed over recent years
to professionalise and enhance practice so as to
effectively respond to the threats. In her interview,
Claudia Sturt, particularly emphasises that the purpose of
security is to create a foundation for the rehabilitative
work of prisons. 
One of the threats that have intensified in recent
years is that of organised crime and ongoing criminality
in prisons, in particular facilitated by developments in
technology, particularly mobile phones. Dr. Kate Gooch
and Professor James Treadwell offer an analysis of the
extent and nature of this problem in prisons. This is
followed by a study conducted at HMP Holme House
prison by Dr Victoria Bell and Dr Maggie Leese of Teeside
University. This study describes the effectiveness of the
approach taken to tackling drug supply. This approach
integrated security and a broader drug treatment regime,
and security practice consciously incorporated an
emphasis upon procedural justice. This is an example of
the potential synergy of security and rehabilitative
cultures.
An interview with Jason Hogg, Deputy Chief
Constable of Thames Valley Police, considers the effective
working relationship between prisons and the police in
tackling and preventing crime. As the national lead for
policing in prisons, he has particular expertise and insight
into what this means across a range of activities.
Three articles follow that provide detailed
assessments of critical security practices. Professor Robert
Barrington, Jack Silverman and Marie Hutton from
University of Sussex offer an account of the development
of counter corruption activity in prisons. After a slow
start, recent years have seen greater acknowledgement
and action to respond to the threat of staff corruption.
Professor Julian Richards of University of Buckingham
provides an overview of security intelligence practices.
This draws upon the use of intelligence in a range of
settings including law enforcement and military and
speaks to prison intelligence as part of this wider
profession. Dr Grant Bosworth and Sarah Ashcroft
discuss recent work in prisons to improve the
governance, scrutiny and research of the use of force. As
the use of force by state actors is sometimes necessary,
but is also one of the ultimate exercises of power. Given
this context, the considered attention provided by this
article is to be welcomed.
The final contribution is an interview with Alyson
Wakefield, Professor of Criminology and Security
Studies at the University of West London and Chair of
the Security Institute. The security Institute is the
leading professional body for people working in
security. In this interview she describes the importance
of security work and the cross-sector efforts to
developed excellence in practice, and to nurture a more
diverse workforce.
This edition of PSJ attempts to offer a dedicated
examination of security practice in prisons. It is not
intended to be definitive, but rather it aims to draw
closer attention to this field of practice, draw upon a
broader range of academic expertise, and encourage
further engagement. Security can be a highly technical
field, which has an element of specialism. Those who
work in security need to have a command of the tools
available and understand how to deploy them to their
best effect. It also, however, involves the application of
generalist skills including leadership, planning,
governance, analysis and, interpersonal interactions. The
way security is practiced has wider implications for
prisons as a whole. Security can contribute to safety
internally and for the wider public. Yet this needs to be
conducted in a way that is integrated with the broader
strategic objectives, including nurturing a fair, decent and
respectful environment; tackling inequality and
disproportionality; creating openness and trust, and;
supporting opportunities for people to experience
personal growth and change. Reconciling and
integrating these aims is a sophisticated and highly
complex task. This is what is required from effective
prison security.
Editorial Comment
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Introduction 
Security is one of the fundamental needs in
society for both individuals and organisations.1
Delivering security and consequences of those
modes have stimulated some significant academic
debates and research.2 However, applied security,
particularly the performance of security tools and
effectiveness of security systems, in comparison
to other disciplines, has been under-researched.3
An engineer, a medical doctor, a human resources
specialist would have a substantial body of
knowledge to consult when examining the
different ‘tools’ of their trade and the merits of
their use vis-a-vis a security manager. Given the
importance of security in prisons one might
expect this might be an exception in the broader
field of security studies; but here again there is a
sparse base of scholarship. There is a body or
research that investigates the culture of the
prison, which considers the nature of security,
exemplified by Sykes4 seminal work. Some of the
sparse research which exists, is listed next to some
important security issues: 
q Categorisation of prison inmates for various
purposes;5
q The effectiveness of prison security staff;6
q Prison escapes;7 and 
q Perimeter security.8
Considering prison escapes have been the subject
of numerous dramas and movies from The Great
Escape, Escape from Alcatraz to the Shawshank
Redemption it is interesting to juxtapose the interest of
creative writers with their academic equivalents.
Although prison escapes do often result in official
enquiries, which will be an issue this paper will return to
later. 
The brief potpourri of research identified above
does not identify the totality of prison security related
research and it is not the intention of this article to
identify all of the extant literature. Rather this article
intends to consider the issue of prison security from a
security scholar perspective. It will begin by exploring
the importance of security in prisons. The paper will
then move on to consider the importance of
professional security managers, before setting out some
of the issues of research which should be developed
further by security and prison researchers.   
The importance of security in prisons 
Security in prisons is a very important issue for a
variety of obvious reasons. First and foremost many
prisoners are dangerous or high risk of committing
further crimes and it is important to keep them from
society to prevent further incidents, which requires
security to keep them there. Even if they are not a risk,
offenders are sent to prison as a penalty and it is
important they remain there to maintain the integrity of
the punishment. Second prisoners are also potentially
offenders within prison and it is also essential to have
Professionalising Prison Security: 
Developing a Model and Agenda Rooted in Research to
Enhance the Delivery of Security in Prisons
Mark Button is Professor of Criminology at the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies, University of Portsmouth
1. Zedner, L. (2003). Too much security?. International journal of the sociology of law, 31(3), 155-184.
2. See for example Loader, I., & Walker, N. (2007). Civilizing security. Cambridge University Press.
3. Button, M. (2008) Doing Security. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
4. Sykes, G. M. (2007). The society of captives: A study of a maximum security prison. Princeton University Press.
5. Cunningham, M. D., Sorensen, J. R., & Reidy, T. J. (2005). An actuarial model for assessment of prison violence risk among maximum
security inmates. Assessment, 12(1), 40-49; and Gaes, G. G., & Camp, S. D. (2009). Unintended consequences: Experimental evidence
for the criminogenic effect of prison security level placement on post-release recidivism. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 5(2),
139-162.
6. Shamir, B., & Drory, A. (1982). Occupational tedium among prison officers. Criminal justice and behavior, 9(1), 79-99; and Roy, S., &
Avdija, A. (2012). The Effect of Prison Security Level on Job Satisfaction and Job Burnout among Prison Staff in the USA: An
Assessment. International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences, 7(2).
7. Culp, R. F. (2005). Frequency and characteristics of prison escapes in the United States: An analysis of national data. The Prison Journal,
85(3), 270-291; Culp, R. F., & Bracco, E. (2005). Examining prison escapes and the routine activities theory. Corrections Compendium,
30(3), 1-5; and Peterson, B. E., Fera, A., & Mellow, J. (2016). Escapes from correctional custody: A new examination of an old
phenomenon. The Prison Journal, 96(4), 511-533.
8. Camp, G. M., Camp, C. G. (1987). Stopping escapes: Perimeter security. US Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice;
Dessent, G. H. (1987). Prison perimeter cost-effectiveness. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 38(10), 975-980.
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effective security to protect staff, other prisoners and
visitors. Third the nature of the population and the strict
rules within them regarding consumption of alcohol,
drugs and access to items such as mobile phones
means it is important to prevent such items from been
smuggled in. For all these reasons maximising the
effectiveness of security in prisons is a very important
issue. Highly effective security therefore look like in
prisons: 
q Very low risk of prisoners escaping; 
q Very low levels of further offending within
prisons; and
q No contraband getting to prisoners.
But these must also be delivered by a security
system that does not disrupt the wider core aims of
prisons, such as provide a regime that also rehabilitates
offenders, among many others. Thus the challenge of
achieving these aims cuts to one
of the central dilemmas of
security in any context. A retailer
could easily enhance security to
prevent shoplifting, by for
instance, placing security staff
checking all those who enter and
leave, but this might be at the
cost of less customers coming to
the store - undermining the
purpose of the retailer. For a
prison the dilemma is balancing a
reasonable prison regime for
inmates against an appropriate
level of security. In addition to
this is the issue of cost. Politicians
and taxpayers do not generally
like paying taxes for prisons and in most cases higher
security equals higher costs. High walls, fences, CCTV,
drones, security staff etc all cost money. Prison
managers therefore face the following challenge of
balancing:  
High Security versus Reasonable Prison Regime
for inmates versus Cost
This is a very difficult balancing act and it highlights
where research can play an important role. The scarce
resources of prison managers need to be deployed to
their maximum and research can help them to make
smart decisions. However, this assumes decision-makers
focused upon security have a professional approach,
built upon research based decision-making and that
there is a body of knowledge to consult. As the next
section will show, general security management until
recently was not generally wedded to such a
methodology. 
Professional security managers 
The professionalisation of security managers in
general has been undergoing a significant
transformation over the last 30 years. From a role
traditionally associated as a second career for ex-police
and military staff, with no specialist qualifications where
what was considered ‘relevant’ experience was central
to recruitment, there has been a move to a much more
professional approach.9 Degrees,
Masters and other professional
qualifications in security are now
much more central to recruitment
- although the new recruits to
security management are still
dominated by the ex-police and
military they do at least generally
come with higher relevant
qualifications too.10 Security
management, however, still
differs from other ancillary
professions such as Human
Resources, Health and Safety etc
where choosing a career in it on
leaving university is common. The
core requirements of a
‘profession’ are still not completely there. There are still
gaps in the traits associated with a profession such as a
clear body of knowledge, clear entry standards to the
profession, a code of ethics all work to to name some.11
And perhaps one of the most significant identifiers of a
profession in the UK - receiving Chartered Status from
the Privy Council - is still lacking in the security industry. 
The gaps in the UK security professional infra-
structure have probably in part propelled the UK
Government to create its own security profession from
scratch built upon physical security, personnel security,
cyber security and technical security, which was









9. See Hearnden, K. (1995). Multi-tasking in British businesses: A comparative study of security and safety managers. Security Journal,
2(6), 123-132; Nalla, M. and Morash, M. (2002) Assessing the Scope of Corporate Security: Common Practices and Relationships with
other Business Functions. Security Journal, 15(1), 7-19; and Gill, M., Burns-Howell, T., Keats, G., & Taylor, E. (2007). Demonstrating the
value of security. Tunbridge Wells: Perpetuity.
10. See Button, M. (2019) Private Policing. 2nd Edition. Abingdon: Routledge; and Petersen, K. L. (2013). The Corporate Security
Professional: A Hybrid Agent Between Corporate and National Security. Security Journal, 26(3), 222-235.
11. Button, (2008) op. cit. 
12. HM Government (2020) Introducing Government Security. Retrieved from
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/864750/Introducing_government_se
curity.pdf
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upon extensive standards that go from entry to high
level managerial positions. These and the wider industry
developments to a more professional infra-structure are
welcome and likely to lead to better security within
government. They are also likely to lead to increased
demands for knowledge on security drawn from the
highest quality research.
It is here where there is a gap, we have already
referred to. Medical doctors, engineers and human
resource management specialists can point to dozens if
not hundreds of journal in some cases publishing
research on issues which may be very useful in the
decision-making of appropriate tools to deliver. In the
security world there are only two specialist journals:
Security Journal and the Journal of Applied Security
Research and only a handful of
articles on prison security can be
found. Wider criminological
journals also contain a few. These
illustrate the small and dispersed
body of knowledge dedicated to
the security effectiveness of tools
and systems in prisons. There is
an extensive body of generic
crime prevention based research
and some of this will be useful,
but it is not necessarily
transferable to prison contexts or
easily discovered.13
Policing has in recent years
also been gradually embracing
more professional approaches to
the development of policies. The
creation of the College of
Policing, extensive research
activity and evaluations rooted in random control
experiments have yielded an evidence base showing
strategies that work, which have then been
implemented.14
Both policing and crime prevention have various
initiatives that clearly bring together these important
bodies of knowledge to enable practitioners to make
use of them (see footnotes 13 and 14). Such
approaches for security in general and prison security
specifically would be beneficial if all relevant knowledge
was brought together in a user friendly hub. However,
there is also a need for more research. Some critics
might immediately think this is just academics calling
for more research and therefore funding. This is in part
true, but research can also be done by practitioners as
part of their normal way of working and there are also
many ways for research to be stimulated by others to
undertake through relatively low cost options such as
students studying degrees through to PhDs. The next
section provides a snapshot of areas where the author
believe there should be a priority for prison security
research, it is not exhaustive and there are many more
areas security professionals would consider. This is just
a starting point. 
Security failure 
Security failure is an act that breaches what the
security system is designed to prevent. This could be a
criminal act, such as a robbery, burglary, theft and so
on; or a lesser act, such as trespass or breach of
organisational rules.15 Thus in a prison context it could
be an escape or a prisoner to
making alcohol in their cell.
Security failure therefore
encompasses a wide range of
potential incidents that take
place in different nodes and the
consequences of which vary
greatly. Failures of security in
aviation have resulted in the
catastrophic events of 11
September 2001, while security
failure in a supermarket might
mean no more than the loss of
£50 worth of razors. Another
consequence might be nothing
more dangerous than huge
embarrassment and bad publicity,
such as in the incident in which a
member of Fathers 4 Justice
breached security at Buckingham
Palace to reach the Queen’s balcony in a Batman outfit
in order to highlight the organization’s campaign for
greater access for separated fathers to their children.
Security failure occurs all the time despite the millions
of pounds spent to reinforce security systems. As
Zedner16 argues:
...absolute security ... is a chimera, perpetually
beyond reach. Even if security were today
obtainable ... the potentiality for new threats
means that the pursuit can never be said to be
over ... Just as the capa- bilities and intentions
of potential adversaries are unknowable, so
there may be unknown vulnerabilities,
revealed only when they are exploited. The
central issue here is that security is not and











13 See for example https://popcenter.asu.edu/ 
14 See for example https://whatworks.college.police.uk/Research/Research-Map/Pages/Research-Map.aspx 
15 Button, (2008) op. cit.
16 Op. cit., 2003, p 158.
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relational concept whose invisibility must be
continually tested against threats as yet
unknown. 
Security failure, however, is not an easy subject to
study. First, the embarrassment of security failure can
be such that the breach is never actually publicised
(many frauds for example). Second, in order to
minimise the chances of similar breaches happening
again, detailed information of what went wrong is
often not made publicly available. Consequently, the
study of security failures is restricted to cases where
information is available, which may well be a biased
sample in the first place. Nevertheless, particularly in
the public sector, when there is a major breach there is
often some form of enquiry.17
Sometimes the media carry
articles that shed light on security
failures, both reports from
journalists and, in some cases,
from the perpetrators themselves
some years later. Finally there are
also evaluations of particular
security products, which can shed
light on the causes of security
failure and which can be used to
further our understanding.18
Understanding why security
failures have occurred is central
to improving security, as Button19
has noted drawing upon the
research of Toft and Reynolds20
on disasters, which can be
applied to security failure.
Organisations can reduce adverse
events such as disasters and
security failures from occurring by
engaging in three types of
learning. First, there is organisational learning where
individuals within an organisation draw their own
lessons from an event. For example discovering a new
means of a visitor smuggling in contraband into a
prison should provide learning for all others in that
organisation to prevent further breaches. 
Second, there is isomorphic learning in which an
incident (that occurred in another place, at an earlier
time, or to another business or organization) is studied
by other similar groups. The intention of scrutinizing
‘someone else’s incident’ is to identify and assess
potential risks that might apply to your own systems or
procedures and to eliminate them. Thus in this context
prisons should be scanning more widely and if for
example a new smuggling technique is uncovered in an
airport, prisons should be considering whether it is an
issue for them. 
Finally, there is ‘iconic’ learning where simply being
informed of a negative event is considered a learning
event in itself. An example might be hearing that in
another organisation an employee clicked on what they
thought was a job opportunity sent to them by email,
but actually it was malware which triggered a
ransomware attack which led to serious damage to the
organisation. 
Toft and Reynolds argue that
while the first and third types of
learning are important, the most
significant is isomorphic. What
does this therefore mean for
prisons? First prisons should be
gathering data on all security
failures that occur within them.
This should capture as much data
as possible relating to
circumstances and causes. This
data should be regularly analysed
and used to fine tune security
systems to reduce risks. The
wider prison security
management network should
also be embedded, receiving
analysis and feeding into the
data. However, prisons should
also be looking beyond prisons to
conduct isomorphic learning and
also feeding this knowledge into
the adapting their security systems. Security failures in
other contexts related to smuggling, searches,
perimeters to name some offer important knowledge.
These activities can be undertaken “behind the wire” of
the prison system without compromising revealing
important security knowledge to prisoners. The
opportunities from big data associated with the Fourth














17. See for example Home Office. (1966). Report of the Inquiry Into Prison Escapes and Security, by Admiral of the Fleet, the Earl
Mountbatten of Burma, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty,
December 1966. HM Stationery Office; Learmont, J. (1995). Review of Prison Service Security in England and Wales and the Escape
from Parkhurst Prison on Tuesday 3rd January 1995. HM Stationery Office; Woodcock, S. J. (1994). Report of the Enquiry into the
Escape of Six Prisoners from the Special Security Unit at Whitemoor Prison, Cambridgeshire, on Friday 9th September 1994. HM
Stationery Office.
18. Gill, M., & Spriggs, A. (2005). Assessing the impact of CCTV (Vol. 292). London: Home Office Research, Development and Statistics
Directorate.
19. Op. cit., 2008. 
20. Toft, B., & Reynolds, S. (1997). Learning from disasters. Leicester: Perpetuity Press.
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The Fourth Industrial Revolution and Security 
There are a wide range of traditional security tools,
strategies and systems where more research is required
on their effectiveness from CCTV in specific contexts
through to searching procedures. However, the fourth
industrial revolution (4IR) holds the potential for a wide
range of new methods and approaches to security that
presents for a more pressing priority for research and
experimentation. The 4IR is used to describe a variety of
technological advances proceeding at pace, around
three broad areas: 
q Physical: autonomous vehicles, 3d printing,
advanced robotics and new materials. 





Schwab22 has argued: 
We are at the beginning of a
revolution that is
fundamentally changing the
way we live, work, and
relate to one another. In its
scale, scope and complexity,
what I consider to be the
fourth industrial revolution is
unlike anything humankind
has experienced before. 
The application of the
technologies of the 4IR to
security are also emerging. For
instance drones and robots are
increasingly used to conduct
surveillance; and digital advances
are enabling big data to better
profile risks and deploy
mitigations to manage them. There is huge potential to
utilise some of the technologies of the 4IR for prison
security and to evaluate their success. Some of the
technologies could yield more effective security at lower
costs in the long term. Beyond the obvious benefits of
using drones and robots to patrol perimeters and other
important areas there is the potential to use big data to
monitor and predict risks, such as risk of self-harm,
violence, insider threats etc. Indeed the latter issue is
very important in prisons and utilising big data to
identify potential threats could be beneficial. In finance
such data is being used to predict potential fraudulent
transactions with high degrees of accuracy and the UK
is already pursuing such approaches in the prison
sector.23 The most important aspect of utilising these
new approaches is using research to evaluate their
effectiveness. 
The mental health and well being of prison staff 
Working in prisons in general is a stressful and
potentially dangerous occupation. Those officers with
security roles face particular risks
and with those risks come the
potential for impacts on the
mental health and well being of
staff. Research conducted by the
author on private security staff –
who probably face less risks than
prison officers – has highlighted
significant problems with levels
of well being and the mental
health of such operatives.24 These
problems ultimately impinge
upon performance and as
research has illustrated in security
failure, often the human element
of security systems is the reason
security failure occurs. There has
been research in the past in the
UK on this issue and in other
countries, but much more work
needs to be dedicated towards
this.25 Maximising the
effectiveness of prison officers
given their importance in security
systems is an important objective
and research can be utilised to
develop the most effective workforce. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This article has briefly introduced some of the
emerging thinking in security more general and applied
them to prison security. It has, in-particular, identified
some of the broad themes of research which should be
Working in prisons










for impacts on the
mental health and
well being of staff.
21. Schwab, K. (2017). The fourth industrial revolution. Crown Business.
22. Ibid., p1. 
23. Patil, S., Nemade, V., & Soni, P. K. (2018). Predictive modelling for credit card fraud detection using data analytics. Procedia computer
science, 132, 385-395; and ZDNet (2018)  UK Ministry of Justice using data to gain control of prisons. Retrieved from
https://www.zdnet.com/article/uk-ministry-of-justice-using-data-to-gain-control-of-prisons/
24. Talas, R., Button, M., Doyle, M., & Das, J. (2020). Violence, abuse and the implications for mental health and wellbeing of security
operatives in the United Kingdom: the invisible problem. Policing and Society, 1-16.
25. Rutter, D. R., & Fielding, P. J. (1988). Sources of occupational stress: An examination of British prison officers. Work & Stress, 2(4), 291-299.
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a priority for prison security managers. Central to the
model identified is the need for professional security
managers rooted in the traits associated with a typical
profession such as grounding in a suitable high level
qualification and working using techniques that there is
an evidence base of their proven success. The lack of an
extensive body of security knowledge in general and
particularly to prisons requires much greater attention
should be applied to security managers commissioning
and conducting research. They should also be utilising
isomorphic learning to scan for evidence from within
their prisons, the wider prison sector and other relevant
sectors to integrate that knowledge into their
strategies. There are many areas where research should
be priority and of varying levels of sophistication there
is no doubt research already occurring in the UK. This
article has stressed the importance of understanding
security failure, which is a founding knowledge base for
prisons; using and evaluating some of the emerging
techniques associated with 4IR; and finally the mental
health and well being of security operatives within
prisons. There are many more, but the foundations of
this approach can yield more effective security
decisions. Figure 1 illustrates the essence of this
approach. 
This article will end with an agenda for prison
security managers to enhance security and they can
judge to what extent they are fulfilling this agenda with
new Government initiatives to professionalise security
in the public sector and wider industry developments. 
q Recruitment of managers of security who
have been educated and trained in the
discipline and who recognise the importance
of and use research; 
q The pursuit and commissioning of research
where there are gaps to expand knowledge of
what works; 
q Active learning within prison security; 
q Building a body of knowledge through a an
easily accessible repository of knowledge; and 
q Building a network to share that knowledge. 
There are many other aspects to developing a
profession beyond the scope of this article. These steps,
however, are the most pertinent to developing a
professional approach to security that maximises
effectiveness.
Figure 1. Foundations of good security decisions 
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Claudia Sturt is the Executive Director for Security,
Order and Counter Terrorism in HM Prison and
Probation Service (HMPPS). She was the first
person to undertake this role after it was created
in 2016. Her responsibilities include leading
services across prisons, probation and youth
custody tackling violent extremism, serious
organised crime and corruption. Her team also
lead on the management of intelligence and the
development of security policies and practice,
including new technologies and countermeasures.
In addition, she manages teams that respond to
serious incidents.
Prior to taking on this role, Claudia Sturt was a
successful prison manager. She governed for prisons:
Erlestoke, Dartmoor, Winchester and Belmarsh. She
was also a Deputy Director between 2010 and 2016,
responsible for leading all of the prisons in the Thames
Valley area.
This interview took place in October 2020. 
KG: How would you describe prison security? 
CS: Security can be understood as the protection
of an organisation, its mission and objectives against
hostile activity. The mission and objectives of HMPPS are
to protect the public; reducing reoffending and building
positive lives. What Security means in that context is
ensuring the sentence of the court is carried out, but
then enabling prisons to be places where rehabilitation
can happen and people can lead safe, well ordered lives
in our custody. You won’t get much meaningful
rehabilitation within prisons that are chaotic and
dangerous, because people in there are just too busy
surviving. I see Security as creating the bedrock for
rehabilitative cultures and opportunities, rather than
just something for its own sake. The traditional view of
prison security was dominated by preventing escape.
Of course that’s still our pre-eminent responsibility, but
it’s no longer enough. In former days, when you
incarcerated somebody behind a big high wall, their
offending behaviour either stopped or was at least put
on hold while they were in custody. All you had to do to
protect the public from prisoners was to stop them
escaping- because as long as they didn’t escape, they
couldn’t carry on their criminal activity. That’s clearly not
the case any longer, with the proliferation of digital
technology. We’re not able to eradicate this or
completely prevent its use, and for that reason many
offenders still manage to maintain their networks and
criminal activity while they’re in custody. Therefore, in
order to protect the public and reduce reoffending we
have to curtail ongoing criminal activity; prison Security
now is as much about tackling the illicit economy and
ongoing criminality as it is about preventing escape.
KG: Do you think that changes the daily
practice of security within a prison?
CS:Yes, I think it needs to. We best protect the
institution, its mission and objectives by, first of all,
understanding the threat- the nature of things that can
go wrong, let’s say in our context escape, ongoing
criminality and extremism. Then we need to understand
the level of risk- by which I mean the likelihood that
those things will go wrong. Then we have to find ways
to mitigate those risks. We protect the organisation by
building its resilience, by reducing the rewards of hostile
activity and by increasing the jeopardy attached
continued offending. You can’t do those things in
isolation from other partners across the law
enforcement and national security landscape. I think
much more of our focus now is more upstream than it
used to be. So traditionally, I think prisons have looked
at the way the threat manifests itself in relation to
individual prisoners’ behaviour. For example, you
observe prisoner X passing something to prisoner Y,
and you might drug test one and search the other —
that’s dealing with the downstream manifestations of
the threat. If you look upstream, and you’re willing to
be partnership-minded and work with other agencies,
then you start being able to tackle the threat at source.
You can start looking at the criminal groups who are
supplying prisons rather than the individual who’s
handing it out across the wing. You can start disrupting
and degrading the supply chain. By using strategic
intelligence you can begin to get ahead of the problem
rather than only ever dealing with the symptoms of it.
Leading prison security
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If as a SOCT (Security, Order and Counter-Terrorism)
team we are sitting around the table with the right
agencies, we can be contributing to their
understanding and they can be contributing to ours
and we jointly start filling the knowledge gaps. This
Directorate has got to be a knowledge-based economy.
KG: Has that involved cultural change either
on the part of the prison service or the police or
both? 
CS:Yes, certainly some fundamental changes were
necessary. We had to make a strategic choice to be at
the table with law enforcement and national security
partners, rather than working in isolation. Traditionally,
the Prison Service was a little bit closed and had a
mindset that the outside world didn’t really understand
us. We would just plough our own furrow-and you can
get away with that, but you
won’t make any headway-so part
of the shift for us is having more
of an open, outward- facing
mindset that says, ‘ we’re
partners not competitors’, so we
can build a joint response. Our
partners also had to recognise
that we had a really valuable part
to play and that we could be
trusted, so that they would
choose to work with us. I think
we are now treated with a lot
more respect and consideration
by our partners in law
enforcement and national
security We’re seen as part of the solution, not
irrelevant or just something to be worked around. 
KG: One of the things that has happened in
the last couple of years is that prison security has
attracted a lot of investment, which in terms of
the context of the last decade, is quite unique. Do
you think that the new capabilities are making a
difference and bringing better outcomes for
individuals, for prisons or the Service as a whole? 
CS: I think you’ll see a big difference. That
investment was made possible by a couple of things. I
spoke about intelligence; the strategic intelligence
picture we developed gave us an evidence base to
establish what our critical threats were. In place of
anecdote we had for the first time an authoritative
articulation of our threat picture with powerful enough
Evidence to open the Treasury purse-strings. Developing
a partnership approach was the second thing that was
necessary. One of the reasons why we got the
investment was because the Home Office wanted us to
have it and wanted to work with us on the case
management of high harm individuals. If they hadn’t
supported our bid, I don’t think we would have been
successful, so it’s a real tangible example of the benefits
of facing outward. And of course, we were lucky with
the timing- a new Government keen to tackle crime just
as we were producing our threat assessment. The £100
million investment will strengthen our resilience from
multiple directions, starting with enhancing gate
security. I spoke earlier about increasing the jeopardy
and reducing the profitability of criminal supply
operations, so one way you reduce the profitability is to
increase the number of consignments that don’t’ get
delivered, so that the profit-loss equation is shifted. If
you can also identify who is people bringing
contraband into the prison, you’re increasing their
jeopardy. What I am working towards is that people no
longer see prisons as a worthwhile or lucrative
marketplace because too many of their trades go
wrong and they run too high a
risk of getting caught themselves.
Enhancing gate security is a
critical aspect of that because it
makes it much harder to get the
items in quantities through the
gate. We are investing in new
technologies, such as X-Ray body
and bag scanners and metal
detector portals, with SOCT staff
working directly with the
manufacturers to develop the
best possible specifications for
prison use. We are also
increasing searching staff and
dogs so that anything that
comes through the gate is scrutinised in a really
credible way. We are able to do this in about 50 new
sites that don’t already have those measures. I’d love to
go further, but it’s a great start.
As part of the Security Investment programme,
we are also developing a digital forensics lab. The
purpose of that is to access the information
downloaded from SIM cards and mobile phones that
we recover. Those mobile phones have often been
places that are not very bio-secure so we need to be
able to handle the items properly. And then we are
replacing the Mercury intelligence system with a new
digital platform that will give us the opportunity to
interrogate data not just process it, then use our
intelligence much more proactively. 
We are developing our multi-agency responses to
serious organised crime, investing in a powerful joint
case management, control and disruption approach
for high harm and serious organised criminals to make
it as near impossible as we can for them to continue
their activities in prison and after their release too —
that’s why the Home Office wanted us to have the
money for that. 
Our partners also
had to recognise
that we had a really
valuable part to play
and that we could
be trusted, so that
they would choose
to work with us.
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The other area where we are going to be investing
quite heavily is on counter-corruption work. We
recognise that if you close down other supply routes for
contraband, crime groups and individuals will
increasingly target our colleagues, so we are helping
to build resilience of staff against being corrupted.
Organised crime is absolutely ruthless, and they will
exploit whatever weakness they can find, whether
that is people who have debt, or those who are lonely
or insecure, who are uncertain about their status at
work or think that colleagues don’t value or support
them. Very few people join the job with a view to
working corruptly; a small number might, but
generally speaking, those people who get corrupted
are singled out and manipulated
because criminals see a chink in
their armour.
The Security Investment
Programme is a combination of
measures- technological and
human factors- and from both a
staff and offender perspective,
that will make a significant
difference, but that doesn’t mean
it will be job done. One of the
unfortunate realities that we are
working with is that serious
organised crime is ruthless,
entrepreneurial, adaptable,
greedy, and as long as they see
an attractive market and they
think that the cost:benefit ratio is
in their favour, they will keep
trying to exploit it. 
KG: Do you think that
threat has changed whilst
you’ve been in the role, or
perhaps in the Prison Service? 
CS:Certainly, during my time in the Prison Service,
it is hardly recognisable from the days of trading
lavatory paper and phone cards. It will have developed
even since I’ve been in this role, but I think what has
really changed is our ability to know what it looks like.
Previously you were just working blind about what
happens outside the prison. But now we have improved
our ability to see. Digital technology of course is
changing everything- and the illicit economy in prison is
no different. The most significant change is that people
can grow very rich without ever getting their hands
dirty and they can have victims that never meet — they
can have victims on another continent and that’s a
massive game changer. With the dark web and digital
technology, there’s now a market place where you
never have to meet the person who is supplying you. 
KG: And in some ways, that’s the change with
mobile phones in prison; you don’t have to meet
the victim or be in direct contact…
CS: A lot of people ask, why can’t we relax a little
bit about mobile phones in prison because prisoners are
just trying to keep in touch with their loved ones, speak
to their kids before bedtime, and they’re doing it on a
mobile phone because it’s private, cheaper, and easier
than speaking on a landline on prison landings. Most of
the people in prison come from a generation where
they spend most of their time with a phone in their
hand so it just feels unnatural not to have a mobile to
text and call with. But because all those mobile phones
have to be trafficked in, they are all feeding the illicit
economy, and the debt and
violence that goes with it. It may
be true that nearly three quarters
of calls on illicit mobiles are made
to people we are happy for them
to contact, but that still leaves
25-30 per cent of calls to friends,
associates or victims who we are
not happy for them to speak to-
and we have evidence or that
figure, by the way. 
KG: And when they are
calling family members there
can sometimes be an indirect
link to the illicit economy
because family members are
repaying debts or being
coerced directly…
CS: Absolutely. To say we are
happy for them to talk to their
family doesn’t always mean we
would be happy with the content
of what they are saying.
KG: I guess that speaks to some of the
difficult tensions when trying to balance those
things that we know support rehabilitation and
desistance, but also being alive to the things that
might constitute a threat or create an element of
risk, and that balance is never perfect. 
CS: Yes, one of the things that was wrong with our
response traditionally has been how we categorised
people, so we’ve been reliant on sentence length to
establish someone’s security category as a shorthand,
which doesn’t take into account that risk of harm and
sentence length don’t necessarily go hand in hand.
Plenty of people who are immersed in serious
criminality don’t get long sentences, either because
they are well represented in court or because law
enforcement is unable to prosecute them for the
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totality of what they are doing. We always have a
significant proportion of known organised crime group
members in custody at any given time, with the
majority still held in relatively low security conditions.
For some of them, that’s appropriate because they
might be coming to the end of their sentence and we
should be trying to get them successfully resettled. For
many, though, they will make their way to medium or
low security conditions because their short sentences
mean that they are automatically categorised as
Category C or Category D, or they are skilled at shaping
how we see them, very good at becoming cleaners,
orderlies and in trusted positions on the Prison Council
and so on. They do well out of
the decisions that are made
about them by prison staff. So if
you can change how you
categorise people to reflect
actual risk, than you can be much
better at making sure that those
who need genuinely need
rehabilitative support don’t have
those opportunities ruined by the
activities of organised criminals
trying to control the
establishment for their own
profit. The new generation of
prisons are designed to be all
about reducing reoffending and
to give people an opportunity to
be busy in a constructive way, to
behave responsibly and live
positive lives in custody. If we
make sure that people in those
prisons are the ones who need
and won’t abuse it, that’s an
important service. It also creates a
degree of leverage for the people who are currently
doing really well out of the system but are not desisting
from criminal activity. 
KG: One of the recent changes has been to
introduce financial investigation units, and to
invest in both regional and national intelligence
units — how important has this been?
CS: It’s probably the first time that we’ve made a
real effort to be knowledge based and that knowledge
isn’t just about what happened locally, but goes beyond
establishments, beyond criminal justice and even
beyond U.K. borders. Some of the new capabilities have
been really important to that. We have increased the
number of prison-based intelligence staff, and
professionalised their role so they are qualified to the
same level as law enforcement analysts. Better local
intelligence provides the building blocks for better
regional and national analysis. The use of data is a shift.
This includes, for example, downloading data from
captured drones or recovered mobile phones, and using
that as part of a wider law enforcement effort. We have
been able to get convictions for drone pilots by getting
data off drones that were recovered, and that was
never previously possible. The Regional Intelligence
Units are very important to us now because they help
join the dots and synthesise the local intelligence, and
see the associations and networks that you can’t
necessarily see when you are just looking within a single
establishment or group. Where those Regional
Intelligence Units now partner up with Regional
Organised Crime Units, that starts both contributing to,
and drawing on contributions
from, agencies such as the
National Crime Agency, the
Police, HMRC, Borders and
Immigration and so on. We can
therefore see a much more
complete picture about how the
illicit economy operates. Crime
Groups are completely agnostic
about how they make money,
they look for the best
opportunities for profit and
power. One week it might be
supplying steroids to a gym in a
prison, the next week perhaps
trafficking sex workers or moving
cryptocurrency on the dark web
— they don’t care how they do it,
it’s about whatever is most
profitable and least risky. 
KG: The theme that has
come up during the interview
is about law enforcement. Do
you think that’s a change in philosophy, strategy
or practice for prison officers or prison managers?
CS: I think traditionally, people working within
prison have almost had to choose which hat they are
going to wear — whether they are focused on security
or rehabilitation. I came to this job having never worked
in a security related role. I was always about reducing
reoffending and decency in prisons, and I wouldn’t
necessarily even say that I had a positive view or expert
understanding about the role of Security. Sometimes it
even felt like Security saw their job as stopping me
doing mine, although I’m sure from their perspective
they were just watching my back. What I absolutely
urge people to think about is that you don’t have to
choose, because security serves rehabilitation. Good
Security should be helping the rehabilitation effort to
happen safely and making a reality of it, not stopping it.
We should have people working in prison who are
interested in both simultaneously and see how they can
The new generation
of prisons are
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contribute to both simultaneously. One of the areas of
investment in the Security Investment Programme, only
a small investment but I think an important one, is
about capability raising. I’m really influenced by a case
that Ian Bickers and I investigated several years ago
when I was DDC (Deputy Director of Custody) for South
Central. It was the escape of a Category A prisoner
from Crown Court, and we were struck that the whole
case was a triumph of process over critical thinking. The
process was correct at every stage, but the escape
occurred because they were so reliant on the process
that they lost their ability to think about the threat. I
think that investigation was the single most influential
thing I’d done in my career in terms of security because
it showed me that process might assure people that
they have done their job correctly
but it doesn’t actually prevent
things from going wrong, it
doesn’t protect the organisation’s
mission. For this reason much of
my focus with SOCT has been
developing a Directorate that has
questioning and thinking at its
heart. We want to develop
intelligence and ask questions
about how things go wrong, not
to attribute blame but to
understand so that we can
improve the response next time.
I’ve tried to move us away from a
mindset that is about handling
adverse events to one that is
about not repeating them. To do
that, you need to have a culture
where people say I think a
mistake has been made, how was that mistake possible
and how do we design it out? 
KG: So, it’s about building resilience without
designing out human capacity and skill?
CS: It is absolutely. I’m long enough in the tooth
now and I am a Historian so I’m bound to think back to
HMP Whitemoor and HMP Parkhust and the escapes in
the 1990s, and the lessons that we learnt very painfully
then which were about inadequate process. We had
prison staff who were conditioned and intimidated into
not doing their job, and the organisational response to
that was to codify every requirement with a regime of
auditing to make sure that each task had been
completed and couldn’t be missed or avoided. It was
probably an important corrective at the time, but we
became over reliant on it and a successful Security
Audit became the test of whether a prison was deemed
to be secure or not. I wouldn’t want to see the audits
go all together but it has to be balanced by having an
intelligent and enquiring approach to what our threats
are, be they places, problems or people; understanding
what those threats are and how they operate and then
thinking about how best they can be mitigated. 
KG:  What makes you proud about the work
that you do or that you see in others?
CS: I was very lucky to have an opportunity to
create something almost from scratch; you don’t often
get that and certainly not with the combination of
investment coupled with space to innovate and make a
real difference. My colleagues and I have been able to
build something new; a Directorate where the culture,
capability, partnership, and the outcomes make me
very, very proud. I’m proud that it is a Directorate that’s
not afraid to do things differently, that isn’t constrained
by the way we have always done
things. Because it’s fresh and
interesting and exciting work,
we’ve been able to attract some
brilliant people to join SOCT. I
don’t have words for how proud
I am of the work that they do,
though some of it I can’t talk
about, which is very frustrating.
When I see the sheer
inventiveness and quality of the
work that some of my colleagues
do, I’m incredibly proud. They are
not simply doing it because I’ve
told them to; I’ve built the clock
and wound it up but they’re
doing it and working it out for
themselves. I’ve got people in
SOCT who have enormously
greater security experience that I
have. I don’t have all the answers on this at all. I’ve
brought a mindset and way of looking at an issue, but
other people have developed things, so I’m proud of
them. I see successful operations from the capabilities
and relationships that my colleagues have built. I know
that there are people walking around alive on the street
today because of a piece of work that was done in
SOCT, and that’s not an exaggeration. I know that we
are putting holes in the illicit economy because of our
activity, and I know that we are keeping the public
safer, and people who live in work in prisons and
probation safer. I’m really proud of that, and it’s been
probably the greatest privilege I’ve ever had, to be able
to create this Directorate. 
KG: How would you describe your experience
as a female senior leader working in a male-
dominated security world?
CS: People used to always ask me this question
when I was a Governor, but my response was always,
‘It’s not a male dominated environment, it’s a Claudia
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Prison Service Journal14 Issue 252
dominated environment.’ I was not completely joking.
As a leader, you set the tone and culture by what you
do and what you put up with. I don’t ever feel that I’ve
suffered from being in a world that is numerically
dominated by men because the work I’ve done has
been determined by me and the people I’ve got around
me. For a young directorate, SOCT has a good track
record in attracting senior female leadership to pivotal
roles. Both men and women in SOCT have brought
their talents to bear on the problems that they’ve seen
and they’ve been brilliant at it. There might be more
men than women in the Security arena, I think we are
going in the right direction and the SOCT Directorate is
a good counterbalance for that- although like other
parts of HMPPS gender is not the only area where we
would benefit from greater diversity.
KG: Could you name one person who has
influenced you?
CS: I’ve been lucky enough to work for some great
leaders — Martin Narey and Michael Spurr come to
mind immediately, of course. And I learn so much from
people who work within my Directorate. But another
person who had a really profound influence on me, and
who I really miss now, is Dr Ruth Mann, not just
because she was also a really passionate servant of
rehabilitation and always wanted to find ways to make
things better, but she taught very powerful lessons
about evidence, about not approaching questions with
pre-formed assumptions or believing that you already
have all the answers. She taught us about having an
open mind and to be evidence based, which is
important in every part of our work but especially so in
the world of Security. Ruth was a person of genuine
goodness; without ever making you feel harassed she
always advocated strongly for hope, dignity and
humanity in a way that was impossible to ignore. She’s
not someone we can easily replace but her influence
and legacy are powerful and enduring, and they live on
after her.
KG: What are your future hopes for SOCT
Directorate?
CS: The next challenge for SOCT, which I think will
make a huge difference, will be to help the organisation
to understand better what we can offer. People don’t
necessarily know enough about what we do for us to
have maximum impact. Before COVID, our primary
objective for this year was bridging the gap between
SOCT and wider operational capability so that people
who work in prisons and probation can have a greater
share of the knowledge capital that we have built up. It
is no good at all having all these fantastic capabilities if
they’re not being used, or they are only being used for
the things we can spot. We’ve created the capabilities,
and I really want them harnessed to the maximum
effect which requires operational colleagues to be
actively aware, lobbying for and exploiting them
because that’s what will make prisons safer, stable and
more law abiding, and more decent and rehabilitative. 
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Introduction 
‘What happens out there, happens in here.’
(Category B Local)
In July 2020, the National Crime Agency and the
Metropolitan Police announced that they had
made 746 arrests and seized £54m in cash, 77
firearms, over two tonnes of Class A and Class B
drugs, and over 29 million pills of street Valium.2
Operation Venetic — as it was dubbed — centred
on the use of EncroChat, an encrypted
communication platform that could be discreetly
accessed on smart phones and had facilitated
instant messaging between associates of a
criminal network spreading across the UK and
within Europe. When announcing the outcome of
the operation, Chief Constable Steve Jupp, the
National Police Chiefs’ Council’s Lead for Serious
Organised Crime, announced:
Serious organised crime is complex but working
together with our Regional Organised Crimes Units and
the National Crime Agency we have achieved an
unparalleled victory against the kingpin criminals whose
criminal activity and violence intimidates and exploits
the most vulnerable. By dismantling these groups, we
have saved countless lives and protected communities
across the UK.3
Implicit in this statement is the assumption that
organised criminal activity ceases when suspects are in
custody, that criminal networks are permanently
disrupted, and that communication between associates
ends. As Van der Laan states, ‘at first glance, prison
would seem to be a prime example of a location with
strict supervision, where offenders are separated from
potential targets by walls of a prison.’4 However, prisons
are places where some individuals continue to offend
and where organised crime can be initiated and
become embedded in the very routine activities of
prison life. Such activity has become increasingly more
pronounced within prisons in England and Wales over
the course of the last decade.5 The possibility that
organised crime groups and networks might seek to
expand into ‘new territories’ has been observed in the
community across a number of jurisdictions and, as
Varese argues, such transplantation is more likely to be
successful where there is a demand for protection
and/or a desire to maximise the economic opportunities
regarding the sale of illegal goods, particularly where
the state has failed to manage those markets.6
Quite why organised crime has become
increasingly well-established within the English and
Welsh prison system merits careful attention, as does
the forms of criminal exploitation represented (both
within prison and extending into the community), the
ways in which criminal networks continue or even
expand, and the particular forms of organised crime
within the British context (which bear little resemblance
to some of the more notorious and iconic expressions
of organised crime elsewhere).7 Despite a significant
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growth in prison studies, and a well-established body of
literature on organised crime within the community and
across national borders,8 very little research considers the
emergence or continuation of organised crime within
prison. Even the Oxford Handbook of Organised Crime
excludes from its remit a specific focus on organised
crime within prison. Those studies that do exist retain
an international, rather than a British, focus.9
This article begins to address this gap.10 It begins by
setting out the complexities in defining ‘organised
crime,’ before discussing the relevance of the gang
trope in England and Welsh prisons and offering an
overview of reasons why organised crime has expanded
into prisons in England and
Wales. Finally, the article explores
the extent to which those
individuals participating in
criminal exploitation, criminal
networks and organised crime
are identifiable within prison and
to what end. In so doing, this
article challenges the orthodox
view that harmful group
behaviour in prison is principally
the preserve of ‘gang’ members.
Rather, it argues that harmful
group behaviour and criminal
activity is better understood as
organised crime. A continuum
exists between criminal activities
requiring organisation and those
forms of organised crime where
individuals and groups are
seeking to usurp or corrupt
prison authorities and operate
with power, control and
influence. Critically, this article
argues that organised criminal
networks and activities have
become an embedded feature of prison life over the
last decade, primarily because more sophisticated
groups have been able to take advantage of the market
opportunities created by a flourishing prison illicit
economy, by exploiting weaknesses in State governance,
and by accessing digital technology to communicate,
trade and organise themselves (often without necessarily
leaving the prison cell). As crime and criminality has
changed in both the community and in prison, traditional
local and internal responses within prisons cannot
adequately address these new challenges, nor can a
reliance on ‘disruptive’ moves or a focus on whomever is
left holding contraband (who is not necessarily the real
instigator). Rather, a more nuanced, agile, intelligence
and evidence-based, and regional (sometimes national)
response is required, one that focuses on law
enforcement and public
protection in the widest sense,
recognising that criminal
exploitation extends from the
prison to the families and partners
of prisoners and to vulnerable
persons in the community.
Methodological Note
This article draws on the
findings of five separate but
overlapping key studies. The first
study focused on the incidence,
prevention and responses to
prison violence. This
ethnographic and qualitative
study of three prisons (a Category
B Local, a Category C prison and
a YOI) revealed the extent to
which prison violence was
underpinned by economic
imperatives, how and why the
illicit economy had flourished in
some contexts, the criminal
networks that such economic
activity was linked to, and how organised crime had
emerged in some prisons but not in others.11 The
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the Police and Crime Commissioners of West Mercia
Police, West Midlands Police, Staffordshire Police and
Warwickshire Police.12 As part of this study, we have
been able to further explore crime in prison from a
prison perspective, but also from the perspectives of
police representatives, court representatives, the Crown
Prosecution Service, the National Probation Service, the
Regional Organised Crime Units and from the
Regional/National Intelligence Units. In this study we
have been better able to understand trends in the
nature and dynamics of crime in prison, the offences
committed and by whom, the wider context within
which these offences occurred, the penalties applied,
and how the criminal justice response could be
improved. The third study — with Professor Nathan
Hughes13 and Dr Isla Masson14 — is a study of the
experiences of care leavers in prison, involving semi-
structured interviews in two
Category C/YOIs and a women’s
prison. In this study, our
interviews demonstrated how
connections to criminal networks
and criminal exploitations
develop prior to imprisonment
and how they manifest within
prison, and the extent to which
any harmful group behaviour
could be defined or constructed
as ‘gang behaviour’, ‘organised
crime’ or ‘crime that is
organised.’ The fourth study
represents the first empirical,
systematic study of prison homicide in England and
Wales. This mixed-methods study not only draws on
qualitative interviews with those who have perpetrated
fatal or near-fatal offences in a range of prison settings,
but also includes ethnographic and qualitative research
within in a Category A prison. The final study is a
comparative international study of prison violence in
Aotearoa New Zealand, Australia and England. This
study is ongoing but has allowed us to explore and test
the differences in organised crime and gangs from an
international perspective, and explore regional
variations in the forms and dynamics of harmful group
behaviour, harm and crime in prison.15
In addition to the formal research projects, we
have benefitted from the insights gained from
invitations to visit a much wider range of prisons —
either as part of specific research projects or to offer
support or training on specific issues. We have also
learnt much from an ongoing dialogue with
representatives from the Ministry of Justice, Home
Office, and HMPPS. This dialogue, coupled with the
ability to draw on the experiences from a much wider
range of prisons, has allowed us to — as best we can —
test the generalisability of our findings, and better
understand where organised crime has become more
embedded, and where it has not, for what reasons, and
how such trends are changing over time. Although
each of these studies listed above focused on a slightly
different aspect of prison safety and security, our
continued presence in the field over the last seven years
allowed us to observe,
understand and to begin to
articulate the transformations in
prisoner society and within
prisons themselves. It was
significant to us that one such
transformation that we observed
— and that was confirmed to us
throughout all the studies above
— was the emergence of
organised crime and the relative
absence of ‘gang behaviour’. 
Defining ‘Organised Crime’
‘Organised crime’ is an ambiguous and ill-defined
concept.16 There is in excess of 150 academic, policy
and statutory definitions of organised crime, all of
which vary significantly. The most consistently used
definition is that provided by the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
which stipulates that an organised criminal group is ‘a
group of three or more persons existing over a period of
time acting in concert with the aim of committing
crimes for financial or material benefit.’17 The emphasis
on ‘a group of three or more people’ has achieved a
statutory footing as part of the Serious Crime Act 2015.
However, as Levi explains, such slippery definitions
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mean that ‘organised crime’ can ‘mean anything from
Italian syndicates to three menacing burglar and a
window cleaning business who differentiate by having
on as a look-out, another as burglar, and a third as
money launderer.’18
To complicate matters further, concern with
organised crime has, in both academic and policy
discourse, been somewhat superseded by references to
Transnational Organised Crime (TNOC). TNOC is a term
in common usage but is ‘especially problematic,’19
lacking a shared definition for operational or research
purposes.20 Broadly speaking, TNOC represents the
transnational variant of organised crime — activity that
is devised and carried out across geographical or
jurisdictional boundaries. Links are often made to a
diverse range of criminal activities, including: the more
established global trade in
narcotics; the greater illegal
movement of people, goods,
money and data across
international borders; cross-
border money laundering,
bribery, corruption and the
financing of criminal and terrorist
activities; modern slavery;
transnational sexual exploitation;
and, the trade in counterfeit
identities and goods.21 However,
as Hobbs argues, ‘the
global/transnational obsession
that has dominated recent British
organised crime discourse is
difficult to justify.’22 Rather it is
more helpful to ‘identify local
units of activity that are linked via networks’ and are
taking full advantage of an illegal market that
represents a ‘form of unlicensed capitalism.’23
The best empirically informed accounts of
organised crime establish it as a set of activities, rather
than placing emphasis on the logistical and hierarchical
structure of criminal groups.24 Such activities include,
for example, the provision and transport of illicit goods
and services such as security and protection.25 This is
critical since British organised crime does not replicate
the formal and highly structured hierarchies typical of
the Mafia and ‘Outlaw Motorcycle Groups’.26 Much of
what is considered professional and/or organised crime
within the British context is, in reality, the antithesis of
good management and coordination — it is messy,
chaotic and disorganised.27
It is also prudent to distinguish between ‘organised
crime’ and the ‘organisation of crime,’ with the latter
requiring a degree of association and co-ordination but
remaining diffuse, informal, and
lacking the ‘visible hand of
violence and corruption which
affects persons and events as
evidence of an organising force
behind ‘organised crime’.’28 Levi
further argues that ‘organised
crime’ is distinguishable from
other sorts of criminal activities
due to four essential
characteristics: 1) violence; 2)
corruption; 3) continuity; and, 4)
variety in types of criminal
conduct engaged in.29 He
suggests that there may be value
in sustaining a distinction
between those who generate
(sometimes affluent) livelihoods
from crime — professional criminals — and those who
fit this fourfold criterion and who are ‘organised
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‘organised criminals’ is that set of people whom the
police and other State either regard, or wish us to
regard, as ‘really dangerous’ to the State’s essential
integrity.30 In addition, by introducing the dimension of
profit and illegality, it is possible to see the role of
(sometimes extreme) violence — or the threat of
violence — in regulating an illicit market that is not
constituted through legally enforceable contracts.31
Furthermore, organised crime should be viewed as one
end of a continuum of business and enterprise that
extends between, and often blends, legitimate and
illegitimate business activities. 
Mafia Myths and Legends: Understanding the
British Context 
Beyond the definitional dilemmas, the
phenomenon of organised crime
is understood differently, and has
different origins, across the
globe. Failing to understand
these essential differences can
cause, as Finckenauer argues,
unduly simplistic and incorrect
assumptions about the
presentation of organised crime,
with many viewing ‘organized
crime and what they know to be
the mafia [as] synonymous terms
and synonymous concepts.’32
Certainly in the U.S. context, the
‘myth of a powerful and
centralized mafia organisation’
was politically attractive and
served to justify increased law enforcement powers and
resources.33 Organised crime was seen as an imported
problem, traceable to immigration of Irish, and
particularly Italian-Sicilian, communities. However, the
US construction of organised crime contrasted rather
starkly with the dominate forms of ‘organised crime’
within the UK in the aftermath of World War 2. While
the US were expressing concern about Cosa Nostra,
organised crime in England and Wales was synonymous
with violent young men raised in the shadow of the
Blitz who had matured through boxing gyms, street
fights and petty instrumental criminality to more
ambitious criminal ventures. The allure of both business
and protection money gave these British ‘firms’ (to use
the vernacular) their logic. Unlike the US concern of an
‘alien’ threat, British organiesd crime was very much a
homegrown problem — a mixture of street heavies,
hard men and sometimes more specialist criminals and
corrupt businessmen. The Kray Twins became
synonymous with just such a group, and embodied
something of the status, celebrity and infamy that the
‘family firm’ appeared to enjoy.34 However, the lesson
that many had taken from the Krays was that it was
important to be business savvy. As a consequence,
armed robbery gradually ceased to be chosen source of
income for the criminal elite. Those individuals with
reputations to violence, criminal networks and access to
firearms, gradually moved into
the drug trade — a trade which
was increasingly offering far
greater financial rewards.35
By the 1990s, professional
criminals had moved towards an
‘entrepreneurial trading culture
driven by highly localized
interpretations of global
markets.’36 Those men versed in
the heavy end criminality of
commercial and armed robbery,
became savvy and more business
orientated.37 New opportunities
such as the homegrown business
of cultivation of cannabis were
profitable and less risky than
importation.38 The interconnected processes of de-
industrialization, globalization, and neo-liberalism had
normalized some criminal activity that was previously
the exclusive prevail of a more professional criminal
elite, with organised criminals increasingly depositing
and cleansing their money in legitimate businesses,
property portfolios, pubs, garages and car dealerships.39
Cash businesses also fared well, as did those sports that
had purchase in the working class milieus, increasingly
adding a veil of legitimacy to the cash flowing form the
Organised crime
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drug trade. Drug dealing became increasingly
‘normalised,’40 offering an accessible ‘alternative sphere
of enterprise to declining opportunities in traditional
male employment.’41 These changes occurred within a
context where online banking, online markets, the dark
net, and digital technology were reshaping everyday
life, culture and communications. These markets are
underpinned by ‘discreet, action-based networks that
informally connect individuals.’42 During the last decade
(2010s), these networks have increasingly taken root
and continued to operate from within the prison walls
in ways that suggest that the gang trope is misleading
and outdated, and only able to explain harmful group
behaviour in very particular contexts. 
From Prison ‘Gangs’ to the ‘Prison Firm’
‘It depends what jail you’re.
Like in Dispersals, you have
Muslim gangs. Then you
have other gangs where it
depends what area you’re
from. I think London is a lot
more gang orientated. More
Manchester and Liverpool, I
think it’s just about making
money and the fact you’re
from Liverpool obviously it
gives you that bit of a head
start. But I would say still
London, obviously it’s
organised crime and there’s
less gangs. On the news they show a lot of
these Black kids in London stabbing each
other, like what about these guys that are
getting executed on motorways and that?
Like organised gangs, you never see that on
the news. I know a couple of stories about
people in like organised crime executions and
things, they don’t say anything about that on
the news.’ (Category C)
To date, explanations of harmful group behaviour
within prison have routinely employed a gang narrative,
erroneously importing a construct from countries such
as the United States,43 Brazil44 and New Zealand45 where
prison gangs arguably have a greater symbolic and
physical presence. Given the growing concern about
youth violence and urban street gangs in the UK over
the last 20 years,46 it is perhaps unsurprising that ‘prison
gangs’ have become an
explanatory framework for prison
disorder within the UK.47 Despite
the longstanding, international
interest in prison gangs, the
literature on gangs in prison is
not well developed and it is for
this reason that prisons are
described as the ‘final frontier in
gang research.’48 In the context of
Texan prisons, Pyrooz and Decker
argue that ‘gangs occupy an
important place in the social
order of prisons,’ adding ‘Gangs
are responsible for a
disproportionate share of
violence and misconduct and
maintain a grip on contraband markets in prison.’49
Similarly, Skarbek describes prison gangs in California as
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being highly structured and organised, operating with
well-defined goals, clear criterion for membership, and
‘elaborate written constitutions.’50 Such gangs also
restrict their membership and demand a lifelong
commitment.51 Crucially, Skarbek found that prisoners
were not importing street gangs within prison in all U.S.
states, rather, ‘gangs formed as prisoners exploited the
decline in traditional controls’52 — namely, when
‘officers lost control of prisons’53 and prisoners could
not ‘rely on officials to resolve all disputes and to
protect them at all times.’54
It is highly doubtful that English and Welsh prisons
ever witnessed the particular forms of highly structured,
well organised and formally
constituted gang behaviour
described in the US or elsewhere.
Those research studies that claim
to have demonstrated the
presence of gang activity within




research by Woods55 and
colleagues56 claimed that both
prisoners and staff believed that
prison gang behaviour was
widespread within male prisons.
However, Wood defined prison
gangs as ‘a group of three or
more prisoners whose negative
behaviour has an adverse impact
on the prison that holds them.’57
It is questionable whether this
definition was sufficiently robust
to create clear distinctions between ‘gang’ behaviour
and the behaviour of groups of men who may have no
affiliation with gang activity and whose association may
be fleeting. It is also unclear whether it is because of
these conceptual weaknesses, or despite them, that she
‘discovered’ gang related violence in the prisons
surveyed.58 Maitra has subsequently argued that ‘prison
gangs are now a reality within the English prison
system.’59 However, it is far less clear whether Maitra
simply means that gang members are present in prison
in greater numbers or if he believes such individuals are
acting with the same level of power, influence and
control described in the U.S. context, or making the
same contribution to prison violence. Maitra also
appears to employ the gang narrative too readily and
without offering any conceptual
definition of ‘gang’. His
arguments contrast starkly with
his own earlier publications from
the same two-week study which
concluded that ‘the lives of most
prisoners were not defined by
gang membership.’60 He not only
appears to overstate very loose —
and as he himself describes —
‘amorphous’ peer groups with
gangs, but also conflates the
settling of community ‘beefs’61
with gang activity. Yet, as we
found, resolving such disputes
can occur independently of any
gang association and often has
little or no association with
‘gangs’.62
Notably, and by way of
contrast, Phillips found that the
‘organised and violent gangs
depicted in the US research’ were ‘seemingly absent in
the UK context.’63 Moreover, violent incidents ‘began









described in the US
or elsewhere.
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typically as individualised one-on-one masculine
contests and while they might escalate with the
involvement of supporters, they were not influenced by
organised gang allegiances.’64 Such findings correspond
with our own research, which found little sustained
‘gang’65 activity, even within a historically significant
context where two high profile gangs — and their
affiliated splinter groups — had dominated the local
Metropolitan area over a 20 year period.66 Our
continued research on crime in prison across a range of
prisons and involving police representatives has further
confirmed the absence of entrenched gang activity
within most English and Welsh prisons. References to
‘gang’ were significant only in two specific contexts —
YOIs and High Security Prisons — albeit for slightly
different reasons. 
Within the YOI context, ‘gang activity’ was
associated with a small number
of young men who had a post-
code or regional affiliation and
whose associations contributed
only to a minority of incidents
characterised by retaliatory ‘tit for
tat’ violence. However, such gang
activity did not structure the
prison experience, nor were there
any attempts to usurp or corrupt
State authority. Within prison,
there was also some conflation
between the sort of fraternal
groups loosely connected by
geographical affiliations and
those people who have
‘imported’ and sustained gang activities within prison: 
‘It’s not even really gangs because I’m not in a
gang but I just grew up in a certain area so I
don’t get along with a lot of people from
other areas but I’m not in a gang. A lot of
people think that I’m in a gang but I’m not in
a gang. [People who associate with certain
groups] are probably just around a bunch of
people or friends or probably not even friends,
probably associates, but they’re just like this
person has got my back.’ (Category C/YOI)
It is fairly typical for young men to form loose
acquaintances with young men from the same area,
partly because it offers some familiarity, reassurance
and sense of solidarity.67 Great care needs to be taken to
ensure that young men identifying with friends or
individuals from the same regions are not mis-identified
as constituting a ‘gang’. It is also possible that
approaches such as ‘keep apart lists’ create rather than
mitigate a gang problem since young people may feel
more compelled to identify with a particular group for
the purposes of safety, identity and protection. For
those young men who did have a more sustained
association with a ‘gang’ or street group, such activity
could, however, act as an entry point for more
sophisticated and organised
criminal activity as young men
matured and moved into adult
prisons, primarily because they
were developing their networks
and moving into criminal
activities that brought them into
contact with more experienced
and criminally active individuals. 
In the High Security Estate,
studies have identified concerns
regarding a small number of
prisoners operating in ‘Muslim
gangs.’68 Such gangs are thought
to have defined membership
roles, be involved in circulating
contraband, and in violence, bullying and intimidation
‘under the guise of religion.’69 Liebling et al’s follow up
study at HMP Whitemoor found that gang membership
was one of seven motivating factors for converting to
faith.70 In addition, they found that there was a ‘certain
new type of gang culture that glorified terrorist
behaviour and motives,’ but the expressed attitudes
‘constituted an artificial ideology’ and ‘insincere
performance.’71 Liebling et al further note that the
‘ambiguous use of the term gang at Whitemoor








65. Although the notion of the gang is highly contested,67 we take as our definition section 34(5) of the Policing and Crime Act 2009
which suggests that the group must: 1) consist of at least 3 people; 2) have a name, emblem or colour or any other characteristic that
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67. Crewe, B. (2009) The Prisoner Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.320; Phillips, C. (2012) “It Ain’t Nothing Like America with
the Bloods and the Crips”: Gang Narratives inside Two English Prisons,” Punishment and Society 14(1): 51-68, p.57. 
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69. Powis, B., Dixon, L. and Woodhams, J. (2019) Exploring the Nature of Muslim Groups and Related Gang Activity in Three High Security
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70. Liebling, A., Arnold, H. and Straub, C. (2011) An Exploration of Staff-Prisoner Relationships at HMP Whitemoor: 12 years on. London:
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71. Ibid, p.67.
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presented a problem when trying to explore differences
between the (supportive) Muslim brotherhood and the
(suppressive) ‘Muslim gang’.’72 One of the difficulties is
that, as Phillips also identifies, ‘Muslim solidarity’
creates a strong power base73 and a ‘collective identity’
that may result in Muslim brother defending each other
against officers, or the collective defence of a Muslim
prisoner against a non-Muslim prisoner(s).74 This could
engender fear, contempt and resentment amongst
non-Muslim prisoners.75 However, Phillips found that
the ‘’gang label’ can function as a racialised Othering
device and as a repository for feelings of envy and
frustration which abound in prison life.’76 For prisoners
in Liebling et al’s study, there
were ‘new fears about
misrepresentation,’ especially
since ‘laughing too loud or
‘having fun’ ran the risk of being
‘written up’ for gang-related
behaviour.’77 Those who imported
gang membership into the prison
believed that they were
monitored accordingly, but these
prisoners assumed that ‘staff
would stereotype them as
members of a ‘Muslim gang’ by
conflating a criminal past with
present religious denomination.’78
Moreover, prisoners believed that
‘helping and supporting
someone who is in need, acting
in accordance to Islamic
principles was misinterpreted and
exaggerated due to a misguided
perception of what a gang was.’79 Liebling et al add:
‘Every close knit peer group was potentially a ‘gang’.’80
Powis et al similarly concluded, ‘the nature of Muslim
groups of prisoners and the difference between Muslim
groups and gangs remains poorly understood.’81
The relative absence of ‘gang’ activity within
English and Welsh prisons is not only indicative of
important distinctions between British gang structures
and contexts, and those of the North America, South
America, Asian, Australia, and New Zealand context,
but also reflects a much wider shift in criminal activity in
the community. The evolution of street drug dealing
into a ‘county lines business model’ and to a more
‘entrepreneurial’ approach has served to move (street)
youth criminal associations from urban ‘gangs’ or street
groups to a form of drug dealing and enterprise that
needs little or no connectivity
with a gang.82 The ‘county line’
represents the use of a mobile
phone line to co-ordinate the
supply of drugs from a city hub
into villages and towns, often
well beyond regional boundaries
(such as from London to the
Bournemouth or Plymouth).83
Such criminal activities offer
flexibility, often involve the
exploitation of more vulnerable
individuals, and allow individuals
to profit more directly from their
‘graft’. 
Whittaker et al found that
over a ten year period, there had
been a noticeable and significant
shift away from the use of
violence to defend postcode
territories — as previous studies
of street young gangs had described84 — to the defence
of (drug) marketplaces.85 Young people were described
as more ruthless but focused on the expansion of new
...helping and
supporting
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drug markets beyond the confines of a specific
postcode and into other towns, replacing the
‘emotional sense of belonging’ to a gang with a more
‘business orientated ethos.’86 ‘Gangs’ were more
‘organised’ and had rejected ‘visible signs of
membership as ‘bad for business’ because they attract
unwanted attention from law enforcement agencies.’87
Thus, even amongst youth street groups, there has
been a drift towards more organised forms of
criminality. Given these shifts, it is questionable whether
the ‘gang’ remains the correct construct for criminal
group behaviour. Our contention then, is not that
‘gang’ members do not exist within prisons, but that
constructing prison disorder, violence and drug supply
within prison as ‘essentially a
problem of gangs is an exercise
flawed on empirical, theoretical
and methodological grounds.’88
Ultimately, as Hallsworth and
Young argue, ‘gang talk … runs
the risk of misrepresenting what
it claims to represent — the
reality of violence street worlds.’89
Explaining the Emergence of
Organised Crime
Criminal activities within
prison may include: organising
the murder or violent assault of
an individual in the community,
homicide within prison, jury
tampering and intimidation,
harassment, blackmail,
conspiracy to supply, money laundering, conveyance
and/or possession of contraband, prison mutiny,
assisting an escape or abscond, fraud, false
imprisonment, sexual assault, physical assault,
‘pottings’ (throwing urine or faeces at or over
someone), use of boiling/hot sugar water to injure,
criminal damage, arson (including the destruction of
cars in staff car parks) as well criminal participation
(under the Serious Crime Act section 45). Although the
vast majority of criminal activity is perpetrated by
prisoners, staff may also be implicated in the
conveyance of contraband (in amounts worth tens of
thousands of pounds), assault, and in behaviour that
may fall under the banner of ‘misconduct in a public
office,’ such as forming inappropriate and sexual
relationships with prisoners. Some such crimes —
whether involving prisoners or staff — can be isolated
incidents, disconnected from wider criminal networks
and not constituting a form of ‘organised crime’. 
However, criminal activity may require a network
of acquaintances and associates to, for example,
threaten, blackmail, rob, assault, or murder an
individual in the community whilst the organising
individual or co-conspirator is in prison. Clearly this
requires communication, co-ordination and
organisation — and, using Levi’s characterisation of
organised crime requiring violence, corruption,
continuity and variety — it is possible that such acts can
represent either ‘criminal activities that are organised’
or ‘organised crime’ depending
on the extent to which such
activities may reflect an enduring
network of criminal association
and a variety of activity. For
example, arranging the murder
of an individual in the community
will require organisation between
a prisoner and his co-
conspirator(s) but may be a
relatively isolated incident. By
contrast, the murder may
constitute a ‘hit’ or retaliation
between organised crime groups
where homicidal violence is only
one form of criminal activity that
these individuals engage in.
Thus, in seeking to identify those
acts that might constitute
‘organised crime’, it is prudent
to consider ‘the way criminal activities are carried out,’
how individuals interact with other accomplices, and
the extent to which such networks are seeking to
amass and use power.90 Inevitably, there will be a
‘continuum’ between ‘market-based crimes’ (e.g.
drug supply) that require some degree of organisation
and communication to ‘what could be
termed…’control-orientated,’ ‘regulatory’ or
‘governance’ crimes involving the setting and
enforcing of rules of conduct and the settling of
disputes in the absence of effective government
regulation.’91 In the latter case, alliances form to not
only gain ‘a share of illegal profits’ but also to exercise
power, to ‘govern’ and to regulate behaviour between
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Prison based criminal entrepreneurs require
networks and associates beyond the prison walls.
Increasingly the smuggling of contraband, the
associated transfer and recovery of payments, reflects
something more sophisticated than an isolated incident
of ‘crime that is organised’, typically involving criminal
networks that spread across the country and into more
than one prison. For example, serving prisoners at HMP
Hewell were able to orchestrate drone deliveries of
drugs, weapons, and mobile phones by drawing on a
wider network of accomplices both within prison and
the community. These drone deliveries spread across
prisons within the Midlands, the North West, Lancashire
and Scotland.92 This is not an isolated example, and
whilst the supply route may vary, the involvement of a
wider network does not, nor does the possibility of co-
ordinating or communicating with associates either via
mobile phones or pin-phones/in-cell telephony:
‘It’s 100 per cent business for me, nothing
else, and it was set up as a business with a tier
of people with me at the top as your chief
exec, if you like, and then you’ve got people
beneath you that are running the thing. So,
you’ve got a lad that drives and picks it up,
you’ve got a lad that holds it, you’ve got a lad
who holds the money, you’ve got people that
move it. It’s just purely business.’ (Category C)
Notably, the criminal exploitation of vulnerable
individuals in the community — such as female partners
or associates and/or care experienced individuals — can
represent a form of modern slavery, where vulnerable
individuals are coerced into driving criminal associates,
transporting contraband, conveyancing contraband
into prison (including through visits, throwovers or
drones) or collecting payments. In addition, prisoners
are active in recouping debt payments not just from
fellow prisoners, but also members of their family.93
Efforts to co-ordinate and profit from the supply of
drugs within prison, and to more deliberately corrupt
state authority, may come in the form of the partners or
associates of individuals affiliated organised crime
group entering the workforce. Such ‘plants’ may be
operating as ‘sleepers’ or may be very actively involved
in criminal activity. 
For some individuals, imprisonment was
unwelcome, but did not serve to halt their criminal
activities: 
‘Say someone’s convicted on the outside of
organised crime — of a massive drugs, money
laundering type of thing, drug smuggling,
huge, worth a lot of money, and then they
come into jail, they carry on the illegal
activities because they know they right
people, they’re able to. It is more coordinated,
it’s less violent, but it’s more financially
beneficial if you know what I mean.’
(Category C)
‘[Drug dealing] puts food on a lot of lad’s
tables out there and in here, you get me? We
need to keep earning, and there are ways to
do that. Big money, as much money as can be
earned on the out, on road [in the
community]’ (Category B Local)
In some cases, imprisonment was less an
occupational hazard than a business opportunity since
they were able to make more money within prison than
in the community: 
‘I know a lad who does nothing but little silly
sentences. He’ll go and do a stupid shoplifting
just so he’ll come in plugged up to make his
money again, so he’ll come back out and take
the missus to the Bahamas and stupid
holidays, so it’s serious money. Well, one
Kinder egg94 full of spice can make you
anything up to £4,000 or £5,000, so if you’ve
got three of those inside you that’s £15,000.’
(Category C)
There was remarkable consistently across prisons
both in the amounts that could be gained by selling the
illegal contents of a Kinder egg, but also the possibility
that individuals might commit minor offences or be
deliberately recalled to prison. In some cases, this was a
voluntary act, but in other cases, individuals were
coerced into returning to prison with contraband:
‘It’s not that all recalls are earning money.
There are muppets, sad cases, debtors, they
are being put up to it. They are […] not the
ones making any money off of it, they are
paying back the debts they have been driven
into. It’s a business model, they come back in
to pay their debts.’ (Category C)
The possibility that someone may deliberately
jeopardise their freedom illustrates something about
92. BBC News (2018) ‘Gangs who flew drones carrying drugs into prisons jailed,’ 29 October. Available online:
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-45980560; BBC News (2017) ‘Ten sentenced for smuggling drugs into prison by drones,’ 13
December. Available online: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-42341416.
93. Gooch, K. and Treadwell, J. (2020) ‘‘Prisoner Society in an Era of Psychoactive Substances, Organised Crime, New Drug Markets and
Austerity,’ British Journal of Criminology 60(5): 1260-1281.
Prison Service Journal26 Issue 252
the power and control that some prisoners — and their
associates in the community — are operating with. 
The possibility that the prison serves as a key
marketplace and site for organised crime activity seems
counter-intuitive. Individuals not only need to navigate
prison walls or fence lines, but also the restrictions on
freedom of movement, social contact and
communications. How and why organised and serious
criminality appears to have increased within prison over
the last decade merits attention. As Varese illustrated,
organised crime groups can and do expand and
transplant into new territories: 
‘The critical factor [in the emergence of
Mafias] is proximity to a sudden market
expansion that is not properly regulated by
the State and the presence of people who can
step in and regulate such markets. In a




specifically on ‘Mafias’, the
principles apply equally well
when considering the structural
conditions that make the
expansion of organised crime
within prison possible. His
findings also correspond with
Skarbek’s research which found
that prison gangs provide ‘extra-
legal governance’, protection and
security when individuals cannot rely on officers to
provide the governance they require, but in so doing,
they ‘govern crime’ and allow prisoners to participate in
the illicit economy.96 Taken together, these studies
suggest that whether it is a ‘prison gang’ or the ‘Mafia’,
such groups flourish when there is a lack of State
governance, where individuals cannot rely on the State
to regulate or resolve market disputes, and when there
is the opportunity to invade or expand a market. In
these cases, the Mafia and the prison gang serves to
create order as much as they can destabilise order. 
It is, therefore, no surprise that prisons in England
and Wales became vulnerable to increased organised,
serious, and ongoing criminal activity over the last
decade. First, ‘sudden market expansion’ was possible
due to increased demand and greater ease of supply.
Limited time out of cell, a lack of meaningful activity, a
growing sense of hopelessness and feeling ‘stuck in the
system’ contributed to increased demand for drugs.97 In
addition, supply routes diversified as drones became
available. This diversity of supply methods — which
includes reception, visitors, mail, staff, throwovers, and
escorts — meant that individuals could change and
switch supply routes in response to security tactics or
measures. In addition, drones were cheaply available,
offering an additional supply route, one that could be
directly exploited when conditions were poor (and a
delivery could be flown straight to a cell window) or
supervision was lax. Crucially, though, the possibility of
spraying psychoactive substances onto domestic or
legal mail meant that drug supply and consumption
was far easier — and incredibly
profitable. The exploitation of the
market was easier due to
technological advances. Those
individuals who imported or
expanded their network in prison
could run operations from the
prison cell using mobile phones.
In addition, online banking, social
media and crypto currencies
means that financial transactions
can occur outside of the prison
and in ways that are difficult and
resource intensive to investigate
and track. Poor prison conditions
and the inconsistent or inadequate supply of basic
items compelled individuals in some prisons to engage
in the illicit economy simply to, for example, have
sufficient underwear, access a television remote, have
sufficient bedding and toiletries. At the point of entry
into the economy, individuals may not necessarily be
trading contraband but they are quickly in debt, the
repayment of such may involve doing the bidding of
more dominant and controlling individuals (including
holding contraband, assaulting staff or assaulting
prisoners).98 The exploitation of illicit markets in prison
can, therefore, ‘be understood as evocative of the crude
market rationality.’99
The possibility that
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Second, prisoners cannot rely on staff to arbitrate
disputes over financial transactions, primarily because
of the nefarious nature of such activities. Thus,
intimidation, threats and the actual use of violence
serve to generate compliance and regulate behaviour.
As market activity increases, there are of course more
disputes to resolve, further cementing the role of those
willing to resolve conflict and govern conduct. Third,
prisoners have not always been able to rely on the State
to provide the governance they need, to supervise them
effectively, to define rules and boundaries, and to
protect them when needed. A combination of too few
officers, too many inexperienced officers and
managers, physical withdrawal by officers to the back-
room spaces and offices, and a lack of the competent,
consistent and legitimate use of authority have served
to create the fertile conditions for
sophisticated, domineering and
organised individuals to gain
power in some prisons. It is
undoubtedly true that State
governance has been
inconsistent and unreliable as a
direct result of efforts to reduce
financial resources beyond a
threshold where it is possible to
meaningfully maintain the moral,
legal and ethical performance of
the prison. Thus, the combination
of technological changes,
changes in the drug economy,
the diversification of supply
routes, poorer prison conditions,
impoverished regimes, changes
to the composition of the workforce, structural
hopelessness caused by long and IPP sentences,100 and
the increased use of recall have creating the ideal
conditions for organised criminals to expand their
activities and exploit the market that emerged. 
The ‘Screw Boys’ and the ‘Businessmen’: The
Organisation of Organised Crime in Prison
Prior to, and during, the 1990s, the ‘faces’ of the
most notorious criminals — such as the Krays — were
well-known, occupying the position of the self-avowed
criminal elite.101 Today, serious and sensible criminals
increasingly prefer to perform the faceless role of chief
executive and to maintain some distance from front-
line operations.102 Moreover, not all organised crime
requires direct coercion or violence — involvement in
the latter may, for example, frustrate business activities
by bringing unwanted attention. Organised crime
groups merely want compliance, so they can and will
express power in more subtle ways — the business is
never all about the money, but a chaotic world of
complex interactions and drivers, where acquisition and
dominance can feature as clear motives.103 Similarly,
within prison, the ‘Businessmen’104 who are co-
ordinating activities often operate at a distance from
every day ‘operations,’ keeping their hands away from
the ‘dirty work’ and avoiding suspicion:
‘You’ll find lads in prison,
you’re sorting out logistics,
you’re sorting out product,
you’re sorting out buyers,
you’re sorting out sellers.
You’re sorting out, in effect,
a massive industry. You’ve
got to go under the radar,
haven’t you, so you’ll find
they’re very business-
orientated.’ (Category C)
‘In my hierarchy, I’ve done all
that [drug dealing], but since
I’ve been in this prison, I just
send an order down,
because shit rolls downhill. So if I just send it
downhill to the Middlemen and they would
send it out to the Foot Soldiers and that. …
There’s about another three or four here on
this wing that I consider at the top, and they
know it as well. But they’re not above me.’
(Category C)
The ‘Businessmen’ recognise the importance of
developing a network of people, with the ‘Middlemen’,
‘Foot soldiers’ and ‘Runners’ remaining primarily
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contraband, as well as punishing non-repayment,
holding debt lists and bank account details, and
sending threatening notes, texts or phone calls when
needed. This might lead us to erroneously conclude
that criminal activities are difficult to observe and
identify within prison. However, much organised crime
within prison hides in plain sight. The names are barely
hidden from those who need to know them. Careful
observation of — for example — who is associating
with who, commonalities in terms of visitors or pin
phone contacts, who volunteers to push the
servery/kitchen trollies, who is trying to access
wings/residential units for no other explicable reason,
who has a plentiful supply of ‘canteen’105 and ‘exclusive’
items, who wants to be ‘padded up’106 with who, who
is passing to who, who is in debt to who, who assaults
staff and for what reason, who holds the ‘respect’ of
their peers (whether through fear or respect based on
admiration):
‘They can see who’s grafting. It’s like when
you see them on the wing and they’re
running around, you can see who’s selling
drugs. […] So, when they’re running around,
in and out of pads, it’s obvious who’s doing
what, do you know what I mean? I think
some of it is the thrill of the chase. […] You
know, obviously, you can have a better
existence.’ (Category C)
The Businessmen often operate from positions of
responsibility — such as peer support, mentor or
representative roles — and continue on ‘Enhanced
regime’107 for periods, appearing convivial, polite and
charismatic with staff and able to exert pressure on staff
should there be any hint of a negative report or
‘nicking’ (adjudication report). This is, of course, the
path of least resistance, scrutiny, and oversight,
ensuring that they can enjoy greater freedom (including
more time out of cell and unescorted movements), can
progress and can move to a lower security prison at the
earliest opportunity. Rather than being governed
‘tightly’,108 they both exploit the advantages offered by
the State whilst operating their ‘drug empires’ from
within. They don’t try to ‘beat the system’ but have
learnt to ‘play the game’. In so doing, they are able to
effectively manage the vertical relationship with State
agents and the horizontal relationships with peers.
Balancing a legitimate front with the co-ordination of
criminal activity was familiar behaviour to those who
had been involved in the organisation of drug
importation or distribution in the community and knew
how to compartmentalise activities:
‘You were getting up in the morning and
going to work, you were looking after the
kids, you were taking them on holiday so the
kids had their time, [the wife] had her time,
the business had that time, the drugs had that
time, and you had your time.’ (Category C)
Those who had been caught typically gave reasons
such as ‘getting greedy’ or ‘getting lazy’ by, for
example, forgetting to take the same safeguards with
vehicles, mobile phones and taking other shortcuts that
they would have been careful to avoid in the earlier
days of those operations. Notably, for those who were
connected with organised crime but did not occupy a
leadership role, those key individuals continued to exert
power and influence from other prisons or other prison
wings: 
‘Because I’m here and I work with
psychologists and I say, ‘Yeah, I really want to
get away from all that bollocks to do with all
the firm I’m with and having to worry about
what they think and…’ But at the end of the
day, I do need to worry about what other
people think, because I can easily be whacked
in prison if I do something that pisses them
off, do you know what I mean, someone can
easily come after me that knows them. […]
I’m more worried about what my firm think of
me and what I’m doing, than anyone else.’
(Category A)
In such cases, even those individuals who were
subject to bureaucratic forms of power — such as being
the focus of regular risk assessment, psychological
assessment and psychological intervention — their
chief concern was not how penal power ‘gripped’
them, but how they were perceived by more senior
members of their criminal network and how reprisals
and punishment could still be organised and exacted. 
Although the ‘Businessmen’ sought to exploit the
available opportunities and freedoms for their own
benefit, prisoners made distinctions between those
who were operating as ‘Businessmen’ but with a
105. ‘Canteen’ refers to the items that can be bought from an approved list within the prison. It typically includes food, toiletries, e-
cigarettes and stationary. 
106. ‘Padded up’ is prison slang for being in their cells. Thus, the expression ‘padded up together’ refers to the sharing of a cell with one or
more other individuals.
107. The 
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and Ieins, A. (2020) ‘’Tightness’, recognition and penal power,’ Punishment and Society (Online First): 1—22.
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legitimate ‘front’, and those who sought responsible
roles for genuine motives or to support and evidence
their attempts to desist from criminal activity. Those
men who were seen to be willingly and uncritically
complying with penal power, and enjoying ‘close’
relationships with staff, were dubbed ‘Screw Boys’ by
others and did not enjoy the same level of status,
power and control as the ‘Businessmen’:
‘I’ve got four jobs. I’ve got unsupervised
worker on my card, I’ve got more jobs that
entitle me to free movement, do you
understand? So, I’m supposed to be treated
like a man. I’m a person that abides by the
rules. […] When I was downstairs, I was
probably one of the main
ones that was pro-social to
the staff. So, basically, what I
do, I’ll have my coffee and
then I’ll sit on my table with
my paper, or whatever. A lot
of the staff members would
come and sit around and
have a talk. A lot of lads
took a disliking to this. They
were, like, ‘Oh, screw boys,
blah-de-blah.’ Not to my
face, just behind it but, you
know, you’d hear about it.’
(Category C)
To be named a ‘Screw Boy’
was a slur, but it is not always
apparent to the individual
concerned that his peers were
describing him as such. Some such ‘screw boys’
remained relatively unaware and were happy to
maintain some distance from wider wing politics. For
those who engage in peer support or volunteer for
positions of responsibility for benevolent reasons or to
earn a positive report from staff, they became
frustrated when their motives were misunderstood and
their integrity questioned. The argument here is neither
that prisoners operating in positions of responsibility
should not be empowered to operate with some
degree of trust and autonomy, nor that staff should be
immediately cynical or suspicious of all prisoners.
Indeed, evidence suggests that such roles and schemes
(e.g. the Listener Scheme) can have a range of
significant benefits, including personal transformation,
development of a ‘positive self-image’ or new identity,
developing a sense of purpose, a sense of achievement,
having a chance to ‘give something back’, acquiring
new skills and ‘earning the trust of others’.109 Rather,
we argue that such roles need to operate within a
context of the confident, competent and consistent of
legitimate authority by prison staff, ‘intelligent trust,’110
and the ability to engage in dynamic, agile and
responsive assessments of risk are required. Those
‘Businessmen’ who operate with impunity do so
because it is either directly or inadvertently permitted.
Much criminal activity can be prevented when staff
(and managers) ensure that they
are present, engaged, neither too
‘light’ nor too ‘heavy’ in the use
of power,111 observant, reward
positive behaviour, challenge
poor behaviour, enforce the rules
judiciously, to notice the
subtleties of human interaction
(including when the risk of harm
is increasing or an individual is
becoming more vulnerable), and




‘representative’ roles function in
a context where power is
imbalanced and prisoners are
poorly or ineffectively supervised,
a Faustian pact can occur when
organised criminals exert influence in prisons and are
able to help to ease managerial pressures on a prison
establishment itself. For example, we encountered
examples where prisoners were used to ‘stabilise’ a
prison wing — either because staff (and in some cases
managers) arranged ‘straighteners’ within cells and/or
appointed violence reduction representatives and
allowed them to adopt a pseudo-officer role.112 When
this is accompanied by a physical or psychological
retreat by staff, or staff are unwilling to use their
authority, this can distort the balance of power and the
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110. Liebling, A., Arnold, H. and Straub, C. (2011) An Exploration of Staff-Prisoner Relationships at HMP Whitemoor: 12 years on. London:
Ministry of Justice, p.185.
111. Crewe, B., Liebling, A. and Hulley, S. (2014) ‘Heavy-Light, Absent-Present: Rethinking the ‘Weight’ of Imprisonment,’ British Journal of
Sociology 65(3): 387-410. 
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for more sophisticated, entrepreneurial, or organised
criminals to fill the power vacuum left by staff.113 Whilst
staff may achieve some temporary sense of physical or
psychological safety by using prisoners to reduce
violence, handle disputes or put prisoners ‘back in line,’
this can ultimately benefit those involved in, and
profiting from, the supply of contraband. Organised
crime and corruption have a complex relationship, one
that can benefit both criminals and, in some instances,
the prison and its staff. The corruption that supports
organised crime activity does not necessarily always
come in the form of staff acting at the requests of
criminally active prisoners, but can come in the form
of the inadvertent or indirect abdication of
responsibility. Once the balance of power is distorted,
it is harder to regain control than if it had never been
lost in the first place. Such a rebalancing can only
occur when the staff group as a whole acts
consistently — those officers who try to do the right
thing alone may find themselves the target for assault
and ‘pottings’, acts which are ultimately aimed at
humiliating them and reasserting power and
control.114 The response to such incidents by the
officer group — not just managers and criminal justice
agencies — indicates whether efforts to undermine a
staff member are successful in the long-term.
Concluding Thoughts 
Crime does not stop at the prison gate, and
incarceration alone is not a barrier to ongoing and
serious organised criminal activity. Digital technology
makes it possible to arrange, co-ordinate, continue and
develop criminal networks and activities without leaving
the prison cell. Organised individuals can adapt to
changes in security and disruption ‘tactics’ with the
effect that supply routes are adjusted when needed by,
for example, diverting from throw-overs and drones to
the corruption of staff, or from the use of legal and
domestic mail to greater use of visitors and people
arriving in Reception. The traditional response has been
to arrange a ‘disruptive’ move of those individuals who
generate the greatest concern for staff. However, such
moves either create opportunities for other individuals
to function in their absence or serve to expand criminal
networks across the prison estate. Transfers do not
automatically end communications between individuals
within and/or across different prisons, or with
community associates and accomplices. Similarly,
moving vulnerable prisoners who are being exploited or
victimised does not necessarily mean that the threat is
mitigated or harm averted — more controlling
individuals can continue to not only arrange ‘hits’ from
other prison wings or prisons, but also directly contact,
intimidate or victimise family members. Thus, prison-
based organised crime is not solely a prison problem,
nor can it be dealt with purely at a local level. Yet, just
as with the investigation of EncroChat, prison based
organised crime is ultimately detectable, prosecutable
and preventable. Effective prevention, investigation and
legal or disciplinary responses require regional and
national solutions — those that draw on multiple
stakeholders and law enforcement agencies, and that
take seriously the safeguarding responsibilities to those
in the community, not just the prison. Indeed, the
Serious Violence Bill — if implemented — will put the
safeguarding responsibilities of prisons to those in the
community on a statutory footing. In this respect,
public protection is as much about law enforcement
within prison and the protection of victims of prison-
based offences as it is about those offences committed
in the community (either prior to imprisonment or on
release). Whilst there is a tendency in prison scholarship
to view forms of State power with suspicion, cynicism
and as ‘inherently damaging’,115 this article serves as a
corrective — seeking to illustrate the ways in which the
legitimate, judicious, ethical and competent use of
power and authority by prison staff and by wider law
enforcement agencies can serve to reduce the pains
and burdens of imprisonment. Indeed, our argument
here is that it is in the absence of effective State
governance and material provision that organised crime
networks and groups can operate most effectively.
Thus, prisons can only be safe, secure, decent, orderly,
and rehabilitative when they operate in the context of
the rule of law, moral order and effective governance.
113. Ibid. See, for example, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons (2018) Report of an announced inspection of HMP Birmingham – 30 July –
9 August 2018. London: Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons. Available Online: www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprisons/wp-
content/uploads/sites/4/2018/12/HMP-Birmingham-Web-2018.pdf
114. Gooch, K. (2020) Understanding Staff Assaults – A Research Briefing. Bath: University of Bath. 
115. Crewe, B. and Liebling, A. (2017) ‘Reconfiguring Penal Power,’ In: Liebling, A., Maruna, S. and McAra, L. (eds), Oxford Handbook of
Criminology. 6th Edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 889-913, p.892.
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Background
Drugs remain a key issue for prisons, with 78 per
cent of people who entered prison in 2017/18
testing positive for illegal drugs1, compared with
up to 9 per cent of adults in the general
population admitting to having taken drugs in the
last month2. Furthermore, HM Prison and
Probation Service (HMPPS) stated that between
2012/3 and 2017/18 the rate of positive Random
Drug Tests (RDT) in prisons increased by 50 per
cent, meaning that drug use within prisons is
‘widespread’3. This paper reports on the
qualitative findings of a research study that
explored the perceived impact of the increased
security measures that were implemented as part
of the Drug Recovery Pilot. The findings, in
combination with analysis of open access data,
suggests that the increased security measures put
in place are having a positive impact on the prison
environment however they also raise further
challenges for consideration by HMPPS.
The Drug Recovery Prison programme (DRP) in
HMP Holme House (a male, local, category C prison)
started in April 20174 with the aim of reducing demand
through ‘recovery’. The programme was aligned to the
2017 Government Drug Strategy, with the purpose of
‘get[ting] everyone living and working in the prison to
collaborate, to create better chances for people in
recovery to change and feel hopeful and optimistic
about their future’5. In order to do this, the programme
enhanced the local security measures in an effort to
reduce the known supply routes into the prison. The
changes focused on ‘activities to deter, detect and
disrupt illicit items entering the prison by enhancing
physical, procedural and interpersonal security’6. 
Drug use and the concept of recovery
The concept of recovery can be defined in a
number of different ways that include complete
abstinence from a substance, to more dynamic and
inclusive definitions that identify the importance of the
individual experience and the aspirational process that
underpins the journey7 8. There are a number of models
that have attempted to explain the concept of recovery
including the CHIME model9 that identified five
elements that are central to supporting the process of
recovery: connectedness, hope, identity, meaning, and
empowerment. This represented a shift away from
viewing recovery as the point at which a person
abstains from using alcohol or drugs to a more self-
motivated process that views recovery as a journey. The
Social Identity Model of Recovery (SIMOR) places
importance on social groups and networks, signifying a
change in attitude and the internalisation of a new set
of personal values10. This shift to a more pro-social
Increased security measures in a drug
recovery prison:
Disrupting the drug supply
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model which enables the individual to see a positive
alternative future can result in both changes to
behaviour, leading to a transition of identity11. In order
to promote recovery within the prison it was essential
to reduce the availability and use of drugs within HMP
Holme House. 
Drug use within prison can have an impact on
prison regimes12, and while this is not a new issue, the
changes in drug use and availability, especially the
increase of new psychoactive substances (NPS) that
imitate the ones found in cannabis, presents a range of
challenges for the prison estate13 14. NPS such as ‘Spice’
has increased in popularity, largely due to its low cost15.
It is well documented that the buying and selling of
drugs form part of the informal prison economy which
can be linked to internal hierarchies, enhancing status,
and producing economic rewards16 17 18.
Wheatley19 suggested that there are ‘five possible
explanations for drug use in prison’: self-medication;
time management; a social network; acquiring and
enhancing status; and, economic status and rewards.
Other factors can include an existing reliance on
substances when a person is sent to custody, as an
attempt to forget their current surroundings and in an
effort to manage underlying mental health issue20 21. 
Despite the reason for illicit drug use in prisons, it
is agreed that it brings with it an increased level of risk
to both the prisoners and the staff. In order to reduce
harm, there needs to be interventions that reduce drug
use and therefore reduce the overall risk within the
prison setting22. During 2017, the issues with drugs
within HMP Holme House, particularly psychoactive
substances (PS), was widely reported in the media23.
This issue was acknowledged by Peter Clarke, Chief
Inspector of Prisons, in the 2017 HMIP Inspectorate
Report for Holme House24 where he commented on
levels of drug use and availability within the prison:
‘…at the heart of our concerns was a very
serious problem with drugs. Mandatory
testing suggested a positive rate within the
prison of 10.45 per cent, which was bad
enough, but this rose to nearer 36 per cent
when synthetic cannabinoids or new
psychoactive substances (NPS) were included.
Nearly 60 per cent of prisoners thought it was
easy to get drugs in the prison, and a quarter
suggested that they had acquired a drug
problem at the prison.’
The 2020 Inspectorate25 also acknowledged
that in 2017 ‘…the availability of illicit
substances […] had been almost out of
control’. This report recognised that measures
to tackle the availability of illicit substances
‘had delivered some impressive reductions’. 
Data available from the Ministry of Justice26 reflects
the issues that the prison was facing with a peak of
drug finds in 2018. The data also identifies decreasing
numbers of mobile phone finds and an increase in
alcohol finds:
11. Mawson, E., Best, D., Beckwith, M., Dingle, G. A., and Lubman, D. I. (2015) ‘Social identity, social networks and recovery capital in
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One of the methods that the prison service use to
gain information on drug use and to deter prisoners
from consuming illicit drugs is the targeted or random
mandatory drug test (MDT). Testing for PS was not
rolled out across the prison estate until October 2016,
with the range of PS tests being expanded in June
201727. Again, this data is publicly available and
contributes to building a picture of the efficacy of the
Drug Recovery Prison pilot at HMP Holme House.
Between 2016 and 2020 (year ending March) the
prison service carried out an average of 53,369 MDTs,
at HMP Holme House this average was 707 per year. A
further breakdown of positive random mandatory drug
tests over the last five years at HMP Holme House can
be found in the table below.
Drug finds in HMP Holme House by (calendar) year
Year Number of finds (all drugs) Number of finds (PS) ( per cent of all drugs)
2016 92 33 (36 per cent)
2017 129 48 (37 per cent)
2018 373 160 (43 per cent)
2019 248 62 (25 per cent)
2020* 49 2 (5 per cent)
*Jan/Feb/March data only available
Other finds in HMP Holme House by (calendar) year






*Jan/Feb/March data only available
HMP Holme House random MDTs, including percentage of positive PS tests.
Year ending Number of tests Positive tests all drugs Positive tests
March administered (incl. PS) ( per cent) (PS only) ( per cent)
2016-2017 741 66 (9 per cent) does not include PS Not available
2017-2018 631 202 (32 per cent) 158 (25 per cent)
2018-2019 736 128 (17.4 per cent) 65 (8.8 per cent)
2019-2020 718 39 (5.4 per cent) 2 (0.3 per cent)
Prison, Drug Policy and the Drug Recovery
Programme
The recent Prison Drug Strategy 201928,
acknowledges that reducing supply and demand is not
a simple case of abstinence, arguing that the issue
‘requires a coordinated effort to […] encourage people
away from drug misuse towards positive and productive
activities, and support those requiring treatment’. This
builds on previous policy that focused on recovery and
harm reduction, with the emphasis on individual
journeys, rather than a single approach to drug
27. HMIP Annual Digest 2019-2020 for further details. Available at:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/905580/HMPPS-annual-digest-2019-
20.pdf (accessed 7th August 2020)
28. HM Prison and Probation Service (2019) see note 3 (p.1).
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rehabilitation29. As such, the Prison Drug Strategy30 has
three main objectives for tackling drug issues in prison:
restricting supply; reducing demand; and building
recovery. The ‘restricting supply’ objective is most
relevant for discussion here, with the three main ways
that this is to be tackled set out as:
1. “Minimise the supply of drugs into prisons
through guidance, processes and technology. 
2. Find drugs that do enter prisons using
searching, intelligence and drug testing.
3. Disrupt the trade of drugs within prisons,
working with law enforcement, sharing
information, and tackling corruption”.
These three objectives are focused on five areas,
all of which can play a part in the reducing drug use
and supply and these are:
q People: Staff awareness; Staff training
q Procedural: Searching; Visits; Prisoner
reception; Drug testing
q Physical: Dogs; Perimeters; Technology;
Physical security 
q Population: Prison safety; Visible deterrents
q Partnerships: Law enforcement; Intelligence;
Information sharing.
The Prison Drug Strategy31 states that procedural
processes within prison should be ‘clear, fair and
effective’. This informed the work of the DRP at HMP
Holme House prison and included the setting up of a
new team, the Drugs and Crime Reduction Unit
(DCRU). This team lead procedural security at the
prison, working both reactively and proactively to
support safety and security32 with the overall aim of
making the prison environment safer and more
rehabilitative. Staff in this unit were trained in
procedural justice to ensure that they were; ‘carrying
out the duties of law or authority in a way that is
perceived as fair by those [they] are dealing with’33.
These specially trained officers have the ability to carry
out intelligence-led searches and use a range of
equipment, including mobile phone detectors, to
interrupt the supply of drugs within the prison. In
addition to this, increased security measures were
implemented as part of the DRP included millimetre
wave scanners placed in visits and an I-Scan full body
scanner placed in the prisoner reception where
prisoners arrive and leave the prison. Finally, as part of
the DRP there was an increased and more systematic
searching of staff, including limitations on certain items
being taken into the prison, increased restrictions on
prisoner post and restriction of personal property, such
as clothing, entering the prison.
Study methodology
The findings presented here are relate to the
perceived impact of increased security measures on
staff, prisoners, and visitors at Holme House. The
study utilised qualitative data, including interviews
with staff and visitors, and focus groups with
prisoners. The sample was not randomly selected and
members of staff from the DRP programme acted as
gatekeepers, organising interviews, and promoting
the research to participants within the prison. While
recognising that this was not ideal, it was necessary
given the time constraints of the project. The staff also
negotiated access to the visitor centre, where
researchers were able to speak to members of the
public prior to their visits with friends and relatives
within the prison. Data collection was carried out
between February and April 2019.
Interviews were semi-structured in nature,
ensuring that all participants were asked the same
range of questions, with prompts and probes used
where appropriate. Interviews ranged from fifteen
minutes to one hour. The number of interviews carried
out with visitors and staff were as follows: visitor (n=11)
and staff (n = 26), staff were from a range of roles
involved in the DRP, including the Drug Crime
Reduction Unit (DCRU), prison reception staff;
managers of the DRP programme, and prison officers
working on the residential units. Focus groups were
held with groups of four prisoners over three occasions
(n=12) and they were asked the same questions as the
staff interviews. The DRP staff invited a larger number
of prisoners to the focus groups, with 12 agreeing to
take part in the day.
The qualitative data from the individual staff
interviews were digitally recorded, transcribed, and
anonymised. The group interviews with prisoners and
the visitor interviews were captured in note form by the
researchers and then written up in full directly after the
data collection had taken place. The transcription of the
staff interviews was carried out by an HMPPS approved
transcription service. All qualitative data was entered
into NVivo, a computer software package that supports
the analysis of large amounts of qualitative data, and
thematic analysis34 was undertaken. All data has been
treated confidentially and stored securely and
29. Hearty, P., Wincup, E., and Wright, N. M. J. (2016) ‘The potential of prisons to support drug recovery’, Drugs and Alcohol Today, 16(1),
49-58.
30. HM Prison and Probation Service (2019) see note 3 (p.7).
31. HM Prison and Probation Service (2019) see note 3 (p.5).
32. Wheatley (2019) see note 5.
33. Mann, R. E. (2019) ‘Polite, assertive and sensitive: Procedurally just searching at HMP Holme House’, Prison Service Journal, March
2019, no. 242, 26-30.
34. Braun, V. and Clarke, V. (2006) ‘Using thematic analysis in psychology’, Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3(2), 77–101.
Prison Service JournalIssue 252 35
anonymously. In order to maintain the anonymity of
staff participants, specific roles have not been
attributed to comments.
Findings
Overall, the findings suggest that the participants
perceived that since implementation of the new
security measures, there has been a decrease in the
number of illicit drugs within the prison. This perception
by participants in this study is reinforced by the data
reported earlier in this paper.
Staff and prisoners who took part in the study
were largely in agreement that since the introduction of
security measures linked to the DRP, availability of illicit
drugs within the prison estate has reduced, thus
disrupting the supply. Whilst this reduction has had a
positive impact on the prison regime, it was also
suggested that a complete
cessation of drug use and supply
within any prison environment
would be almost impossible to
achieve:
Oh, I think it’s definitely
interrupted it. To a big
extent. I think if you speak to
the staff, you speak to the
men — you’re never
probably going to be able to
close off all avenues — but
it’s absolutely disrupted it.
(Staff)
I would say 90 per cent has
stopped, but they’ll never
stop that ten per cent. If you want something,
you’re going to get it in, they will always find
a way [because] it stems from other problems.
(Prisoner)
Restricting the supply of illicit drugs has resulted in
a reduction of erratic and violent behaviour, however
the perceived ‘ten per cent’ still finding its way into the
prison has the potential to negatively impact the prison
regime and the experiences of those living and working
within the estate.
As part of the DRP, scanners were installed in
prisoner reception where men are administered into
and out of the prison and in visits. It could be argued
that the presence of the scanners has been most
successful in both detection and deterrence of
contraband entering the prison. Their presence was the
security measure that all participants (staff, prisoners
and visitors) were most aware of — this was due to a
number of reasons including the physical presence of
the scanners and promotion of their presence. 
An I-Scan body scanner with the capacity to detect
contraband that has been concealed internally was
installed in prisoner reception to search men when they
arrive at the prison and, when needed, in response to
intelligence-led searches within the prison. Staff were
mostly in agreement that this scanner has contributed
to a reduction in drugs entering the prison.
[A]ll the men go through the scanner in
reception, it picks up anything they’ve got on
them — and then they go into the security
cells. (Staff)
Scanner technology was attributed to successful
detection of contraband, and
staff also considered that this
scanner located in reception
acted as a potential deterrent to
those arriving at HMP Holme
House from other prisons:
[W]hen the prisoners are
coming from [HMP]
Durham, they know now
they’re going to get scanned
so that’s, like, you know:
‘Am I going to get caught?
Am I not going to get
caught?’ 50/50 chance.
(Staff)
The inspection of the prison
carried out in 2020 also
highlighted efficacy of the scanners for disrupting the
supply of illicit substances and the reduction in positive
drug test, but also questioned some of the procedures
that were used in conjunction with this. It stated:
‘Intelligence was managed well, and an
effective use of technology disrupted the
supply of illicit items. Positive drug testing
rates had dropped significantly. However,
some procedural security measures were
disproportionate for a category C prison.
The prison made excellent use of a body scanner to
detect illicit items, but all prisoners were also routinely
strip searched without risk assessment.’35
Whilst the technology was detecting contraband,









finding its way into
the prison.
35 HMP Holme House inspection report (2020) see note 25 (p.14).
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the scanner could be more successful with additional
staff training:
I think there’s a training need there for [all
staff who] are using the scanner […] those
that have been trained have expressed that
once they’ve been trained they know how
and what to look for, and it’s made a massive
difference in using the scanner and actually
identifying what’s in the human body. (Staff)
This point was reiterated by prisoners who, whilst
agreeing that the scanner in prison reception could act
as a deterrent, did question the efficacy of the scanner
to locate contraband:
I don’t think it’s worked. I know friends with
phones inside them and
they’ve come back with
them. (Prisoner)
Millimetre Wave Scanners
were trialled in the visiting area;
these scanners are similar to
those used in airports and detects
items that have been concealed
under a person’s clothing. Whilst
these scanners were initially
considered a successful deterrent,
they were quickly considered
unreliable because their main
purpose is detecting metal, rather
than organic material such as drugs that may be
entering the prison estate and so were removed from
use:
[O]ne of the scanners, the millimetre wave
scanner, after twelve months of recalibrating
it and making improvement in the sensitivity,
still wasn’t quite correct for a prison
environment. It’s better for the airports, but
certainly not for us. (Staff)
Staff members noted that although they thought
that this particular scanner was not appropriate, there
was the need for a scanner within the visit area as it
was suggested that this is probably one of the main
ways that drugs can enter the prison. One staff
participant highlighted plans to get a replacement
scanner that would be for the prisoners when they are
exiting visits, with the aim of identifying and removing
any restricted items.
[W]e are replacing [the millimetre wave
scanner] with a full, a body x ray   not a full
body one but just a torso scanner… so we will
have one in reception and one in the exit to
the visits area…we’re just trying to stop the
supply getting back into the residential units.
(Staff)
Visitors spoken to were largely not concerned
about the presence of the scanner, saying that they
understood the need for the prison to implement
searches such as this. However, several commented on
the impact of the scanner on their allotted visiting time.
It was suggested that if the prison were to implement
new scanners in the visit area, that visitors would prefer
to be scanned prior to rather than during visiting times
as this could limit potential time spent with family and
friends, especially for those who had to travel some
distance to the prison:
It just stalls it, it takes longer
to get in. […] Taking longer
to get in means you have
less visit time — visiting time
should start once you’re in
the visit room. (Visitor)
The Drug and Crime
Reduction Unit (DCRU) carry out
a range of intelligence-led
activities based on procedurally
just processes, with the aim of
restricting, reducing and
disrupting illicit drug supply and
use within the prison. Intelligence
is gathered from a range of sources and, from the
perspective of the staff spoken to, this has made a
positive contribution to the aims of the DRP:
We basically work off intelligence led
information coming off the house blocks or
staff, other prisoners, members of the public,
you know […]. We work off that and we
target the people who have the drugs. We
gather as much intelligence as we can, and it
seems to work really well. (Staff)
Alongside intelligence-led searches by the DCRU,
routine searches have continued, and the DCRU also
use technology that enables them to analyse drug finds
and to investigate confiscated mobile phone data. All of
these measures are an improvement on past practice
and have made a significant contribution to reducing
contraband items within the establishment.
Furthermore, in several interviews, staff suggested that
working in a more targeted way, using intelligence-led
interventions, was proving positive for fostering positive
relationships with prisoners, resulting in a better, safer
environment for everyone: 
...these scanners are
similar to those
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We’ve got a good relationship with the guys
[prisoners], that’s what we go around and do,
a lot of cell searching on an intel base, we
don’t go ‘willy nilly’. (Staff)
As well as searches of prisoners, staff are now
subject to more stringent and systematic searches as
they enter and leave the prison. Although for some this
was frustrating due to the time it could sometimes take
to get into and out of work (similar to comments made
by visitors), overall, this was seen by all those who were
interviewed as a positive procedural process. The
necessity of this was also highlighted, with some staff
acknowledging that a small number of staff could be
involved in bring in restricted items, including drugs.
Staff members commented
that the searching of staff on a
regular basis has acted as a
deterrent and while they
acknowledged that during busy
times you might not be searched,
the chance that you could be is
enough to deter staff:
[I]f there is corruption there,
one of the ways to help
reduce it or stop it, is to put
that search in place because
[…] even the random side of
things, puts that doubt into
their head as to whether
they will get searched or not.
So it’s a deterrent, a massive
deterrent (Staff).
Staff also discussed the use of dogs, and
commented that these should be used more routinely,
but understood that this was often not possible due to
the dogs not being deployed solely at Holme House.
The use of sniffer dogs for alerting staff to drugs was
discussed by some of the visitors, but because they had
noticed that the dogs were not used consistently, they
questioned the efficacy of this approach:
They do have sniffer dogs occasionally when
you’re waiting in the queue but it’s not all the
time (Visitor).
Well it’s a bit of a joke really because they use
the dogs but then if it gets busy and it’s
getting late, they stop using the dogs halfway
through (Visitor).
Other changes in procedural practices include the
photocopying of mail (prisoners receive the photocopy
rather than the original) and limiting personal
belongings that prisoners are allowed to bring into the
prison. Due to the practice of impregnating paper with
NPS, the procedure of photocopying mail was
considered by those who took part in the study, to be
one of the main ways of disrupting the supply of this
substance entering the prison:
I think, because they’ve started photocopying
the mail, you’re not getting the problems with
the spice coming in. (Staff)
They’ve stopped 90 per cent coming through,
by photocopying letters etc., but they will
never stop all of it. That 90
per cent has made a
difference. (Prisoner)
Prisoners compared their
experiences in HMP Holme House
with that of other prisons and the
current levels of security. The
deterrents discussed above — the
body scanner in prisoner
reception and the photocopying
of mail — were identified as the
two major differences in relation
to security; they then attributed
these measures to contributing to
the reduction in the supply of
drugs in HMP Holme House. 
Despite the
acknowledgement that the
photocopying of mail had
restricted the drug supply, the prisoners also discussed
the negative impact of this new security measure on
their daily lives. Prisoners no longer receive original
cards, pictures and photographs sent to them by family
and friends — this was described by the prisoners
spoken to as limiting access to family and friends,
particularly with regard to cards and pictures that
children may have made. Photocopying was also raised
as an issue by visitors to the prison, not only due to lack
of original correspondence, and the cost of alternatives,
such as using an online card service (e.g. moonpig.com,
funky pigeon.com) where the expense of using these
services can be difficult for families on limited budgets,
but also in relation to the time-lag of writing and
prisoners receiving the post, and for one visitor, this has
resulted in her stopping writing:
Letters have to be photocopied and he gets
the photocopy but that can take three weeks,
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As described in the findings, the reduction in
personal belongings appeared to be a positive step in
reducing supply of drugs, visitors raised concern about
their friend or family member’s access to clean clothes.
The men are only able to purchase goods through the
approved supplier, but this can be prohibitively
expensive for some and could have a negative impact
on the person’s well-being and self-esteem. 
Discussion 
The findings of this study suggest that the new
security measures that have been implemented since
the establishment of the DRP are perceived to have
been successful in reducing the quantities of illicit drugs
entering the prison, resulting in a perceived decline in
personal risk. This perception is supported by the data
from the Ministry of Justice that clearly demonstrates a
reduction in finds, and a reduction in positive MDT’s.
This is a crucial step in HMP Holme House’s endeavour
to bring about a positive change in the prison
environment in order to promote a recovery-focused
approach to drug rehabilitation. As positive as these
results are the 2020 HM Inspectorate report36 noted
how the reduction in drug finds, had also coincided
with an increase in finds of illicit alcohol within the
prison.
In 2019 the Government announced £100m to
increase security in prisons including a number of
measures that have been used in HMP Holme House.37
In 2020 HM Inspectorate38 stated that the funding had
been used effectively to improve the prisoner’s
outcomes and this included the use of searching,
technology and control of goods coming in. However,
whilst it appeared that the technology was successful in
detecting contraband, there was also a suggestion by
participants, particularly staff, that further training on
staff awareness and use of the scanner could result in
more contraband being found. This supports the
suggestion in the Prison Drug Strategy (2019)39 that
staff awareness and staff training both contribute to
restricting drug supplies entering the prison.
It is important to state that staff training should go
further than the use of the security systems and needs
to engage with the concept of procedural justice. As
described by Mann40, specialist staff training in
procedurally justice processes can help foster
relationships and garner understanding between staff
and prisoners. From the findings it was clear that the
staff on the DCRU team were selected for these roles
based on previous experience and have received the
specialist training. 
Staff explained that these searches are only carried
out based on intelligence and not, as one participant
phrased it ‘willy nilly’. Whilst this may be the case, these
searches can cause tensions as the perception from
some of the men was that sometimes individuals are
targeted based on hearsay, rather than legitimate
authority based on intelligence. Striking the balance
between security and decency is not easy and a lack of
information about the role of the DCRU and how it
operates can result in the men feeling victimised. Cell
searches and searching of individuals, for whatever
reason, can raise tensions but sharing information
clearly and regularly about the process of searching
individuals and cells, could reduce some of the negative
perceptions from prisoners. 
Conclusions 
The study was designed to explore the perception
of the men, staff and visitors on the use of increased
security measures within the DRP and to understand
key stakeholder views about how these have succeeded
in the aim to reduce the drug supply into the prison.
The study findings revealed that the participants
strongly perceived that the changes in security
measures had led to a decrease in the availability of
drugs within the prison, which in turn has led to a more
positive environment, with fewer instances of
disruption to the regime. Having an environment that
has less erratic and violent behaviour will hopefully
open up more opportunities to implement the third
element of the Prison Drug Strategy41, building an
environment that supports and fosters recovery. Overall,
the presence of the scanners and the photocopying of
mail appears to be the most successful in both
detection and deterrence of contraband entering the
prison, however this was not always well received. The
men and their visitors appeared to understand the need
for these security measures, however they discussed
ways that these can impact negatively on their daily
lives. In conclusion, the new security measures
implemented as part of the Drug Recovery Prison
appear to have had a positive impact in the prison and
this is evident in both the Ministry of Justice statistical
information and the qualitative data from this study.
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As Deputy Chief Constable, Jason Hogg is
responsible for the three counties of Oxfordshire,
Buckinghamshire and Berkshire. Jason joined
Thames Valley Police in June 2016 as an Assistant
Chief Constable (Crime and Criminal Justice)
before moving to be the Chief Officer lead for the
South East Counter Terrorism Unit and Regional
Organised Crime Unit.
Jason previously worked for Hampshire
Constabulary where he held a number of roles as a
Chief Superintendent including Head of Crime and
Head of Prevention and Neighbourhoods. He started his
police career at Cleveland Police in 1995 before
transferring to Hampshire in 2001.
Jason has spent most of his career working in
Criminal Investigation roles, serving as a Detective in
every rank. He spent a significant part of his career
investigating homicide offences and has delivered
training on the National Senior Investigation Officer
(SIO) development programme. During his career Jason
has been on extended secondments with Her Majesty’s
Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) and the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) working overseas in
Iraq. He is currently the National Policing lead for a
number of areas including Prisons, Lifetime offender
Management and Detective Resilience.
The interview took place in June 2020.
PC: What do you most enjoy about your work
and how does it compare to other areas of
policing?
JH: As the Deputy Chief Constable for Thames
Valley Police, I act as Chief Operating Officer for a £450
million organisation and all the diversity that comes
with such a large organisation. My role is to ensure that
our front line teams are making a difference, keeping
our communities safe and working hard internally to
provide appropriate support to our those staff. I value
that no day is ever the same in this role. As the National
Policing Lead for Prisons, I enjoy building close working
relationships with Her Majesties Prisons and Probation
Service (HMPPS) and giving a voice for policing in prison
settings. I also enjoy acting as an advocate for the
HMPPS in liaising with Chief Constables and Police and
Crime Commissioners, with a view to increasing
awareness about some of the challenges HMPPS faces
and establishing what the Police can do to assist. 
PC: Leaving aside the Coronavirus pandemic,
could you describe the relationship between
HMPPS and the Police? How has this changed in
recent times?
JH: I understand that in the past, at times there
was a somewhat tense relationship between the Police
and HMPPS. I have heard stories of meetings between
Home Office and Ministry of Justice officials and
ministers, where the Police and HMPPS have turned on
each other to blame each other for issues and
problems. I have received feedback that relationships in
general have improved significantly. I would now
describe the relationship as having a significant degree
of trust and understanding, at a senior level, between
the Police and HMPPS. I now regularly receive
telephone calls from somewhere in HMPPS around a
particular difficulty that the local police force might be
able to assist with. I think that overall, the relationship
is as good as it ever has been.
PC: What has been the impact on this
relationship and your work during the current
Coronavirus pandemic?
JH: I believe that COVID-19 has seen limited
impact on the relationship between HMPPS and the
Police so far. Although prisons on an individual basis
have had to significantly change how they work, there
have been very few people being sentenced to custody
through the impact of the pandemic on courts. This has
allowed us the opportunity during this time, to work in
the background on improving our outcomes as a
partnership. Personally, I have been involved with the
National Criminal Justice System Gold group, which is
chaired by HMPPS, and my team have been active in
working with Prisons and Probation on the End of
Custody Temporary Release (ECTR) scheme, which
focused on delivering early release plans to decant
prisoners from custody who were coming to the end of
their sentences. The good relationships that we have
built in the preceding years have provided the
foundation to allow us to work effectively together on
this project, and in particular I was able to represent the
views of local police forces at an early stage of the
concept. The final model that was agreed on and
implemented, from a policing perspective, was sound
including the relevant checks, balances and risk
Effective police and prison collaboration
Jason Hogg is the Deputy Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police. He is interviewed by Paul Crossey, Deputy
Governor at HMP The Mount.
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management around early release, and ensured that
local forces could effectively manage those people in
the community.
The pandemic has caused some tensions and
stresses with other partners besides HMPPS, but
reflecting on the work we are engaged in with HMPPS,
I do not believe there will be a long-term negative
impact. All parties will have to develop different ways of
working in the medium to long term, and potentially
there may be discussions to be had around the size of
the prison population in response to the pandemic.
Nationally, a number of police forces have been using
the lockdown period to solve historic crime. For
example, my own police force
have significantly increase the
arrest rate during lockdown,
mainly due to officers being able
to locate suspects much easier
than before. As these cases
progress forward through the
justice system, that is likely to
create further pressure for the
prison service. It is therefore
strategically important to ensure
that each agency’s efforts are
joined up and there is mutual
understanding of the impacts on
each other. This is applicable to
either releasing prisoners early or
having more or fewer prisoners in
custody. 
PC: The level of assaults
against prison staff is very
concerning. In a number of
cases, prisoners appear to be
engaging in these acts as a
means to an end, rather than
a targeted attack based on a specific grievance.
What is being done in HMPPS to assist successful
prosecutions in these circumstances and are
prosecutions a meaningful deterrent?
JH: There is a significant challenge within prisons
around the extent of violence and violent offences are
at an all-time high. From the figures that I have seen
there has been a more than 50 per cent increase in
assaults on prison officers over the last three years. I
think this is something we should all be concerned
about not just those working within the prison sector
because there are significant risks for the whole of the
criminal justice system being undermined.
There are two key areas of work in relation to this.
Firstly, in relation to assaults on prison officers, there are
parallels with policing. Three or four years ago the
attitude of police forces towards officers being
assaulted was ‘it’s just part of the job’. However, as a
result of pressure and complaints from the police
federation, forces now deal with assaults on officers
much more seriously. We have developed a national
seven-point plan about the minimum level of service an
officer who is assaulted should expect to receive. I have
shared this plan with HMPPS colleagues who have now
developed and recently published an eight-point plan
for HMPPS. I think HMPPS need to develop a culture
whereby assaulting a prison officer is viewed as totally
unacceptable and when it does occur, to ensure that
the ‘wrap-around’ support is in place. I am not
suggesting that policing has necessarily got everything
right, especially when you consider the media reports
highlighting the significant
increase of assaults on police
officers as a result of the
pandemic lock down. However, I
do believe that the mind-set
within forces in relation to
officers who are assaulted has
changed and that police officers
now receives a better service than
in the past.
Secondly, in relation to the
wider issue of violence in prisons
in general, a Crime in Prisons
Protocol was agreed in 2019
between the CPS, the Police
service and HMPPS. This protocol
sets out minimum standards
about the types of crime police
forces should investigate and
which cases the CPS should be
taking to court. I am very
confident that when partners at
a local level follow the guidance
in that document, violence within
prisons will undoubtedly be prioritised and will receive
a more consistent service, with more offenders being
brought to justice. 
Clearly, for this to be a deterrent the outcome
needs to be effective. Previously, what we found
anecdotally is that there were some individual prisons
that were over reporting crimes to the police, some of
which could have been dealt with far more effectively
through the adjudication system. For example, if
somebody is already serving a long sentence, then
spending time, resources and money through the
police, CPS and court services, to secure a small number
of days added to a sentence, would have a limited
impact. However, we have also noted prisons who
report very little crime to the police, quite possibly
because of a lack of confidence based on the service
they have received in the past. I believe there needs to
be a deterrent and I think it’s important, especially for
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through action taken internally by the prison service or
by the police. Prisoners who seriously assault prison
officers should expect to be charged and receive
substantial sentences regardless.
PC: The government has pledged £100million
to improve prison security, most notably by
introducing airport style screening processes in a
number of prisons. In your view will this have an
impact on security, crime and the illicit economy
and what more needs to be done? 
JH: It will undoubtedly assist in this area and I am
very confident that, with the right funding, many of the
routes by which contraband enters prisons could be
‘designed out’. Clearly, the measures proposed will act
as a deterrent and make it more difficult for, for
example, visitors smuggling
contraband into prisons.
However, we know that prisoners
are remarkably innovative when it
comes to servicing the illicit
economy and very effective at
exploiting any vulnerability in the
system. Therefore, we need to
ensure for all agencies involved,
that we have a dynamic, ongoing
plan to quickly address emerging
trends as prisoners find ways of
working around the new security
measures. 
Remaining one-step ahead is
a challenge but is not all about
money. Even though I think with
appropriate funding we could design out a majority of
the issues, it is also about getting the basics right. In
2019 we published a report of best practice as a result
of findings from the Drugs Task Force that visited
prisons across the estate. The task force included a
senior police officer seconded in to offer expert advice.
For example, ensuring routine searching, joint
operations with local police forces, sharing of visitor lists
between the police and prisons and the examination of
mobile telephone data to understand the criminal
networks that are in operation, could all assist in us
jointly using our resources more effectively and
significantly impacting the supply of contraband. A
good example of this was a prison that had agreed with
a local police force to routinely park a police car outside
the prison at visiting times. This car did not need to
have an officer present, however, they did find that the
number of visitors that arrived against those planned
dropped between a third and half. After considering all
other factors, they concluded that by that one car being
there they reduced the number of attempts at
trafficking with nil cost. I think that overall by having
close working relationships with individual police forces
and individual prisons, we can make a difference
without significant costs, just by working together more
effectively.
PC: Serious and organised criminals use
mobile phones, money service businesses and
corrupt staff amongst other techniques to
continue their criminality whilst in custody.
Considering the challenges of maintaining the
basic fabric of some sites, do HMPPS and the
Police have the technical capability, flexibility and
funding to meet this evolving challenge in
prisons?
JH: I am unable to go into significant levels of
detail, however, there have been significant strides
ahead and enhancements within HMPPS around how
serious organised crime is
tackled. We now have the
HMPPS Serious and Organised
Crime Teams (SOC) in place
across the country, with specialist
capability in a number of areas
such as financial investigation.
Those HMPPS SOC teams align
with the nine regional police
Regional Organised Crime units
which assist partnership working
at a local level. Furthermore,
within the last twelve months we
have signed a new memorandum
of understanding around
corruption cases and intelligence
including how intelligence is
shared between the police and HMPPS and how we
work together to manage corruption. Those two things
in themselves are leading to a much more joined up
approach in how we tackle serious and organised crime
linked to the prison estate. I am very confident in terms
of progress we have made and certainly some of those
cases the teams are starting to resolve.
PC: Prison staff corruption can undermine
trust from prisoners, colleagues and the public in
the effective operation of prisons. What more can
be done to protect vulnerable staff and deter or
catch those determined to engage in misconduct
in this way?
JH: The relationship between prisoner and prison
officer is quite unique and very different from the
relationship that police officers have with offenders. It is
important to set expectations from the start around
behaviour and creating the right culture particularly
focussed on upholding ethical standards. Secondly, I
think it is important to have a robust vetting process,
which needs to be regularly reviewed, as individual
personal circumstances can change, leaving them
The relationship
between prisoner
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vulnerable to an approach by an organised crime
group. What we have found in the police is that by
regularly re-vetting our staff, particularly those in high
risks posts, we come across issues such as debt which is
a real indicator of risk. I think it would be no different
for our prison officer colleagues. Thirdly, I think there
needs to be an investment into proactive monitoring
and resources in place that can develop intelligence and
target staff who are suspected of being corrupt,
making sure there are anonymous reporting lines in
place and being used. Probably more importantly, there
is a need to ensure that staff who are put under
pressure or receive threats, for
example, can access support for
themselves and their families.
Staff confidence to report
inappropriate approaches by
prisoners is essential.
In those few cases where
there are corrupt prison staff who
are arrested and charged and
dismissed, there is a need to
ensure that we maximise
opportunities for publicity as a
deterrent. There have been a
number of cases recently where
members of prison staff,
including those who have only
been in the service for a matter
of months, have received
substantial sentences at court.
Therefore, there is a need to
balance awareness of the risks
prison officers face but also a
clear awareness of the impact
and consequences of that type of
behaviour.
PC: Given the recent change in legislation to
extend the custodial element of terrorism related
offences, what work is being undertaken across
HMPPS and the Police to prepare for the eventual
release of these prisoners?
JH:We have seen several terrorist attacks in recent
months linked to prisons or recent prison releases.
Counter terrorism work has led to the police, prisons
and probation services developing extremely strong
links and established working practices. The release of
prisoners is managed through the Pathfinder process,
which is reviewed every time there is a terrorist incident
linked to prisons, to identify learning and how we can
develop the system further. However, the main issue is
the problems associated with lone actors who present
unique challenges and one of the highest risk areas
around the terrorism threat. However, I am very
confident that there is an absolute commitment to the
agencies working together to make ongoing
improvements in relation to the pathfinder process.
PC: How should HMPPS respond to the issue
of those prisoners who are prepared to become
martyrs during violent attacks, potentially whilst
in custody, when the basis of good order and
discipline in prisons is based on good relationships
between staff and prisoners? 
JH: It is crucial to take a two-fold approach. Firstly,
it is important for good order and discipline that prison
officers endeavour to have professional relationships
with prisoners, particularly those
deemed dangerous. Having those
relationships is an opportunity in
itself to gather intelligence on
prisoner mind-sets and
behaviour. Secondly, there is a
need to be proactive at gathering
intelligence on their backgrounds
and associations. We then have a
more complete picture of the
mind-set and ideology of terrorist
prisoners. Clearly, predicting how
an individual is going to behave
is very difficult and in some ways
counter terrorism is no different
from other areas such as sex
offenders. In reality the people
who tend to reoffend and
commit further serious offences
are not the high-risk individuals.
The reason for this is that those
high-risk individuals have a
significant amount of resources
invested in them, providing
support and ongoing monitoring. The very serious
offences tend to be committed by medium risk
offenders and clearly with the resources we have you
cannot give the same level of service to every single
nominal. Therefore a joint, overt approach and covert
approach I described above, is the best way to really
understand the mind-set of these individuals.
PC: Thousands of Police officers in the
community have been issued with Tasers for over
ten years. Based on this experience and recent
serious incidents in prisons such as HMP
Whitemoor, what are your views on the planned
introduction of PAVA spray and rigid bar
handcuffs? Would you advocate the use of Tasers
in a custodial environment?
JH: It is not appropriate for me to advise HMPPS on
what protective measures need to be put in place in
individual prisons. However, there is a difficult balance
between equipping staff to ensure they are protected
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appropriately, without creating an environment where
high levels of force are used routinely. Any increase in
the levels of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) or
protective measures need to be matched by ongoing
governance of use of force to make sure confidence is
retained in the individual prison and the system. When
it comes to Tasers, despite what we often see on social
media, their actual use is surprisingly rare by the police.
In the majority of occasions where it is used, the officer
points it at someone and never actually deploys it, yet
that remains an effective deterrent in itself. I could
envisage a Taser being used in an extreme case on a
single violent offender and that’s where it tends to be
effective. However, that would need to be considered
very carefully because of the risks involved in effectively
having weapons within the prison estate.
PC: Sexual assaults that occur in prisons could
well be one of the most underreported crimes in
prisons1. Given the difficulty
of prosecuting sexual crimes
in the public and the ‘prisoner
code’ of not informing or
appearing to be ‘weak’, how
can prisons best support
potential victims? 
JH: I think there may be
some learning from the police
service. The police approach to
managing offences of rape and
other sexual offences has
developed significantly in the last
thirty years, based on academic research and insights
from organisations who support survivors of abuse. As
an example, my own force (Thames Valley) use
behavioural economics research to encourage the
ongoing engagements of survivors of rape with the
police. It is important that we work with support
organisations to lead awareness campaigns to improve
confidence in reporting sexual offences. We have seen
a significant rise in reports of rape across the UK over
the last ten years and these reports continue to increase
as a result of increased confidence amongst survivors to
report those incidents. When there are cases within the
custody estate, it is important to publicise clear
messaging to demonstrate what will happen when
someone does report an incident. I think using those
cases for ongoing communication and publicity is really
important to help build that confidence. 
PC: The police are recruiting intensely to meet
targets set by the prime minister on officer
numbers and anecdotally a number of prison
officers are leaving to take up these roles. What
can the prison service learn from the police to help
recruit and retain our staff?
JH: I think that it is fair to say that the Police
Service does not have a problem recruiting sufficient
numbers of officers. Most forces will open their
recruitment windows for a short space of time and
regularly receive ten to twenty times the number of
applications that are needed to fill vacancies. The
challenge the police have is recruiting people who are
representative of local communities. A number of police
forces are sending dedicated teams of officers into
some of our most diverse communities and building
greater trust, encouraging people to apply, putting
positive action measures in place and providing more
support to applicants from BAME backgrounds to help
them through the application process. That is showing
some early signs of being effective. There are some
communities that are hard to
reach and we have to invest
resources and work harder if we
really do want a representative
workforce.
A far bigger challenge than
recruitment in the police is
retention. Police officers gain
highly marketable skills as part of
their training, which can
encourage them to consider
other professions. Therefore, it is
ever more important, not just in
policing but in the wider public
sector, to create an organisation where people feel
valued at work. Everybody joins the police service or the
prison service because they want to make a difference
and make society a better place. I believe that it is
important to keep reminding people of this and making
sure people feel recognised, thanked for their work,
that there’s proper training, personal protection, flexible
working opportunities and ongoing career prospects.
There is a great deal of research, which highlights the
value of giving people a sense of autonomy in the work
place as well as opportunities to develop their career.
This certainly applies in the public sector, where sadly
our pay is not what it is in the private sector, therefore
we need to work hard at retaining our staff by making
sure that the working environment is supportive and
people are given development opportunities.
PC: In February 2020 Her Majesty’s
Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue
Services (HMICFRS) said the public is increasingly
losing confidence in reporting crime to the police
Sexual assaults that
occur in prisons




1. Stevens, A. (2015) Sex in prison: experiences of former prisoners. London: Howard League for Penal Reform, Commission on Sex in
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as they struggle to investigate all crimes. Is this
the case for prisoners and staff in custody or are
there differences? 
JH: The recently developed HMPPS Crime Data
tracker will provide more accurate statistics to address
this issue. However, anecdotal data suggests that there
is significant disparity in the reported crimes from
individual Prisons. I believe that results from a mixture
of some over reporting of crime that could be more
effectively dealt with via internal means using the
adjudication system, and a lack of confidence in the
police and CPS being able to produce results when
crimes are reported. That is why the Crime in Prison
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that was
agreed in 2019 is so important. I
am confident that if individual
prisons and police forces follow
the principals of that MOU, it will
significantly improve the issue
around consistency. We already
know what works and best
practice in this field include those
police forces that: have dedicated
crime surgeries on a regular basis;
meetings between dedicated
prison staff and investigators
who understand how to
investigate crime in prisons;
ensuring workloads are regularly
reviewed; assessments are made
about how to make referrals;
victims receive regular updates;
and any issues around prisoner
transfers and prison officer
statements are addressed. 
PC: Professor Dame Carol Black’s recent
report2 suggested that the illegal drug supply cost
the UK £20 billion with only a small fraction of
that spent on treatment and prevention. She
suggested that enforcement activity can have
unintended consequences. Is there more that
could be done by enforcement in prisons and is
there anything prisons can learn from the police
and wider community to help prevent illegal drug
supply and demand in prisons?
JH: HMPPS staff often tell me that drugs are the
root cause of the violence in prisons. We know that 20
per cent of prisoners who have random drug tests test
positive and approximately some prisoners report
leaving the prison estate with a drug problem. At the
same time drug seizures in Prisons (prior to COVID) the
highest that it has been since records began. Across
government and the effected agencies there is an
increasing appreciation that prosecution as a sole
solution, will not work to tackle the problem of drugs.
Dame Carol Black’s report discusses how the
importance of more investment in treatment and
recovery, in line with the Government’s Drug Strategy,
will reduce the need for enforcement and supply.
Within police forces there is a greater emphasis on a
public health-based approach to drug possession. My
own force, Thames Valley Police, are part of an initiative
where we do not arrest individuals who are found in
possession of drugs, including class A drugs, and
instead divert them to a health-based drug advisory
service. I would encourage a
similar approach within prisons.
The clear aim for prisoners to
stop taking drugs and we need to
be open to any approach that is
effective in making this happen. I
feel that a health-based
alternative is more likely to be
more effective in the long term. I
believe enforcement will always
have a role because there will
always be some people who are
not prepared to be helped and it
is important to restrict the supply
by targeting those smuggling
drugs into prison.
PC: In his last annual
report, the chief inspector of
prisons said that ‘last
year…too many of our
prisons had become
unacceptably violent and
dangerous places. The situation has not improved
— in fact it has become worse’. What are the key
solutions to the prison crisis and can we learn
anything from policing? Are the solutions
financial, strategic or moral?
JH: Many of the prison officers I speak to would
agree with the findings from the chief inspector of
prisons around prisons being violent places to work in.
There are no easy solutions to this and there is no one
thing that would solve the problem. Firstly, I believe that
with appropriate funding we could design out some of
the violent behaviour. Secondly, I think there needs to
be a way of controlling the extent of the violence so
that prison officers have the time and space to focus on
the rehabilitation of offenders. If that is not possible,
prison officers will spend their time fire-fighting
There are no easy
solutions to this and
there is no one
thing that would
solve the problem.






2. Black, C. (2020) Review of Drugs. UK Government. See https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/independent-review-of-drugs-by-
professor-dame-carol-black
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demands, dealing with drugs and violence constantly.
There is an issue about the wider criminal justice system
being undermined if violence is allowed to continue
unchecked. We cannot prosecute our way out of this
problem and often these offenders are already serving
long sentences. 
However, targeting police action can help. For
example, in the South West region there was a
particular problem of prisoners carrying weapons. By
utilising the Crime in Prison Protocol, that issue became
a local priority for individual prisons in that region. The
local police force(s) prioritised investigating those cases
where prisoners were found in possession of weapons
which lead to a decrease in violence in those prisons
because prisoners knew with certainty that they would
face swift punishment if they were caught. This
approach was effective because it was used in a more
focussed way on investigating priority crimes, rather
than trying to investigate all crimes of violence. 
More widely, the main learning from the police
approach towards managing violence in our
communities, is an offender management approach
and in particular our dedicated offender managers
managing our high-risk offenders. We have become
better at predicting the times and places where violence
occurs and identifying those individuals that pose the
most risk in terms of violence. I am aware that this
happens in prisons already, but it is crucial to invest in
improving understanding of prisoners who are likely to
behave in a violent way and having more bespoke plans
that prevent violence occurring.
PC: The Lammy review pointed to evidence
that safety in prison and reoffending rates can be
improved if all prisoners feel that they are being
treated fairly. How can we improve trust in
prisons for BAME prisoners in light of the issues
surrounding the Black Lives Matters protests?
JH: This is a significant challenge not just for
HMPPS or the Police but also wider agencies across the
nation. Firstly, we need to ensure that we are
representative of the communities we serve. There is a
great deal of research that links trust and confidence in
public sector organisations and with levels of
representation. People need to look at the police or the
prison service and see themselves represented there to
have confidence that they will be treated fairly. That
requires a great deal of proactive work. In policing,
initiatives over the last 20 years to support this have not
delivered the progress we would have liked, so we need
to be more innovative in finding different ways to
encourage more applicants from some of our more
diverse communities. 
Secondly, it is important that we develop the
independent scrutiny of our processes, policies and
working practices. It is not only important that these
independent advisory groups are in place, but also that
they are made up of the right people. This means they
need to be both representative and have the voice of
lived experience, which includes ex-offenders. Progress
in this area is being made, but it is slow. Those of us in
leadership roles across the agencies need to work a
harder at this challenge. I think that the Black Lives
Matters protests are both a challenge and an opportunity
for us as a catalyst to do something different to make
sure we are representative of our local communities and
provide a fair and equitable service to all. 
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Introduction
The experience of anti-corruption interventions
the world over is that an incorrect diagnosis leads
to an inadequate response. Prisons, in the UK and
elsewhere, are ideal environments for corruption
to thrive. Yet there is little available research or
literature on the nature, extent and prevalence of
corruption in prisons. Where there have been
studies, references to corruption have usually
been a minor part of works whose primary focus
is elsewhere. On the specific subject of corruption,
the focus has generally not been on corrupt staff,
although a classic corruption analysis would show
them as high risk. Other corruption risks also exist
in the prisons environment, such as within
procurement, and it is possible that these risks
have been compounded by performance
management KPIs and aspects of privatisation.
In the UK, the Government and relevant
authorities appear until very recently to have neglected
the level and seriousness of the risk. The situation is
likely to be improving, but significant corruption risks
still exist within the UK prisons system. Despite the
paucity of data and information, there are identifiable
research needs and a requirement for a research
community to be pro-actively developed around this
issue. Having reviewed the available literature and data,
this paper concludes with nine proposed research areas
and six policy recommendations to ameliorate the
corruption that exists today within the UK prisons
system.
The extent to which the UK prison system suffers
from corruption has been a subject of debate, and not
consensus, both inside and outside the prison system.
The leaked findings of a 2006 Metropolitan police
report2 on prison staff corruption, claiming that there
were at least 1,000 corrupt prison staff working within
the prison estate, received a divided reaction from
officials.3. Although the debate has continued, there
has been very little analytical deliberation, such that
policy makers have not much better access to evidence
today than they had in 2006. 
A conventional approach to analysing corruption
in any sector would be to ask some basic questions:
q What form or forms does the corruption take?
q What is the scale and prevalence of the
problem?
q What is the harm and who are the victims?
q What measures have been taken to prevent
or detect the corruption?
q How successful have those measures been?
It is not possible to provide answers to any of these
fundamental question in relation to prisons within the
UK.4 Although it is not uncommon for there to be an
absence of data when analysing corruption, it is
unusual not to be able to answer any of these questions
in a high-risk sector. 
In the absence of data or evidence about
corruption itself, a common approach is to look at
corruption risk. This would address the question ‘how
likely is it that corruption will be occurring?’
A typology of how corruption occurs in a given
sector or setting can typically be constructed from
known cases, and the risks can be analysed both
individually and in aggregate, with mitigation,
prevention, detection and enforcement strategies
designed to reduce the risks to acceptable levels. But as
with corruption analysis, there is also a paucity of
information with regard to corruption risk analysis in
relation to prisons.
This does not mean that is not possible to research
corruption in prisons. There is scope for qualitative and
quantitative data collection; for example, by way of
surveys or one-on-one interviews with key actors in
Corruption in UK Prisons: a critical
evaluation of the evidence base
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establishments. These data may elicit knowledge based
on perceptions or experience and although corruption
is an activity, often a crime, that takes place out of the
public eye, and it is in the interests of all parties involved
to keep it secret, such obstacles to research have been
overcome in other areas. Indeed, it is not uncommon
for the subject matter of corruption in prisons to arise
as part of research exercises not directly on this topic.5
This situation is not unique to the UK. The
literature regarding corruption in prisons is extremely
sparse, and has focussed primarily on the US and
Australia, as well as some extreme examples such as
Abu Ghraib.
This is all the more striking because at face value,
it might be expected that prisons
are not only at risk of corruption,
but in a particularly high-risk
category. They are institutions
whose population contains a
significant number of people
convicted of criminal offenses,
often with internal and external
links to organised crime. They are
closed worlds with little
continuous external scrutiny. The
staff are often poorly-paid,
whereas some of those
imprisoned have considerable
assets. The exercise of power is a
daily reality, and therefore the
abuse of power is a daily
possibility. The internal sub-rosa
economy has a demand for
supply from the external
economy, but a very small
number of potential supply
points. It is hard to envisage that there could be more
fertile conditions for corruption to thrive, and indeed in
both factual and fictional accounts of life in prison,
corruption is accepted as a daily reality.
It is a plausible hypothesis that one of the principle
reasons for the lack of research in this area is the lack of
sympathy for the victims. Those who research
corruption in healthcare, or education, or the police,
can demonstrate the wider harm that is done and the
damage and injustice for the victims among general
populations or vulnerable groups. In the case of prisons,
there is no generally accepted narrative about the
external damage that is done by corruption that takes
place within the prison system. The closest in the UK
context is perhaps the national Anti-Corruption
Strategy, which states:
‘Corruption has the potential to weaken critical
state functions like our border controls and prison
system — allowing criminality and corrupt insiders to
operate unfettered, and to undermine our attempts to
reform individuals…. Corruption in prisons allows
criminality to proliferate (including serious organised
crime) and thereby not only undermines safety and
security in prisons but also our
efforts to reform prisons and
rehabilitate offenders.’6
Within prisons, as in any
community, there are of course
both victims and perpetrators of
corruption: in this case among
the 80,422 prisoners in the UK
prison estate,7 plus around
36,000 staff.8 In circumstances
where the family members of
prisoners may also be implicated
in corruption, they too can be
considered as potential victims —
not least as involvement in
corrupt act may be a means of
protecting their imprisoned friend
or family member — although
they are more usually viewed as
perpetrators.9 Little has been
heard of the voices of victims of
corruption within prisons, and
there is a little indication that even if the voices were
heard telling a message of serious harm done by
corruption to the prison population, there would be
much response.
Sources of information10
There are four broad types of source material for







on the US and




5. For example, during the third author’s ethnographic research on family contact in prisons and a recent project on communication
practices in the prison environment. 
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Corruption_Strategy_WEB.pdf (Accessed: 22 June 2020)
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i. Studies of corruption, governance and
integrity, which might be extrapolated to
prisons; these would include both general
studies, and studies of sectors that might be
considered to be analogous; examples are the
work on institutional integrity by Paul
Heywood,11 or articles on corruption in the
police.12
ii. Studies and reports of other aspects of prisons,
in which corruption is a minor or incidental
part, even if its importance is acknowledged;
examples would be the Blakey report,13 Jamie
Bennett’s book The Working Lives of Prison
Managers,14 the Ministry of Justice report of
2016 into Prison Safety and Reform,15 and the
Policy Exchange
‘Coming Clean’ report of
2010.16
iii. Technical guidance
notes and plans on
corruption in relation to
prisons issued by
relevant authorities;
examples are the HMPPS
Framework of 2019, the
NOMS Instructions of
2016 and the UK’s Anti-
Corruption Strategy
2017-22.
iv. Studies or reports
specifically of corruption
in prisons. In this last category, there is a
notable absence of not only academic
literature, but any literature at all, and in
particular in relation to UK prisons. 
The only report that definitively covers UK prisons
in a corruption context is a section of the Transparency
International report titled ‘Corruption in the UK:
Assessment of Key Sectors’.17 However, this report is
now 9 years old, and therefore does not reflect recent
changes. 
The most comprehensive piece of ‘grey’ literature
on corruption risks in UK prisons is a widely-cited report
by BuzzFeed News, ‘The Secret Prison Corruption
Epidemic the Government Doesn’t Want You To Know
About.’18 The report uses in depth analysis of the 2006
HMP Pentonville corruption scandal to highlight wider
systemic issues. 
The article by Katie Fish, with contributions from Phil
Wheatley and Mark Pyman, on the Curbing Corruption
website19 gives a good overview of research to date,
collated by experts in the field of corruption. It draws on
a key text by the Australian
researchers Goldsmith, Halsey and
Groves, whose 2016 volume
‘Tackling Correctional Corruption:
An Integrity Promoting Approach’,
introduces an approach called
‘correctional integrity’.20 The work
attempts to fill many of the gaps
highlighted in this paper, for
example in establishing a
language and typology for
corruption in prisons. Although
the principle focus is Australia, the
work also encompasses the US
and the UK.
The same authors have put
together an extremely helpful ‘Literature Review:
Correctional Corruption — Final Report Prepared for
Queensland Corrective Services’ published in 2018.21 This is
the fullest available bibliography of corruption in prisons.
Regarding the UK specifically, apart from the 2011
Transparency International report, the only available
Studies and reports
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works are from the former head of the Corruption
Prevention Unit, John Podmore. His accounts, in large
part based on first-hand experience, are unflattering
about the extent to which the problem of corruption
was understood and acknowledged, taking the view
that the relevant authorities in the UK are ‘in denial’
about corruption in prisons.22
The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crimes
(UNODC), which has within its remit both the
secretariat to the UN Convention Against Corruption
(UNCAC) and the lead on organised crime, has
published practical guidance on how to address
corruption in prisons. Drafted by John Podmore and
published in 2017, it is the most comprehensive
practical guidance available.23
Although it is common for the papers above to
bemoan how little research there is on corruption in
prisons, it is encouraging that the situation has been
improving. A picture of
corruption in prisons is gradually
taking shape. It is not a big
community of researchers, but
one that exists. There is a great
deal of first-hand experience,
particularly from former prison
governors. However, the
considerable corruption expertise
that lies with both academics and
practitioners in other sectors and
fields has not to date been
brought to bear on prisons. 
Official definitions of
corruption in the UK prison system
Building a sensible response to corruption in any
sector requires an understanding of what is meant by
corruption. This is typically achieved through a generic
definition, supported by some sort of typology,
illustrated with examples or case studies. There is as yet
no global consensus on what this looks like for prisons.
Most usefully, in the absence of an established
typology, is the categorisation of five ‘harmful practices’
in correctional settings from Goldsmith et al:24
q Inappropriate relationships
q Trafficking of contraband
q Assaults, use of force and control
q Misuses of prisoner information
q Procurement.
Efforts have also been made by the relevant
authorities in the UK to establish a working definition.
The current definition of corruption in HMPPS’s 2019
‘Counter Corruption and Reporting Wrongdoing
Framework’ is ‘a person in a position of authority or
trust who abuses their position for benefit or gain for
themselves or another person.’25
This builds on the 2016 guidance note for ‘staff in
prisons and headquarters’:
‘Corruption occurs when a person in a position of
authority or trust abuses their
position for their or another
person’s benefit or gain. In
NOMS, this would include the
misuse of their role in order to
plan or commit a criminal act, or
a deliberate failure to act to
prevent criminal behaviour’. This
includes actual or attempted
conveying of restricted items into
prisons, aiding escape,
unauthorised disclosure of
information, accepting or seeking
bribes, inappropriate
relationships, blackmail, taking or
seeking money or other favours for commercial
purposes, for moving or reclassifying prisoners, or theft
of prisoner’s money or property.’26
Almost identical is the NOMS Instruction of 2016
for the Probation Service — the variances are italicised
in each version27 — which states: 
‘Corruption occurs when a person in a position of
authority or trust abuses their position for their or
Corruption occurs
when a person in a
position of authority
or trust abuses their
position for their or
another person’s
benefit or gain.
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another person’s benefit or gain. In NOMS, this would
include the misuse of their role in order to plan or
commit a criminal act, or a deliberate failure to act to
prevent criminal behaviour.’ Examples of corruption
include (but are not limited to) unauthorised or
improper drafting and amending of all reports, records
and licence conditions, unauthorised disclosure of
information, accepting or seeking bribes, inappropriate
relationships, blackmail, taking or seeking money or
other favours for any reason, or theft of money or
property.’28
These disparities in the two NOMS instructions can
be seen as an attempt to tailor the definition to
different audiences. However, the result is two
definitions that are each complex, do not precisely
match, and may therefore muddy
an already complicated subject.
The potential for confusion at this
level — two slightly varying
definitions within the same
organisation — would usually be
avoided in anti-corruption
approaches, and in some
organisations might be indicative
of a turf war.
Notwithstanding the
variances, the two NOMS
definitions and the HMPPS
definition are broadly in line with
standard definitions, including
that of Transparency International
cited in the UK’s National Anti-
Corruption Strategy: ‘There is no
universally accepted definition of corruption, but it is
generally understood to involve the abuse of office and
position to benefit a third party (an individual, business
or other organisation), in return for payment or other
reward. These features are captured in Transparency
International’s definition: ‘the misuse of entrusted
power for personal gain.’’29
The HMPPS Framework of 2019 goes on to
elaborate on its definition by stating that, ‘abusing their
position’ may include acting in a way that constitutes a
breach in their official duties. This importantly clarifies
that turning a blind eye to corruption issues still
constitutes a corruption offence. The ‘benefit or gain’
section of the definition relates to sexual, financial,
emotional or other personal gains that can occur within
the prison environment. 
This HMPPS definition further notes that staff may
be encouraged to act in a corrupt manner based on
causes they consider noble — in other words,
corruption by prison staff would not necessarily need to
be for personal gain. These noble causes refer to
officers breaking the rules and committing acts of
corruption for reasons that they perceive to be ‘right’.30
This has been a long-standing theme of literature in
relation to police corruption. Whatever the motivation,
acts of corruption remain illegal and damaging. The
NOMS Instruction of 2016 is clear on this: ‘Corruption,
as defined in this Instruction, will not be tolerated no
matter what the form or the
motivation.’31
The two NOMS Instructions
of 2016 both contain the same
annex with twenty-two examples
of what constitutes corruption.
By the HMPPS Framework of
2019, this had been reduced to
ten. Taken together, these three
documents tell an interesting
story. There is a genuine attempt
to fill the gaps in defining
corruption, describing the risks
and creating an adequate
management system. Clear
progress is made between 2016
and 2019. 
However, the documents are
complex and look as though they would be hard to use
in practice. They give the impression that they have
been generated by an institution that is used to
procedural thoroughness, extensive cross-referencing,
and thinking hard about how to reduce the possibility
of things going wrong by putting in place extensive
systems and detailed instructions. Perhaps most
notably, the documents incorporate several ingredients
from good practice approaches to anti-corruption
compliance in other sectors, but ultimately read as
though they are quite divorced from those settings.
What is also very unclear is whether they are built
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prevalence of corruption in prisons. If the evidence does
exist somewhere within the prison service, it has
certainly never been published.
Staff corruption as a contraband trafficking route
Most of the rare independent research into prison
corruption assumes that staff corruption in relation to
contraband is an important part of the picture. By
contrast, analyses of contraband trafficking have
tended not to highlight corrupt prison staff or ascribe
them a primary role as a trafficking route.32 This is
distinctly counter-intuitive from the perspective of anti-
corruption theory as the classic conditions for staff
corruption exist: low-paid, de-motivated and poorly-
valued public officials (prison officers and civilian staff)
who are in a position of considerable discretion (their
daily interactions with prisoners) that enables them to
offer an advantage (access to drugs). To compound this,
in recent years the privatisation of areas of the prisons
system (and diminishing pay scales and pension
provision) may have led to an environment in which
institutional culture and loyalty to the public service
ethos might not be expected.
Given what is known from around the world about
the corruption risks for public officials, particularly in
relation to organised crime, the default assumption
might reasonably be that bribery or coercion occurs
relatively frequently
within prisons.
While it is possible
that corruption is
being deliberately












There is surprisingly little data, or academic
literature, on the most widely used routes that either
organised crime gangs or individual offenders use to
bring in drugs and mobile phones into UK prisons. 33
From the academic literature which is available, the
following routes are often highlighted:
q visits from domestic visitors (for example
family members) and official visitors (such as
legal professionals)34
q the exploitation of the prison postal system
q drugs being passed over prison walls,
specifically in reference to the use of drones
q new and returning inmates bringing drugs
into prisons
q corrupt staff members working within an
institution smuggling in contraband.35 
Evidence base for prison staff corruption
The Home Office’s 2005 report, ‘Tackling Prison
Drug Markets’ is the only quantitative study to have
analysed the different trafficking routes for drugs. The
researchers used interviews with 158 ex-prisoners,
current prisoners and staff. One interview question
asked the interviewees to outline the main smuggling
routes that drugs take to get into the prison system.36
The results of this question are summarised in figure 1.
32. Treadwell, J Gooch, K & Barkham Perry, G (2019). Crime in Prisons: Where now and where next?Warwickshire, Police and Crime
Commissioner for Warwickshire, p.19 https://www.warwickshire-pcc.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/PCCs-present-plan-to-
government-to-tackle-organised-crime-in-prisons.pdf?x57250 (Accessed: 22 June 2020)
33. Ibid
34. Hutton, MA (2018). The Legally Sanctioned Stigmatisation of Prisoners’ Families in Condry, R & Scharff Smith, P eds Prisons,
Punishment, and the Family: Towards a New Sociology of Punishment? Oxford, Oxford University Press.
35. Treadwell, J Gooch, K & Barkham Perry, G (2019). Crime in Prisons: Where now and where next?Warwickshire, Police and Crime
Commissioner for Warwickshire, p.19 https://www.warwickshire-pcc.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/PCCs-present-plan-to-
government-to-tackle-organised-crime-in-prisons.pdf?x57250 (Accessed: 22 June 2020)
36. Penfold, C Turnbull, PJ & Webster, R (2005), Tackling drug prison markets: Home Office Online Report 39/05.  London, Home Office,
p.9 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237776662_Tackling_Prison_Drug_Markets_An_Exploratory_Qualitative_Study
(Accessed: 22 June 2020)
37. Ibid, Table 2 p. vii
Figure 1: Formatted interview results for the question on the most prevalent drug
smuggling routes in the Home Office’s 2005 study on ‘Tackling Prison Drug Markets.’37
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It is notable that 48 per cent of all respondents
interviewed named prison staff as the most prevalent
route for smuggling drugs, indicating the high
likelihood of staff corruption. It is additionally
noteworthy that a greater proportion of prison staff (54
per cent) identified their colleagues as the route for the
entry of drugs into prisons than prisoners/ex-prisoners
who were interviewed (46 per cent).38 It is not clear
what proportion of the sample were serving prisoners,
as opposed to those who had been released or what
impact this may have had on the data collection
process. Moreover, the results relating to other routes
might also involve prison staff corruption. All the other
routes could be facilitated by
prison staff’s active involvement,
or indeed passive — turning a
blind eye — involvement.
However, relying on a one-off
study of a difficult population
from 2005, which itself may be
challenged due to the small
sample size, illustrates how little
quantitative research is available
in this area.
Importantly, despite almost
half of all interview respondents
notifying staff corruption as a key
route of drug supply, the study
had no active recommendations
on staff corruption and how to
counteract this threat. 
An independent perspective
The potential for prison staff corruption as a
route for trafficking drugs was reinforced by the
Policy Exchange’s 2010 report on combating drug
misuse in prison entitled ‘Coming Clean: combating
drug misuse in prisons.’39 The report suggests there is
an estimated £100 million prison drugs trade
annually, and there are on average around seven
corrupt prison officials working at every prison —
implying that each corrupt member of prison staff is
responsible for around £100,000 of the drug markets
occurring in UK prisons.40
The researchers sent a survey to prisoners
questioning what they believed was the main route of
drug smuggling. Despite not being one of the options
that respondents were asked to score, the results
showed that 23 per cent of prisoners questioned
claimed that prison officers or civilian staff were the
main route for illegal substances to enter prison.41 The
fact that inmates hand-wrote out this answer suggests
that had the Policy Exchange included this as an option
within the survey they were conducting, then a far
greater percentage of respondents may have also given
the answer of prison staff. 
The Blakey report
The government’s primary
focus on family visits being the
key route of the influx of drugs
and contraband, while neglecting
the role of corrupt prison staff,42
is to some extent reflected in
David Blakey QC’s government-
commissioned 2008 report
‘Disrupting the supply of illicit
drugs into prisons.’43 This report
identifies five routes to
trafficking, and places
considerable emphasis on the
family and friends route.
However, he also notes:
‘No one I have spoken to in
the course of this Review doubts
that staff corruption is a live issue
for the Service or that it constitutes a way of getting
drugs into prisons. I was particularly impressed by the
frank and realistic manner in which Governors spoke to
me about this matter. There is a proper debate about the
actual level of corruption but I did not encounter the
‘head in the sand’ response that might have been the
case in many organisations both now and in the past.’44
The Pentonville scandal 200645
In 2006, there was a large and costly corruption
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trafficked weapons and drugs into HMP Pentonville.
Some of these officers had also been accused of having
inappropriate relationships with prisoners.46 
The governor of the prison, Gary Deighton, chose
a group of trusted prison officers to investigate these
allegations in what became known as ‘Operation
Extract.’ As a result of this investigation, Deighton fired
17 prison officers and suspended 14 other staff
members for alleged corruption charges and deemed
that there needed to be greater investigation into their
potentially corrupt actions. Four senior security officials
from four different London prisons were brought in to
lead an independent investigation into the suspended
prison staff.
The investigation ultimately
failed due to mis-handling of
confidentiality by one of the
investigators. After the
investigators speedily concluded
their investigation and suggested
that 12 of the then 13 suspended
officers should be charged with
corruption, Deighton — who was
put in charge of the disciplinary
hearings of the suspended
officers — decided to remove 9
of them from their posts and
charge the remaining 3 officers. 
Out of 31 suspected officers,
28 were therefore fired or
removed from their posts and the
remaining three were found
guilty of corruption charges but
later cleared and re-instated. The
investigation was deemed a
significant failure, as several million pounds had been
spent on the investigation and no corruption charges
were proven.47
The Pentonville scandal demonstrated the
institutional difficulties for the prison service in being
able to investigate corruption allegations successfully.
All the independent investigators were simultaneously
trying to run busy London prisons and a significant
corruption investigation. A government internal review
of the process concluded the timescale for the
investigating officers to compile and write their reports
was ‘extremely tight.’ This resulted in the investigators
missing their reporting deadline, and not being able to
compile enough detailed evidence, with the
government’s internal review stating that the
intelligence gathered by the investigators had, ‘not met
the required burden of proof…if the investigations had
been carried out more thoroughly and in greater detail
it may have been possible to offset any gaps in the
analysis of intelligence.’48
The prison governor, Gary Deighton, was heavily
criticised in the internal review on a number of
grounds.49 The case shows the potential for
mishandling by an individual prisoner governor
attempting to deal with corruption allegations, and
highlights the advantages of having investigations




The 2005 Home Office
Report, 2006 Pentonville Scandal
and 2008 Blakey Report, would
seem to have provided the
government with evidence both
that staff corruption was a
problem, and that this needed to
be dealt with in a systematic,
independent and coordinated
way. More than a decade on, this
remains the case. The sparse
literature on corruption in prisons
highlights this risk; the scarcely
fuller literature on contraband
trafficking tends to highlight
areas other than corruption; and
there is no sense that corruption amongst prison staff,
and in particular systemic or extensive corruption, is an
area of focus for the government or prison authorities.
While the Pentonville scandal helped make the case for
the government to create an independent anti-
corruption unit, to succeed, it would need to be a unit
that was adequately resourced and had sufficient
institutional support.
Corruption Prevention Unit(s)
Although nearly half of all respondents of the












46. Sturcke, J (2006). Prison suspends 14 officers in corruption inquiry, The Guardian, August 14 2006
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2006/aug/14/prisonsandprobation.uk (Accessed: 22 June 2020)
47. Doward, J (2009). Pentonville prison corruption inquiry folds after huge pay-outs, The Guardian, September 27 2009
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/sep/27/pentonville-prison-corruption-inquiry-folds (Accessed: 22 June 2020)
48. Holmes, R (2016). The Secret Prison Corruption Epidemic the Government Doesn’t Want You To Know About. BuzzFeed News,
December 6, 2016 https://www.BuzzFeed.com/richholmes/the-prison-corruption-cover-up?utm_term=.ufGz16xNw#.ylgzpbxDg
(Accessed: 22 June 2020)
49. Davenport, J (2008). Prison officers to sue over smuggling claims, Evening Standard, July 11 2008
https://www.standard.co.uk/news/prison-officers-to-sue-over-smuggling-claims-6879124.html (Accessed: 22 June 2020)
Prison Service Journal54 Issue 252
corruption as a route of drug smuggling,50 it was not
until 2008 that the government created the Corruption
Prevention Unit, a body which looked to work
alongside the police to identify corrupt prison staff. By
contrast, the anti-corruption unit of the Metropolitan
Police dates from the early 1990s.
In 2008, Blakey had identified a 5-step approach to
tackling staff corruption that was already in operation:
‘These steps are:
q Identify the extent of the threat
q Improve intelligence
q Implement common standards
q Establish a culture where corruption is not
tolerated
q Work closely with other
agencies, especially the
police.51
He reported that this 5-Step
process was being taken forward
by the Professional Standards
Unit, soon to become the
Corruption Prevention Unit.52
However, two years later,
Transparency International was
reporting that: ‘In January 2011
after an internal review, the
National Offender Management
Service (NOMS) announced that
the Corruption Prevention Unit
(CPU) would be subsumed under
another branch of the security
directorate, and that the post of
Head of CPU would be abolished.
This left no one with a senior
operational background in what was already a very
small unit, consisting of a junior prison manager, a
seconded police officer and a handful of administrative
staff. The CPU’s budget had been significantly reduced
since its inception some three years earlier.’53
The original budget for the CPU was £700,000,
and it consisted of ten staff members. By 2010, the
organisation’s employee numbers were halved
alongside its budget, meaning that only five full-time
staff were looking into staff corruption problems in UK
prisons on a meagre budget of £350,000.54
What Blakey had identified as a reasonable
approach (a CPU underpinned by a 5-step plan) was
therefore subject to budget cuts, downgrade in status
and institutional change. These were evidently not the
conditions for the counter-corruption actions to thrive:
there is no publicly-available information on whether
the 5-Step approach was evaluated, or how successful
it was considered.
Indeed, between the Transparency International
report of 2011 and 2017, the formal mechanisms for
dealing with corruption in prisons
seems to have gone into
enforced hibernation due to lack
of resources. The national Anti-
Corruption Plan of 2014 contained
nine paragraphs on corruption in
prisons, indicating that the CPU
continued to exist,55 although its
only listed task was to manage ‘a
network of Regional Corruption
Prevention Managers.’ The Plan’s
action for prisons was ‘NOMS to
consider the extension of its
corruption prevention programme
to cover the increasing number of
non-directly employed staff
delivering custodial services (by
March 2015).’56 While a necessary
action, this was singularly
unambitious given the scale of the
problem.
Progress against the Plan was reported formally in
May 2016, when not only was this action logged as
completed, but in addition NOMS was reported as
having issued the 2016 Instruction, and extending its
anti-corruption approach to the probation service and
non-directly employed (NDE) staff.57 The inescapable
impression is of a small number of dedicated staff
battling against the odds with little senior institutional
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support; but also of the importance of national-level
Plans and Strategies in helping to stimulate and
reinforce activity.
Interviewed in 2016, former governor John
Podmore said ‘the anti-corruption methods for prisons
are incredibly under-resourced’ and ‘the whole thing is
a complete dog’s breakfast.’ He told Buzzfeed News
that while a governor he ‘didn’t have the resources to
investigate corruption so we used to have to find other
reasons to sack people’; ‘It isn’t something the prison
system is wanting to tackle or recognise.’58
By 2017, the government had produced a national
Anti-Corruption Strategy, and somewhat out of the
blue, prisons appeared as one of
four priority areas.
This was followed in 2019
by the creation of a new Counter
Corruption Unit, possibly
reflecting the Ministry of Justice’s
concern about the alarming rise
in prosecutions and disciplinary
actions made against prison staff
since 2014, with over 2,666
prison staff having faced
disciplinary action over the last
five years. This disciplinary action
included a number of criminal
prosecutions, with 960 of these
cases being related to a breach of
security which can include
bringing mobile phones and
drugs into the prison
environment.59
Announcing the creation of
the unit, Justice Secretary David
Gauke said that it was in reaction
to, ‘recent criminal prosecutions’
whereby ‘a small minority continue to engage in
corrupt behaviour in our prisons damaging both the
integrity of the system and their profession.’60 This
suggests a reactive approach to a problem that could
no longer be swept under the carpet. 
Like its predecessor, the 2019 Counter Corruption
Unit has a relatively small number of staff. This new
Unit began operational tasks in 2019 and consists of
29 specialist staff members, divided into 5 national and
regional sub-units. It has four key aims, familiar from
the Home Office and National Crime Agency 4Ps
approach: protect the prison service against corruption
by building an open and resilient organisation; prevent
staff from engaging in corruption by attempting to
strengthen professional integrity; pursue and punish
those involved with corruption; and, prepare prisons to
lower the impact of corruption where it does occur. This
specialist team will also aim to work with other
agencies such as the police and the National Crime
Agency to hinder organised crime groups that act in a
nefarious manner with corrupt
staff.61
The recent 2019 Prison Drug
Strategy, created by HMPPS, pins
the success of the Unit to
achieving the aim of reducing the
proportion of random mandatory
drug tests that are found positive
by March 2020.62 This highlights
the intertwined nature of
HMPPS’s adherence to the use of
key performance indicators (that
can be potentially be
manipulated), the drug strategy,
and approach to tackling
corruption. A positive
development is the focus on
‘staff who use their position for
illicit gain’, and explicit — if
somewhat hidden —
acknowledgement that staff
corruption might have a
significant role to play.63
An internal HMPPS
presentation from September 2019 develops some of
these points.64 There is a clear focus on staff corruption
as a key area. Corruption is seen as part of a ‘wider
security picture’, and there is a strong emphasis on the
importance of culture, training and staff support, based
on ‘academic literature and international evidence.’
There is a more nuanced understanding than previous
Corruption is seen
as part of a ‘wider
security picture’,
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such documents have demonstrated and a plan for a
more comprehensive approach, while still based on the
4Ps.
However, the same challenges and questions
inevitably face the new Counter Corruption Unit as had
faced the CPU. There is a danger the metrics for success
will neither incentivise the unit correctly, nor give real
insight into the nature of the problem and how it is
being tackled; a concern that whatever actions are
taken are built primarily on experiential learning by
those who are personally involved, rather than a firm
evidence base; a risk that the introverted nature of the
prison system will neglect the lessons and expertise that
can be incorporated from other sectors and institutions;
and above all, the risk that the resourcing and senior,
institutional support for tackling
corruption will be insufficient in
the face of competing priorities
and institutional pressures. In the
absence of transparency about
what is going on and how
effective it has been, external
observers are required to guess.
Further research areas 
It is clear that corruption in
the UK prison system is under-
researched. There is no
comprehensive academic
literature on either corruption
risks or the actual corruption that
occur within UK prisons. 
Seven proposed areas to
prioritise for future research are:
1. Typology and harm. For analysis and
management purposes, it would be useful to
have both the academic and practitioner
communities in the UK coalesce around a
typology of prison corruption; similarly,
research and narratives which establish the
victims and the harm would help underpin
policy approaches. An interested party — a
research or practitioner institution — could
convene a workshop of key players to start
building a consensus.
2. Scale and prevalence. Basic quantitative
information, supplemented by qualitative data
collection, would enable a better picture to be
built, along with a basis for prioritising anti-
corruption resource allocation.
3. Motivations and incentives. This would
examine the landscape from junior staff to
Governors, encompassing public and private
sectors, establishing the motivations and
incentives for different actors (including
domestic and official visitors) to become
involved with corruption, including the extent
to which KPIs may be a contributor to corrupt
behaviours and whether privatisation has
made a difference.
4. Staff corruption as a route that contraband
takes into the prison system. A proposed
methodology is a nationwide survey with a
large sample group on the prevalence of
different trafficking routes. Within the
formulation of such a survey, there should be
specific investigatory emphasis on staff
involvement in contraband trafficking. The
results could then inform qualitative research
in establishments (including attempts to
engage with ex-staff members
who have been found guilty of
what would be considered
corrupt practices). 
5. The extent of corruption in
relation to procurement.
Although not covered in this
paper, the same rationale applies
as to other research areas: it is a
key corruption risk that is under-
researched.
6. Confidential reporting
(whistleblowing). In other fields,
information on corruption is
often gathered through
confidential reporting
mechanisms. Within prisons, this
might be considered to have
dangers over and above the
norm. Research would help show
how effective the current channels are and
whether enhancements would make them a
more useful tool. A specialist agency such as
Protect could be commissioned to do this.
7. Gender and corruption. This research would
analyse whether the types or prevalence of
corruption have a relationship with gender.
For example, are there different types of
corruption at play within male and female
prisons?
8. Additional (demographic) factors. For
example, is the prevalence or form of
corruption different in the adult estate
compared to the Young People’s estate? What
variance is there across the estate: is there less
in the High Security Estate compared to local
or open establishments? Eliciting a more
nuanced understanding will aid in resource
allocation and prioritising.
9. Organised crime. The existing prisons
literature suggests that organised crime plays
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a role both in corrupting, and in benefitting
from corruption. This reflects the learnings
from other areas such as border security and
policing. Prisons-specific research should
examine the intersections/collusion between
members of organised crime in prisons and
corrupt prison staff/social and official visitors. 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
This paper aims both to assess the state of research
into corruption in UK prisons and offer a commentary
on what is known about the state of corruption in UK
prisons. In the near absence of research, neither the
corruption nor the corruption risks can be accurately
assessed. This inevitably leads to the conclusion that the
subject has been neglected, and that for a long period
the relevant authorities have been in denial. However,
there are signs of improvement, most notably the
inclusion of prisons as one of the priorities of the
national Anti-Corruption Strategy in 2017, and the
creation of the Counter Corruption Unit in 2019.
Overall, both the research outputs, policy making
and operational actions regarding corruption within UK
prisons need a considerable addition of impetus, with
the latter made more likely by the advent of the
Counter Corruption Unit.
Six policy recommendations to improve the
situation are:
1. Gain consensus on the typology, harm and
narrative, enabling a common language and
framework for policy and operational work
(including training)
2. Pro-actively build a research community,
including academics and those within civil
society who specialise either on corruption or
on prisons
3. Identify key research gaps and questions,
building on the proposal in section 6 above
4. Bring in external expertise to the insular world
of prisons so that practitioners in the prisons
field can draw on the extensive anti-
corruption expertise from other sectors
5. Ensure the anti-corruption approach has
adequate resourcing and institutional support,
a key lesson from the past both in UK prisons,
but also across the world in anti-corruption
agencies
6. Increase transparency over the sector’s
activities, facilitating researchers and enabling
appropriate levels of external accountability
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Introduction
As a formal academic subject, Intelligence Studies
has been something of a creature of the post-Cold
War world, when previously heavily secret issues
could start to be discussed more freely, and
subsequent inquiries and investigations began to
release ever more sensitive data into the public
domain. It did not really gain significant traction
as a formal subject other than in the historical
studies realm, however, until the beginning of the
twenty-first century and the 9/11 attacks that
punctuated the change in the security landscape.
Since then, it has become the subject of a small
number of dedicated research centres — mostly, it
has to be said, in the Anglo-Saxon world — and
has increasingly featured as modules on Politics
and Security Studies programmes across a wide
range of universities1. On publishing, a good
handful of peer-reviewed English-language
academic journals are now dedicated to the study
of intelligence, and all enjoy a very healthy
number of submissions from diverse international
contributors at the time of writing.
Within the subject, the study of intelligence
analysis as an activity is one of several strands. It is also
worth noting that the subject has tended to coalesce
around two separate communities of interest and sets
of considerations. On the one hand is the traditional,
state-centric discussion of intelligence as a core element
of machinery and policy in the national security state.
This community fits comfortably with the traditional
and established subjects of Politics and International
Relations. In another part of the forest sits a much more
practical and professional-focused community, in which
recent and current intelligence practitioners feature
significantly. 
In this paper, I review the state of the nation of
Intelligence Studies in terms of its shape and
development, and the position occupied within it by
considerations of intelligence analysis as a tradecraft.
The general message is that this area of the subject
remains vibrant and active, and is developing in
interesting ways with the advent of massively
expanding data and open-source intelligence
opportunities. At the same time, there are different
strands to the relevant scholarly and practitioner
communities and these are not always as integrated as
they could be. It is also the case that the practical
application of intelligence analysis tradecraft tools and
techniques has not always been evaluated as to its
effectiveness, and could usefully be subjected to further
research.
Learning from mistakes and failures — the
traditional way
It is generally the case that the traditional academic
approach to intelligence studies and to the question of
intelligence analysis has been strongly grounded in the
wider context of International Relations. Considerations
of strategic foreign policy at times of state-centred
military threat have often been the starting point for
discussion. The Cold War itself was, of course, the
archetypal state-centred military and diplomatic
confrontation in modern history, and it is no surprise
that the whole modern intelligence architecture in
many parts of the globe was developed and shaped
around its considerations. It is also the case that the lure
of Cold War spy stories were a powerful draw for those
generally interested in the secret world. Academically,
many, such as Marrin have conceptualised intelligence
studies as ‘an academic complement to the practice of
national security’2; and have long called for it to be
taken seriously as a properly recognised academic
discipline to rival established pursuits such as
International Relations. 
Intelligence Studies as an organised subject of
academic discussion probably dates back to the 1980s,
when a dedicated panel section was established at the
large and prestigious International Studies Association
(ISA) annual symposium. At around the same time the
two hitherto pre-eminent peer-reviewed English
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language academic journals in the field, Intelligence
and National Security and the International Journal of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence were launched.
The impetus for their parallel development on either
side of the Atlantic was purportedly increased
awareness of the activities of the intelligence services
following the Pike and Church inquiries in the 1970s in
the US3. This reflects the initial concentration both on
what can be learnt from major strategic intelligence
failures, and on the development of a critical view of
the intelligence services in terms of being a sometimes
problematic organ of state. 
Writing at a similar time, Richard Betts noted that
case studies of intelligence failures were very numerous
in the academic literature4. As Wesley Wark
subsequently noted in his analysis of the study of
espionage in the early 1990s, the
study of intelligence failures and
strategic shocks provided an
intellectual link between the
traditional discipline of
International Relations, and the
emerging field of Intelligence
Studies5. This, in turn, allowed
largely Realist theorists such as
Wohlstetter6, Handel7, Jervis8, and
the aforementioned Betts9 to
loom large in discussion, taking
twentieth century case studies of
strategic shock and surprise such
as Pearl Harbor and the Yom
Kippur War to frame thinking
about how and why analysis goes
wrong at the strategic level. 
As Gill and Phythian10noted, the post-Cold War era
saw much academic interest in inquiries into
intelligence failures affecting the major episodes of
conflict in the new era, such as the case for going into
war in Iraq in 2003, and issues pertaining to terrorist
attacks in Western cities including those of11
September, 2001. The establishment of the Intelligence
and Security Committee of parliament in the UK in
1993, and its subsequent detailed post-mortem
examinations of major strategic intelligence failures (not
to mention those of parallel government inquiries
across the Anglo-Saxon world in particular) have
provided rich new fodder for scholars and researchers
of national security and the role that intelligence
analysis plays within it. 
In the UK, the Butler Inquiry into intelligence on
Weapons of Mass Destruction11 was comprehensive
and detailed in its discussion of analytical factors that
were causing problems in the post-Cold War era of new
security threats and challenges. The report was
influential in the sense that it led to the establishment
of the new post of Professional Head of Intelligence
Analysis (PHIA) within the Cabinet Office, with the aim
of working across the disparate elements of the
intelligence community and looking for opportunities
to ‘professionalise’ intelligence practice. How successful
it has been in so doing in subsequent years is difficult to
assess from the outside. In the
US, the establishment of the
Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI) at the same
time had a similar remit to work
across the broad and complex US
intelligence community and to
think about the analytical
professionalisation of those who
worked within it (among its
general coordination and
strategic assessment objectives).
In Australia, the Foreign
Intelligence Coordination
Committee (FICC) that flowed
from the post-Iraq Flood inquiry
report of 2004 reflected similar
thinking and objectives. 
In some ways these developments were as much
about the ‘governance/policy’ project, as Gill and
Phythian described it12 as they were about the business
of analysis. The shock of Iraq for the Western
intelligence coalition was as much about a suspected
politicisation of the system, as it was about the
capabilities of the analysts working within it. One can
have the best analysts in the world, but if the machinery
of processing intelligence judgements from analyst to
policy-maker is flawed, then all can be for nought. The
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recognition that the intelligence community itself can
be a very political entity in terms of rivalries and equities
between members. Shifting the leadership of the
community in the US from the DCI to the supposedly
more independent DNI, for example, inevitably
contained as much politics as practicality in its thinking.
These are the many reasons why a critical study of
intelligence machinery remains a critical component of
Intelligence Studies, and why it arguably has to be
considered as hand-in-glove with questions of analytical
capability. 
At the same time, there were valid observations in
all of these inquiries, and other contemporaneous
reports such as the 9/11 Commission Report in the US,
about the adjusted considerations that twenty-first
century intelligence analysts
needed to have when
considering the new threat
landscape. The reports also
provided a language for analysts
to speak about the challenges
and the potential solutions.
Concepts such as institutional
mindsets (or ‘groupthink’),
mirror-imaging, and a ‘lack of
imagination’ when confronted
with new threat actors such as
international terrorists13 all came
more extensively into the
parlance of analysts and scholars
alike. They also helped to
establish frameworks and
structures for a myriad of
analytical training programmes,
whether aimed at newly installed
intelligence agency staff, or at students and scholars
involved with the subject as an academic pursuit. 
It could also be said to be the case that the
renewed emphasis on the skills development of analysts
was following the path set by early pioneers such as
Sherman Kent on the foundation of the CIA after the
Second World War. A historian by training, Kent, whose
name was posthumously applied to the CIA’s central
intelligence school, was a strong advocate of a scientific
method for conducting intelligence analysis14. This
included such notions as structured and forensic post-
mortem analyses of intelligence failures to establish
where the points of analytical failure had been. One of
Kent’s key disciples in the CIA during the Cold War was
Richards J Heuer Jr, who worked for a period under
James Angleton in the agency’s counterintelligence
section during the ‘wilderness of mirrors’ period of
paranoia about Soviet deception and counter-
espionage in the early Cold War. Heuer was himself a
former academic of distinction in the area of
philosophy, and became increasingly interested in
psychology and its impact on the business of
intelligence. I will return to Heuer’s work below, but in
the early period, one of his lasting legacies was a notion
developed during the infamous Yuri Nosenko affair in
the early 1960s, with which he was closely involved,
that deception analysis had to be subjected to a
structured, scientific approach, lest it fall prey to
unstructured biases and prejudices15. This led to the
development of the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses
(ACH) technique, the authorship
of which is claimed by Heuer in
his 1999 book, the Psychology of
Intelligence Analysis16. ACH
synthesises the experience of
early Cold War deception analysis
and applies a basic Popperian
scientific approach, to create the
single best-known and probably
most widely-used structured
analytical technique of the
modern era. 
It is the case, therefore, that
one strand of discussion about
intelligence analysis within
academic Intelligence Studies is
heavily dominated by a state-
centred, foreign policy and
national security approach to the
challenges. In this way, the
traditional approach enjoys heavy and detailed overlaps
with mainstream International Relations as a subject,
and with related disciplines such as Foreign Policy
Analysis and Security Studies. The focus here is as much
on institutions as it is on individual analysts, in the sense
of how intelligence organisations and agencies manage
the business of intelligence gathering and
interpretation, and how governmental machineries best
deliver national security assessments. 
There is nothing wrong with this approach per se,
but it does carry some limitations. The main problem is
that the field of view is somewhat limited to state
intelligence agencies and their agendas. This means
that wider members of the intelligence community,
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organisations, receive lower billing in the thinking than
the Western, Cold War behemoths of state intelligence.
It also means that the focus can tend to be rather
limited to the Anglo-Saxon worldview, and particularly
to that of dominant actors such as the CIA and its
veterans. Again, the suggestion is not that there is
anything necessarily wrong with this per se or that
there is not a great deal that can be learnt from these
approaches: Kent, Heuer and the numerous other
analysts who worked with and for them were
undoubtedly highly significant thought-leaders in the
whole domain of how to do intelligence analysis more
effectively. However, as Lord Butler and others have told
us, limited worldviews and institutional mindsets can
sometimes lead to cognitive traps in our analysis. If we
always look at a problem from




For the reasons identified
above, it is worth considering
developments in the debate
about intelligence analysis in the
wider community beyond the
traditional, state-centred
intelligence agencies. Many of
the debates and discussions in
this wider community are led by a
notable involvement of current
and recent intelligence
practitioners, and particularly
(though not exclusively) in the
law enforcement and military domains. Significant
knowledge communities include the International
Association for Intelligence Educators (IAFIE), which was
established in 2004 following a colloquium at
Mercyhurst College in Erie, Pennsylvania17. The
emphasis of this group is much more about the
professionalisation of intelligence practitioners through
the sharing of best practice and networking amongst
those in and around the business, than necessarily
about academic reflections on the politics and
governance of intelligence within states. With the
exception of pandemic-hit 2020, the group has
successfully held vibrant and well-attended annual
conferences in the US, Canada, Australia and in Europe. 
Other major communities of note include the
Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP),
which, like IAFIE, is primarily a knowledge hub and
networking organisation, but aimed at those working
in commercial, rather than national security roles. The
objectives of SCIP claim to be to ‘increase members’
impact through advancing ethical best practices,
offering training and education in areas critical to
professional effectiveness, curating innovative ideas,
and cultivating a powerful peer community’18. Again,
the strong practical focus of the group is very evident.
Academic reflections on the nature of competitive
intelligence occasionally appear19, such as discussions
about the effectiveness of the Economic Espionage Act
in the US20, but are relatively few and far between.
Given the rising significance
politically of economic and
industrial espionage, there may
be opportunities for greater
cross-pollination of these
communities and debates. 
Particularly in action-
oriented domains such as the
military, much of the thinking in
recent times has been to connect
the challenge of intelligence
analysis with wider
considerations of understanding
and responding to increasingly
complex, dynamic and
asymmetric threats. In this way,
not only are accurate intelligence
assessments crucial, but so are
the speed and efficiency with
which these can be promulgated
to those taking kinetic action on the ground: essentially
the ‘decision cycle’ process. Thus, concepts such as the
OODA Loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) designed by
the US Air Force Colonel John Boyd, have been
developed and elaborated in increasingly complex
ways, such as in Svendsen’s recent paradigm of
‘intelligence engineering’21. Within these models,
intelligence (sometimes rendered as ‘information’ or
even ‘knowledge’) is a critical component, but it is
important to note that the models are as much about
business processes as about the art of intelligence
analysis itself22. This is an issue, and, indeed, a problem














19. Colakoglu. T. (2011). The Problematic of Competitive Intelligence: How to Evaluate and Develop Competitive Intelligence? Procedia
Social and Behavioral Sciences, 24, 1615-1623
20. Horowitz, R. (2001). SCIP policy analysis: Competitive Intelligence and the Economic Espionage Act. Competitive Intelligence Review,
10(3), 84-89
21. Svendsen, A.D.M. (2017) Intelligence Engineering: Operating Beyond the Conventional. Lanham MD, Rowman and Littlefield
22. Odinga, F.P.B. (2007). Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd. Abingdon, Routledge. P.235
Prison Service Journal62 Issue 252
Indeed, policing is a key area in which significant
developments of both a practical and academic nature
have unfolded in the area of intelligence analysis in
recent years. A significant driver was the rise of
personal and social media data within the context of
Information and Computing Technology (ICT), which
offered opportunities both for better intelligence on
targets, and for more efficient and ‘intelligent’
targeting of scarce resources in an age of public sector
stringency. As early as the 1970s, there was recognition
that new sources of ‘information’ would become critical
to the business of law enforcement, as reflected in a
statement by the National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice and Goals in the US in 1973, calling on
every law enforcement agency to ‘immediately establish
and maintain the capability to
gather and evaluate information
and to disseminate intelligence in
a manner that protects every
individual’s right to privacy while
it curtails organized crime and
public disorder’23. Interestingly,
there was recognition here of
potential public anxiety over the
extent of data surveillance; a
point to which I will return. 
By the 1990s, the New York
Police Department was
developing a new ‘goal-oriented,
strategic management process
that uses information technology,
operational strategy, and
managerial accountability to
guide police operations’: a model
which became known as
Compstat24. Compstat was essentially a ‘problem-
oriented’ mode of policing, in which analysis of data
and ‘science’ were applied both to understanding the
picture of crime in a particular area, and focusing
resources and priorities on the key crimes which stood
out as having the biggest impact on the community.
There was a significant paradigm-shift here from
traditional neighbourhood or community policing,
which was driven by what officers on the ground
encountered and addressed reactively. Around the
same time in Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police (RCMP) established a model called CAPRA
(Clients, Analysis, Partnerships, Response, Assessment).
This was driven by a similar recognition that
‘community policing’ was not necessarily very effective
in penetrating serious criminal or terrorist groups; a fact
starkly demonstrated by the failure to anticipate the
1985 bombing of an Air India plane departing
Vancouver by Sikh extremists25. Here again was a
process of attempting to learn from intelligence
failures, but in the law enforcement rather than state
security realm. 
In the UK, ‘intelligence-led policing’ (ILP) emerged
at a similar time, initially driven by Kent constabulary,
and later replicated in a number of other areas26. Initially
called the Kent Policing Model, ILP was similar to
Compstat in reflecting a strategic need to drive down
crime statistics at a time when budgets were being
squeezed. The model in Kent
involved a combination of
analysing statistics to develop a
better geospatial view of where
the key crimes were occurring,
and prioritising incoming calls for
service to more efficiently target
the priority areas where the best
dividends would be scored in
reducing crime statistics27. 
Intellectually, the objectives
of Problem-Oriented Policing
(POP) and ILP would appear to be
the same in the sense that they
involve a conceptual refocusing
of the analysis of security threat
away from traditional and
established processes, and
towards a more holistic and
dynamic view of the situation,
using sophisticated data analysis as the fuel for the
machine. Such thinking was reflected in Robert Clark’s
influential ‘target-centric analysis’ paradigm28, in which
a call is made to see each challenge from the problem
outwards, rather than from the traditional top-down
approach of tackling issues in accordance with
bureaucratic process norms and stove-piped
organisations. Particular reference is made to the
traditional ‘Intelligence Cycle’ process model, believed
to be originally established in the 1970s29, which,
claimed Clark, had inappropriately taken on ‘almost
theological’ significance among its users whereby ‘no-
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post-Cold War world of greater dynamism,
unpredictability and the knowledge economy, it
seemed to make sense to see each problem as unique
and potentially different from those encountered
before. The formulaic and production-line epistemology
of the Intelligence Cycle was described by Hulnick31as
‘not a very good description of the ways in which the
intelligence process works’. 
So far, so good in terms of fitting with the
injunctions of inquiries in which a lacking imagination
and institutional mindsets were seen as problems that
had bedevilled intelligence analysts. However,
experience has shown in the UK and almost certainly in
other jurisdictions that the management benefits of ILP
in terms of reducing costs, targeting dwindling
resources and generating beneficial metrics, have been
prioritised higher than the
analytical uplift implied by a shift
to ILP. In a sense, the
‘intelligence’ part of Intelligence-
Led Policing may have been
neglected. In his extensive
analysis of ILP, typified in the UK
by the initially much-heralded
National Intelligence Model
(NIM), James suggests that
attempts to ‘shift the policing
paradigm, usually have fallen far
short’32. Again, organisational
and governance problems are
seen to have a big effect on the
ability to improve analytical
capability, in the shape of a
‘resistance to change’ amongst
the established detectives who
are fearful that data analysis is
not proper policing33; and further problems in the
lacking profile of intelligence work within the police
hierarchy and woefully poor database and computing
capabilities at the local level34. The NIM has proved itself
to be more of a management model, than one focused
on upskilling analysts (in some ways, a corollary to the
OODA Loop in military thinking). On the training front,
an empirical survey of policing intelligence practitioners
in the UK found that a significant proportion found
their intelligence training to be lacking or too
‘rudimentary’, perhaps reflecting the ‘low status’
accorded to intelligence work within the organisation35.
There is also perhaps further evidence here that the
PHIA model has not yet had much discernible impact on
the law enforcement parts of the intelligence
community in promulgating best practice, if that were
its intention. 
Intelligence analysis tradecraft
All of these institutional and organisational issues
aside, the discussion of intelligence analysis tradecraft
has been a healthy area of debate and publication in
recent years. Indeed, it is probably fair to say that a
small industry has grown up around teaching and
training analytical techniques and approaches. Much of
this has been driven by current or recent practitioners of
intelligence, who have been able to bring their
experience to bear on what does
and does not work well in solving
today’s security challenges.
At this stage, it is worth
returning to the personality of
Richards J Heuer Jr, and to
recognise his highly significant
presence within the practice of
developing intelligence analysis
approaches. The aforementioned
ACH technique, claimed Heuer,
‘helps an analyst overcome, or at
least minimize, some of the
cognitive limitations that make
prescient intelligence analysis so
difficult to achieve’36. Here we see
recognition of the pivotal role
that mainstream psychology has
played within debates about
intelligence analysis, and
particularly that promulgated by Daniel Kahneman and
his close friend and colleague, Amos Tversky37. Central
to the discussion are notions of ‘cognitive biases’ in
judgement and decision-making. These are assumed to
occur in all cultures and walks of life, but have a
particularly important impact for those making
significant assessments based on sometimes
problematic information: a good description of the role
of the intelligence analyst. Heuer himself acknowledges
that his work on cognitive biases was very significantly
informed by the work of Kahneman and Tversky, and
particularly their paper, ‘Judgement under Uncertainty:
...policing intelligence
practitioners in the
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Heuristics and Biases’, published in the journal Science
in 197438. 
As discussed above, Heuer’s lynch-pin ACH model
uses classical Western scientific theory as enunciated by
Karl Popper39. This takes as its basis that perhaps the
most pervasive and damaging of all cognitive biases,
the ‘confirmation bias’, is best mitigated by a process of
scientific discovery and evaluation that attempts to
disprove hypotheses based on available evidence, rather
than to seek to prove and favour a naturally favoured
hypothesis. This allows the analyst to overcome
confirmation bias (that is, a strong tendency to show
that the analyst is right about their instinctive
judgement of a situation), and to ensure that ‘evidence’
is properly and objectively assessed in forming a
judgement. This approach forms
the basis of testing new drugs
and vaccines to destruction
before they can be released to
the public, for example. In the
world of intelligence, where
information and data may be
selective, missing, faulty, and —
on occasion — deliberately
deceptive, this would seem to be
a very valid prescription. 
ACH is one of many
structured techniques that
purportedly help analysts to
overcome innate cognitive biases
and to ensure a more scientific
approach to their analysis. It also
allows for uncertainty to be
properly assessed in making
judgements, and to make sure
that the policy and decision-
makers know exactly what the
analysts are, or are not telling
them. In 2010, Heuer and Randolph Pherson
collaborated in the publication of ‘Structured Analytic
Techniques for Intelligence Analysts’40. This book, in its
third edition at the time of writing, represents a
compendium of analysis techniques, some of which
Pherson — another veteran of the US intelligence
community — had previously published as a ‘Handbook
of Analytical Techniques’. As well as ACH, these include
variations on established techniques such as mind-
mapping, brainstorming and red teaming; and new
techniques such as ‘quadrant crunching’ and ‘what if?’
analysis. The techniques have been supplemented with
compendia in which the techniques are applied to case
studies of recent intelligence challenge, showing how
they could be implemented in practice41. Refreshingly,
these do not include the rather time-worn cases of
major strategic surprise such as Pearl Harbor or the
Cuban Missile Crisis; but more recent and specific cases
of crime, espionage, and cyber activity. 
The language of SATs (Structured Analytic
Techniques), as they have become known in the
intelligence community, has been developed and
adapted by others. The Canadian Association of
Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS), for example,
has developed the notion of
‘SMATs’, or Structured Analytical
Models, Approaches and
Techniques, to provide the
framework for analytical training
courses42. These include not only
the practice of SATs, but also
techniques for presentation and
communication of the results of
the analysis, such as graphical
intelligence summaries
(‘Grintsums’) and the ‘bottom
line up front’ (BLUF) technique.
Indeed, training and exercising of
techniques using simulations of
real-world scenarios, which can
be used in professional or
academic environments alike,
have been the subject of a
number of recent publications
and courses, such as two recent
volumes by Lahneman and
Arcos43. 
There is, therefore, a considerable amount of
discussion, writing and training being undertaken in
various parts of the world on how to improve the
tradecraft of intelligence analysis, using a framework of
cognitive considerations. Much of this is driven by an
essentially ‘CIA school’ of thinking. A question that
could be asked is: how effective is this training in
improving analytical performance? As a recent study by
Whitesmith44 highlighted, there has been very little
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evaluation of whether and how techniques such as
ACH actually work in generating better analytical
outcomes. In her empirical study of a group of UK-
based intelligence analysts, the worrying conclusion
was that ‘ACH had no impact on belief acquisition and
no reducing effect on the occurrence of confirmation
bias’45. Similarly, a study in the US found that, while use
of SATs such as ACH by the intelligence community had
increased, especially following the Iraq inquiries of the
early 2000s, there appeared to be very little evidence of
mechanisms for measuring whether they were effective
in delivering improved analytical outcomes46. 
What this may mean is that an ideology of
industrialised training of new and existing analysts
using the established understanding of cognitive
challenges, and a set of
formatted structured techniques,
is now being undertaken by
bureaucracies — especially in the
Western world — without too
much evaluation as to the
effectiveness of the approach.
This statement may appear a little
uncharitable in that there is
clearly a great deal of well-
designed and rigorous training
and discussion going on with
practitioners, much of it
commendably using relevant and
useful examples of current
security threats. It is also the case
that such techniques never
promised to ‘fix’ the problems,
but merely to raise the awareness
and mental agility of analysts.
But, from a philosophical point of view, the whole
epistemology of the approach is based on a standard,
orthodox Western scientific model, and an
unquestioning use of that approach may itself be
mitigating against challenge and alternative
hypotheses, to some degree. In some ways, structure
could be said to be a strange bedfellow for creative
analysis in uncertain environments. The answer is
probably that continual evaluation and challenge needs
to be undertaken, especially by current practitioners
who are best placed to see how well or otherwise the
techniques translate across from the training room to
the workplace. 
The internet age
The final piece of the jigsaw is that presaged by
the US National Advisory Commission on Criminal
Justice and Goals in the early 1970s about the
importance of data analysis to the business of
intelligence. The authors of that report could barely
have anticipated the spectacular and exponential rate
at which data availability would grow subsequently, and
the opportunities it would offer to intelligence analysis. 
There are several dimensions to these
developments which are driving and shaping the
debate on intelligence analysis. The first is a growing
recognition that social media exploitation can and
should be a new and important part of intelligence
tradecraft. Indeed, Omand,
Bartlett and Miller47 and Dover48
have contributed usefully to
thinking of a whole new strand
of tradecraft under the rubric of
SOCMINT. It is clear that Big Data
exploitation, whether it be of
social media or a host of other
sources of data, offers
tremendous new opportunities
for analysing complex networks
and possibly even working more
proactively in an anticipatory
sense to predict threats. At the
same time, there are contrary
risks in the new landscape. Some
of these are to do with
adversaries using social media
themselves to undermine
democratic societies (a notion of
the ‘weaponization’ of social media49; while other
concerns relate to the ethical questions of privacy
protection in what many critics might characterise as a
creeping ‘surveillance state’50. 
There seems no doubt that modern intelligence
analysis increasingly has to take account of
disinformation in all its guises. This is not the first time
in history, of course, that propaganda, deception and
‘psychological operations’ have been used in
intelligence environments: such phenomena have a
long history dating back to the beginnings of mass
communication. But the sheer scale of contemporary
information environments and the speed and ease with
Similarly, a study in
the US found that,
while use of SATs
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which messages can be spread and consumed, all mean
that the modern intelligence analyst needs to have
extremely heightened awareness and capability in how
to spot and mitigate disinformation and the effect of
such phenomena as ‘hybrid warfare’51. 
Particularly since 2013, when Edward Snowden’s
revelations broke about the scale of data surveillance
on both sides of the Atlantic, the concerns of civil
libertarians in democratic states have increasingly
focused on data surveillance techniques and the
‘proportionality’ of them (to use the parlance of the
European Convention on Human Rights). This has led,
in turn, to legislative developments, such as the passing
of the Investigatory Powers Act
(IPA) in the UK in 2016, which
attempts to more clearly
delineate the roles and remits of
intelligence services in this field,
and indeed of key stakeholders
with whom they work, notably
the large communications and
internet service provider
companies (CSPs and ISPs). The
new regulations have not
necessarily satisfied the critics:
the IPA is commonly known in
some quarters as the ‘Snooper’s
Charter’52. But at least, perhaps,
there is some degree of public
debate about what a democratic
state should rightly do in the era
of Big Data exploitation for
national security purposes. 
These concerns, of course,
are not necessarily immediate
issues for intelligence analysts
undertaking their mandated duties, since appropriate
checks and balances should be in place to ensure
properly authorised investigations are taking place. But
again, there is a strong argument to say that the
contemporary intelligence analyst needs to be fully
cognisant of ethical risks and threats in the exploitation
of Big Data in pursuit of security outcomes, and these
need to shape the thinking, approaches and
assessments. It is also the case that the study of ethics
rightly remains an important element of academic
Intelligence Studies. 
In the meantime, the explosion of data in the
contemporary era means that Open-Source Intelligence
(OSINT) is developing an increasingly influential role in
the business of intelligence analysis, and challenging
the notion that intelligence should be a fundamentally
secret affair53. Increasingly, organisations outside of the
intelligence services themselves are proving themselves
to be thought-leaders and pioneers of analytical
tradecraft in the complex and challenging world of
online information exploitation. Organisations such as
Bellingcat, who claimed to have independently exposed
the Russian GRU agents at the centre of the 2018
Sergei Skrijpal poisoning using OSINT techniques54, are
likely to become significant actors in the development
of analytical tradecraft and best-practice. All elements
of the intelligence community will probably do well to
partner with such actors in
effective ways, or at least to
capitalise on their approach. 
Conclusions
This review of the evolution
of debate and discussion of
intelligence analysis has
highlighted two distinct
communities of interest around
the subject. The first community
preceded the second in its
evolution and has been
characterised by a set of
discussions and debates driven
very much by state-centred
concerns arising from the Cold
War era. This area of the debate
has a close relationship with the
traditional academic disciplines of
International Relations and
Politics, to which it sees
Intelligence Studies as an important adjunct, if not an
emerging academic discipline in its own right. An
analysis of major strategic intelligence failures in areas
of foreign policy and military confrontation have driven
the thinking about analytical tradecraft and its
weaknesses, and the application of traditional
academic theories has been a much-used conceptual
framework. Intellectually, scholars with a varying degree
of relationship with the major Anglo-Saxon intelligence
agencies forged in the Second World War and Cold
War, headed to a significant degree by the CIA, have
tended to set the academic agenda and claimed it to be
the rightful shape and form of traditional Intelligence







capability in how to
spot and mitigate
disinformation and
the effect of such
phenomena as
‘hybrid warfare.
51. Wither, J.K. (2016). Making sense of Hybrid Warfare. Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 15(2), 73-87
52. Mitchell. S. (2013, April 25). Lib Dems block ‘snooper’s charter’. Retrieved September 20, 2020, from
https://www.alphr.com/politics/22986/lib-dems-block-snoopers-charter/
53. Glees, A. (2015). Intelligence Studies, Universities and Security. British Journal of Educational Studies, 63/3, 281-310. P.283
54. Bellingcat (2019, June 28). The GRU Globetrotters: Mission London. Retrieved September 20, 2019 from
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2019/06/28/the-gru-globetrotters-mission-london/
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established a language and framework for thinking
about strategic intelligence analysis tradecraft and
approaches, with the various governmental inquiries
into the 2003 Iraq War debacle proving themselves to be
highly influential in framing the contemporary debate.
The second key community is a much more
practical and practitioner-focused group, which focuses
more on practical applications of intelligence analysis
techniques and principles to current security challenges.
Military and law enforcement are particularly strong in
this community, and, to a lesser extent, other
practitioners such as those engaged in business or
‘competitive’ intelligence. 
It is not the case that these communities are
entirely distinct and never intersect. There are many
colloquia and conferences where elements of both
happily come together and discuss the issues, such as
the major ISA annual conference. At the same time,
there are separate gatherings and sometimes separate
discussions that characterise the two groups. In a sense,
Intelligence Studies is a classic interdisciplinary concern
with multiple connections, sometimes spinning off into
International Relations, and sometimes into other
disciplines such as Criminology and Psychology. 
Despite their differences, there are three factors
that intersect across both communities and unite them
in certain ways. One is the inescapable link between
organisational and governance issues, and the business
of analysis. As the Iraq War showed, the first can be as
pivotal as the second in causing a major intelligence
failure in the system. In policing, models such as the
NIM aimed at structuring the new era of advanced data
analysis have ended up being more about management
of organisations and processes than about honing and
improving the analytical function. Considerable
problems in integrating high-value intelligence analysis
into policing organisations and fully delivering on the
erstwhile promises of intelligence-led policing still need
to be addressed. At the same time, seeing the analytical
function in complete isolation from organisational
factors will continue to be a poor prescription for the
wider intelligence community. 
The second key factor is the way in which social
media data and open-source intelligence can and
should be integrated into the intelligence function,
across the board from tactical to strategic intelligence.
In some ways, private analysts outside of the official
intelligence community are lighting the way here as
well as government analysts themselves, and it is
probably the case that this needs to be recognised and
acted upon, perhaps in a spirit of more dynamic
partnering across and outside of government. 
The final key factor is the big pitfall in all domains
of settling into a standardised and bureaucratised way
of thinking about intelligence analysis and structuring
training approaches and techniques in accordance with
unquestioned principles of Western scientific method,
without necessarily thinking enough about the
evaluation and development of those methods to
deliver solid and demonstrable security dividends.
Further research on how well or otherwise the
structured analytic techniques actually work in the
contemporary intelligence workplace will continue to
be essential in moving towards the objective of
developing excellent analysts able to meet the
challenges of the twenty-first century.
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Introduction
Prisons are intense places to live and work, with
many residents living with poor mental health,
learning disabilities, and addictions. The nature of
prison life appears to generate and sustain high
levels of violence resulting in prison staff being
called upon to maintain safety and security; no
easy task in a prison community of almost 80,000
people. The fine balance of managing safety,
security and rehabilitative support depends on
officers maintaining control and trust, and their
ability to promote boundaries to ensure the
peaceful co-existence of people with very
complex lives and needs. Knowing how to
balance the responsibilities of maintaining control
and promoting rehabilitation has previously been
referred to as a ‘prison officer’s dilemma’.1
Difficulties that prisoners may have with
relationships, debt or responsibilities, which might be
manageable in the community, multiply in intensity and
impact for incarcerated people. We know that efforts to
convey drugs and contraband into and around prisons
generate competition and that this is frequently
controlled through violence and other forms of coercive
control. Add to this that many prisoners may have
suffered various personal traumas, and it is clear why
frustrations can run high.2 This can result in problems
being acted, rather than talked, out. The prison officer
must frequently switch hats between mentor, carer and
disciplinarian; a varied and demanding professional
practice. A good prison officer understands the
complex relationship between security and
rehabilitation, exhibits consideration and understands
the difficulties, frustrations and disappointments that
imprisonment can bring.3
This largely descriptive article focuses on the
considerations and judgements that officers have to
make when exercising their authority to use force. We
start by introducing the evidence base, current
operational guidance, and our vision for a new national
framework, and go on to discuss the challenges officers
face when making decisions about the need to use
force. In the article we put forward how we believe Her
Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) can
ensure all decisions and actions relating to force are
carried out to the highest professional standard. We
hope to demonstrate balance in our understanding of
the challenges and threats associated with the role
officers perform, with acknowledgment of the
importance of relational approaches to conflict
resolution and rehabilitative practice in creating safe
and secure environments. For clarity, in this article ‘we’
refers to the opinions of the authors, and does not
necessarily represent the current position of HMPPS.
Use of Force
Prison officer training is heavily focused on
development of skills that are known to be effective in
supporting rehabilitative journeys, but significant time is
spent in initial training developing practical skills and
explaining sources of authority that underpin the
professional Use of Force (UoF). HMPPS have developed
specific techniques approved for use in adult prisons
(Control and Restraint) and in children’s custodial
environments (Minimising and Managing Physical
Restraint). Both are subject to oversight, review,
continuous development and evaluation. Prisoners have
a right to expect that officers are both competent and
confident to use the techniques professionally, and
within the boundaries of their authority. The
organisation expects that officers will interrupt efforts
by prisoners to pursue criminality, and intervene to stop
prisoner on prisoner violence. Further, officers are
‘L.A.C.E.S’: Introducing a new framework
to enhance professional standards around
Use of Force
Dr Grant J Bosworth is Use of Force Evaluation Lead, HMPPS, and Sarah Ashcroft, Head of Operational
Response and Resilience Unit, HMPPS.
1. Bruhn, Lindberg, & Nylander (2011) Professional Representations among Swedish Prison Officers. 
2. For more on the multitude of challenges officers face see Crawley, E. (2004) Doing Prison Work: The Public and Private Lives of Prison
Officers Cullompton: Willan.
3. Crawley, E. and Crawley, P. (2008) Understanding prison officers: culture, cohesion and conflict in Bennett, J. Crewe, B. and Wahidin,
A. (eds) Understanding Prison Staff Cullompton: Willan p.134-152
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frequently called upon to defend themselves or
colleagues against violence. To put this into context,
there were 267 recorded prisoner-on-prisoner assault
incidents per 1000 prisoners in the 12 months to March
2020, up from around 150 per 1000 in 2015.4 In the
same 12 months, the rate of assaults on staff was 118
per 1,000 prisoners. Despite some progress in the last
year,5 and a welcome reduction in violence during the
COVID lockdown period, the cycle of violence in prisons
has become endemic to prison environments, with
actions and reactions fuelling the problems. It is an
imperative that staff have the skills and confidence to
apply effective techniques to protect themselves and
others should they need to. 
However, the increase in violence in prisons in
recent years does not alter when force is justified, nor
the safeguards that must apply.
We acknowledge that the use of
force against prisoners will
sometimes be necessary, but that
it represents an extreme
manifestation of the authority
vested in prison officers. Even
where justified, using physical
force causes harm to some
degree, and represents a failure
to resolve or prevent conflict in
the first place. For this reason, it is
right that all use of force is
subject to scrutiny and that
professional practice is
underpinned by an effective
process for complaint and investigation where
appropriate. We believe that professional standards as
they apply to the use of force and its governance are
objective rather than subjective, and that clear
articulation of that standard will drive better practice
and safer prison environments. Whether in the context
of daily leadership or a disciplinary hearing, there must
be a clear standard of professional conduct for staff to
work to, and by which Governors can decide whether
the use of force was professional as well as legal,
however necessary and reasonable the officer believed
their actions to be.
The professional UoF demands this level of attention
because of the impact it can have on officers and those
in their care. Not much research has been done in prison
settings examining the outcomes associated with use of
force, but research considering interpersonal violence in
other settings, suggests that exposure to violence is
related to a range of negative effects on mental health,
psychological well-being and behaviour.6
We understand that UoF impacts individuals, but it
also sets the tone for relationships at a prison level, and
we believe this is an important variable in determining
the ‘culture’ of a prison. We can’t list all the factors and
variables that contribute to individual prison cultures,
but it is understood that architectural design and
physical state are important,7 along with regime stability
and the intensity of focus on surveillance and control.8
In addition to logistical and
physical differences, personal and
social factors including the
balance between training and
governance, and the experience
of officers, undoubtedly shape
prison cultures. 
In a previous edition of this
journal Ruth Mann and
colleagues argued persuasively
the view that everyone plays a
role and has the potential to
support or undermine
rehabilitative outcomes, and in
doing so determine the culture of
a prison.9 It is clear that security
practice can be designed so that it connects or
conflicts with rehabilitative efforts, and we suggest
that use of force is an area of critical importance,
where getting it right matters more so than in any
other professional judgement. We also know that in
prisons when the boundaries of authority are
overstepped, particularly when prisoners perceive use
of force lacks legitimacy or justification, it makes
rehabilitative outcomes less likely. From a prisoner’s
perspective, the legitimate use of authority helps
prison environments to feels safe and regulated, in









4. Safety & Order Statistics, England and Wales to March 2020; see Justice Data on gov.uk.
5. Speeches from the former Lord Chancellor and Justice Secretary, David Gauke, on ‘Beyond prison, redefining punishment’, 18 February
2019 and ‘From sentencing to incentives – how prisons can better protect the public from the effects of crime’, 10 July 2018. 
6. Meade, B., Steiner, B., & Klahm IV, C. F. (2017).The effect of police use of force on mental health problems of prisoners. Policing and
Society, 27(2), 229-244.
7. Beijersbergen, K. A., Dirkzwager, A. J. E., van der Laan, P. H., & Nieuwbeerta, P. (2016). A Social Building?  Prison Architecture and
Staff-Prisoner Relationships.  Crime & Delinquency, 62, 843-874.)
8. See Woolf Report: Woolf, L. J.  (1991).  Prison Disturbances. April 1990: Report of an inquiry.  London, England: HMSO. Also see:
Johnsen, B. Granheim, P. K., & Helgesen, J. (2011). Exceptional prison conditions and the quality of prison life: Prison size and prison
culture in Norwegian close prisons.  European Journal of Criminology, 8, 515-529.
9. Mann, R. E., Fitzalan Howard, F & Tew, J. (2018). What is a rehabilitative prison culture? Prison Service Journal 235, pp3-9.
10. Crewe, B.,Liebling, A. & Hulley, S. (2011). ‘Staff culture, use of authority and prisoner quality of life in public and private sector
prisons’. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 44, 94-115.
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Need for a Renewed Focus
We understand that increased oversight may cause
anxiety and could be perceived as a lack of trust in an
officer’s judgement and conduct. We don’t seek to
present a view of UoF through a singularly negative
lens. On the contrary, we are confident that under the
right circumstances, using force can save lives and limit
harm; and we have seen this first-hand, through
experience and in footage of professionally applied
practice. Therefore, while lower annual UoF figures
would no doubt be welcomed by all, this paper’s aim is
not to advocate a strategy that simply demands a
continuous push for fewer and
fewer UoF incidents. Instead, we
want to advocate for an
approach that ensures that every
UoF incident is held to the
highest standards so that the
public, prisoners and their
families can have the greatest
confidence that every decision
and action has been executed
with professionalism and
competence. Our vision is a UoF
culture in HMPPS characterised
by the highest professional
standards and rigorous scrutiny
that balances the responsibilities
to safeguard prisoners and
protect staff. We propose the
LACES framework as a way
forward to achieve this.
LACES: Lawful, Accountable,
Considered, Equal, and Setting the Standard. 
Lawful. 
From a legal perspective, each use of force can
only be justified, and therefore considered lawful, if it is
necessary, reasonable in the circumstances,
proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances,
and the individual(s) uses no more force than is
necessary.11 In every instance where force is applied, the
circumstances are unique so must be judged on their
own merits. This individual approach to scrutiny is
imperative if we are serious about establishing a
character to our Public Service that is built on the
legitimate use of authority by a professional body of
prison staff. It is the foundation upon which we will
build a consistent and universal approach that we can
have confidence will be upheld by every officer, in every
prison, and which is internalised into our culture. We
believe that it is this impression that we should aspire to
be recognised by, and which the scrutiny bodies that
oversee us will describe us in future. 
Use of force that falls short of the law, or which
does not act as an exemplar for professional standards,
can cause severe harm and erode legitimacy.
Inappropriate or excessive use of force undermines
public trust and confidence in HMPPS, and damages
the relationships between prisoners and staff. It
perpetuates inequality and disproportionality in
experience and outcome. It is
squarely at odds with our
organisational purpose and
values.12 This pushes us to better
lead, train and support prison
staff to make decisions about
when and how to use force, and
to practice with legitimacy and to
a standard that goes above and
beyond the expectations of law,
and reflects their professionalism. 
Acting in compliance with
law is our bottom line, with no
excuses for staff failing to meet
this standard. The conditions of
UoF being lawful are set out and
taught in initial and annual
refresher training. We must be
confident that prison staff know
and understand the lawful basis
for their practice. Any use of
force must pass the test of being
necessary and reasonable, and decision making about
use of force must stem from the honestly held belief
that one’s self, or another person is at imminent risk
should you fail to intervene, having considered and
discounted other options. Such harm could include risk
to life, or the imminence of another serious impact. We
also have protection in law to use force to prevent
crime, but not to use this as a means of upholding
prison rules. This is a commonly misunderstood point,
with widespread belief that it is lawful to use force to
gain compliance with a reasonable instruction in the
interests of good order or discipline. 
Where these minimum standards are not met
prison officers can face disciplinary investigation, and
potentially criminal enquiry. The Prison and Probation
Ombudsman (PPO) also provide independent
...train and support
prison staff to make
decisions about
when and how to
use force, and to
practice with





11. See Prison Service Order 1600 
12. Values of preventing victims by changing lives and doing this with humanity, openness, and togetherness. See the HMPPS strategy:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/864681/HMPPS_Business_Strategy_S
haping_Our_Future.pdf. 
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investigations into cases, and act upon any prisoner
complaints relating to UoF.13 The Ombudsman aims to
answer three main questions for each case: Did the use
of force constitute an assault? Was the decision to use
force justifiable? And was the level of force
implemented proportionate to the circumstances?
While the ‘Lawful’ element of the LACES acronym is the
minimum standard we expect, the additional
components build upon the standards outlined in law
to express the professional standards HMPPS strives for.
Accountable. 
Quality scrutiny and assurance processes should
ensure that officers are accountable for their actions.
This is important for those occasions when complaints
are made, and also for allowing senior management
teams to recognise good
practice. An important part of
this process is the statement the
officer makes following a UoF
incident, and the medical report
that accompanies this. HMPPS
have introduced measures to
ensure professional standards are
elevated further. For example,
every prison must form
committees to monitor UoF at
their establishment, and for
national-level specialist teams
(e.g. the National Tactical
Response Group [NTRG]) and a
senior committee meet to ensure
accountability at all levels. HMPPS have also ensured
they are responsive and flexible to changes in
operational demands; for example, during the COVID-
19 response additional scrutiny committees were
assembled to examine exceptional PAVA use. This was a
form of agile response management that ensured that
any local-level issues could be escalated to a national
cross-profession panel when required. 
A key part of accountability is being able to reflect
on the scrutiny process and learn from our actions to
better ourselves in the future. One way of doing this is
through reviewing Body Worn Video Camera footage.14
This aids the officer when reflecting on their actions,
and also helps committees gather better insight into
incidents they are reviewing, and where necessary help
the PPO to more quickly resolve complaints.15 BWVC
use may also help as some research has found that
officers wearing cameras use force less than those who
do not wear them, and that there can be sustained
effects on lowering UoF over time.16 Although research
into the use of BWVC has revealed that the degree of
discretion that is used in whether and cameras were
turned on impacted their effectiveness.17
Another facet of accountability is that of the
officer to both the prisoners and their colleagues. We
feel it is worthwhile for an officer to have a meaningful
conversation with the individual who has had forced
used upon them when it is safe
and appropriate to do so.
Following procedural justice
principles we are keen to ensure
an explanation is provided and
that prisoners have an
opportunity to have a voice as
part of a debrief.18 Another way
we feel providing prisoners with a
voice may be possible is to have a
representative from the prisoners
sitting on the UoF committees
(for at least some of the
meeting). This would go some
way in ensuring prisoners can see
that reviews and decisions are
transparent and fair. This is important as we know that
research shows when prisoners are treated in a way
they feel is fair, and consistent with the rules in place,
they are less likely to engage in acts of indiscipline.19
Considered 
While some UoF may be viewed as truly
instantaneous because of a spontaneous event, many
occasions present opportunities for de-escalation
One technique that









14. National Security Management Framework, Security Management, Body Worn Video Cameras. Prison Service Instruction (PSI) 04/2017,
issued on 20 March 2017.
15. See https://www.ppo.gov.uk/blog/prisons-must-improve-their-handling-and-retention-of-video-footage-relating-to-use-of-force-
complaints/
16. Lum, C., Stoltz, M., Koper, C. S., & Scherer, J. A. (2019).  Research on body-worn cameras: what we know, what we need to know.
Criminology & Public Policy, 18, 93-119
17. Ariel, B., Sutherland, A., Henstock, D., Young, J., et al. (2016).  Report: increases in police use of force in the presence of body-worn
cameras are driven by officer discretion: a protocol-based subgroup analysis of ten randomized experiments.  Journal of Experimental
Criminology, 12, 453-463.)  
18. For more information on procedural justice see:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/771324/prisoner-staff-perceptions-
procedural-justice-research.pdf
19. Reisig, M. D. and Masko G. (2009). Procedural justice, legitimacy, and prisoner misconduct. Psychology, Crime and Law, 15, 41-59.
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before UoF is required. One technique that may help
aid de-escalation is for officers to ensure they offer
calm, rational replies when faced with emotive
situations. We know minimising emotionally driven
responses in such moments can help our decision-
making ability.20 The evidence tells us that generally
people can make less biased decisions (e.g. impulsive
decisions influenced by emotion) when they engage in
‘system two’ rather than ‘system one’ thinking.21 The
difference between the two ‘systems’ is that system one
is fast and reflexive (i.e. the system we operate in most
of the time which enables effortless, automatic decision-
making) whereas system two is slower, conscious and
more deliberate. Therefore, to make an informed and
well-thought-out decision officers
should consider how, in the build
up to an incident, they can move
from quick, emotional responses
to slower, more deliberate
reasoning.
Research suggests a number
of ways that decision-makers can
do this including generating
alternatives to their original
thinking and by considering why
their initial judgement might be
mistaken.22
These techniques may be
particularly useful when trying to
anticipate if an incident has the
potential to escalate. For
example, while an intuitive
reaction to witnessing a prisoner
with contraband may be to
immediately approach the
individual and attempt to retrieve
the item, a more considered approach may be for the
officer to consider the support available to them at the
time (e.g. are colleagues around them?), and the
control the officer is likely to have if the situation
escalates (e.g. what is the environment like, are many
other prisoners present?). This more deliberate decision
making process may ultimately minimise any force
required (should the situation escalate) and even if force
is used, minimise the length of time and severity of
force needed (e.g. if no other prisoners around and if
colleagues are in support, compared to if having to deal
with the situation alone in a crowded environment). 
It is through this more measured decision-making
that officers may be able to reassure themselves and
their seniors that all potential steps to minimise the
chance of the situation escalating had been taken. This
does not mean that officers should avoid challenging or
avoid difficult conversations and let prisoners ‘get away’
with inappropriate behaviour, but instead it provides
officers an opportunity to consider whether the
situation needs an immediate action or whether it may
be safer and more appropriate to deal with the incident
in a different environment, at a different time, or with




environments; we know that
experiences in the criminal justice
system from the point of arrest to
the point of exit are impacted on
by social factors such as wealth,
ethnicity, employment status,
experience of care, and
education achievement level.
Custodial environments and
prison hierarchies are impacted
by the same complexities, with
over representation of
marginalised groups of
individuals, in particular those
from black ad minority ethnic
(BAME) backgrounds. People
from BAME communities
represent 14 per cent of the
population of England and
Wales, but 25 per cent of adult prisoners and 41 per
cent of children in custody.23
In light of this we need be mindful of the impact of
our collective ‘face of force’. In using this phrase, we
mean the impression that is given to and held by those
experiencing force, about our wider culture and our
system of control. Outside of big cites, our staffing
group as a whole remains predominantly white, with
fewer women than men at all grades. Indeed, Crawley
and Crawley (2008) note that ‘prison officers work in
an occupation that has been thought to require the












20. Soll, J., Milkman, K. L., & Payne, J. W. (2015). The users’ guide to debiasing, In G. Keren & G. Wu, (Eds.) The Wiley-Blackwell
Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making. Chicester, UK; John Wiley & Sons.
21. Kahnemann, D. (2011). Thinking Fast and Slow. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
22. Milkman, K. L., Chugh, D., & Bazerman, M. H.  (2009). How can decision-making be improved? Perspectives on Psychological Science,
4, 379-383.)
23. Lammy, D. (2017). The Lammy Review. An Independent review into the Treatment of Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic individuals in the
Criminal Justice System. London, England. Retrieved from
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/643001/lammy-review-final-
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authoritativeness and aggressiveness’ (p.141). While
this is simply not the case, it remains that the face of
force in HMPPS is still overwhelmingly white and male,
and given that we know BAME prisoners experience
more use of force than white prisoners we see this as
particularly problematic. 
Evidence demonstrates the extent of this
disproportionality in the youth estate in particular. A
reasonably recent survey of 600 boys found just over
half of the BAME respondents (53 per cent) reported
experiences of physical restraint
(compared to only 36 per cent of
white respondents), and also
found that Muslim boys were
more likely to be physically
restrained compared to non-
Muslim boys (56 per cent v 41
per cent).24
David Lammy highlighted
the need to address the issue of
disproportionality in 2017,
suggesting that we improve
governance to focus attention on
the problematic levels of use of
force being practiced against





recommendations, but we need
to work with staff on their
individual decision-making, and
help them to engage in
conversations about factors that
impact on that, including internal and systemic bias.
These are not easy conversations to have, but there is
no palatable explanation for the findings of several
external scrutiny bodies that BAME prisoners in many
UK prisons experience excessive use of force, or that
governance arrangements are lacking and fall short of
protecting Human Rights.25 We must look hard,
honestly and reflectively at our organisational policies,
our leadership messages and the behaviours and
tolerances that have become embedded in our culture
if we are to rise above this challenge. It’s uncomfortable
but we must seek to explain how any inequality
becomes established and tolerated. 
There is a need for a global focus on the
disproportionate use of force against BAME people by
police in communities and custody. We recognise and
validate these charges as equally relevant to the prison
environment. Practice which is known to impact in
discriminatory ways must be talked about, challenged
and repaired. We know that unconscious biases affect
us all, and this includes in our professional decision-
making, which can lead to
discrimination even when we
have good intentions not to think
or behave in a biased manner.26
Research has shown that good
intentions are simply not enough
to remove biases. For example, in
other settings research has
shown us that including a
statement reminding people of
their duty not to discriminate on
the basis of age makes no
difference to actual levels of
discrimination when examining
hiring decisions.27 Perhaps more
surprisingly, research has also
found that both unconscious and
conscious racial bias can increase
when people are presented with
a message that emphasises their
legal obligation to comply with
anti-prejudice policies.28 It may be
that people react negatively
when they believe their decisions
or choices are being censored,
and so how we approach bias in UoF decisions needs
careful consideration. As UK police forces have
recognised, change may require further investment in
dedicated training regarding unconscious bias and how
to reduce the influence of negative stereotypes.29
Setting the Standard
The final part of the LACES acronym outlines our
vision that we must be setting the standard at all levels
in the organisation. This means individuals ensuring










culture if we are to
rise above this
challenge.
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they are up-to-date with training and aware of
guidance, supervisors ensuring their staff feel
supported, and leaders modelling the behaviours we
strive for. We know that managerial controls, training
and quality supervision are all ways that have been
reported to help prevent unreasonable UoF.30 The study
cited shows that everyone can make a difference as it
demonstrated that trained supervisors significantly
moderated their officers’ use of weapons-based UoF (in
a police setting). In other words, investing in quality
training and education for staff can help control UoF.
We know from research that training and education
should focus on promoting a professional outlook
which means officers should be open and non-
defensive, make exceptions when warranted, prefer to
gain cooperation through communication, and use
force as a last resort.31 We know that leadership can go
a long way in setting the standard and ensuring officers
strive for these qualities by considering some of the
following suggestions from the literature:32
q Targeting officers with a pattern of poor UoF
behaviour, for remedial attention and training
— rather than blame.
q Reinforcing training on-the-job (plus refresher
training) with close supervision, including
being held to account for decisions. 
q Explicit policies of what is required in different
situations, which are written down, regularly
reviewed and updated where appropriate.
q Accountability frameworks with written
reports that include compulsory justification
for UoF, supervisor sign off and discussions
between officers and supervisors.
q In-depth analysis of UoF reports, with essential
public reporting on an annual basis.
q Effective lines of communication so difficulties
can be discussed and addressed as they arise.
q Commitment in leadership to improve UoF
practice. 
Moving Forward
As we have outlined, the primary aim of this paper
is not to issue a rallying call for reducing UoF (although
we welcome all reductions in violence in prisons), but it
is to share a message of appreciation for the difficult
work our staff do, recognise that the decisions they
have to make are incredibly complex, celebrate that a
lot of the time we make the right decisions and save
lives and limit harm through using force, and
acknowledge there are times when additional steps
could have been taken to minimise or eliminate the
need for force. 
Providing we are satisfied of the legality of the
force, when mistakes happen we should move away
from blame, and try to understand how improvements
can be made: do we need more accountability —
should we be encouraging more use of BWVC? Were
all actions considered — was an opportunity for de-
escalation missed? Is our UoF practice equal — are we
reviewing incidents for disproportionality? Are we
setting the standard — are supervisors providing
feedback and identifying training needs? Each prison
may find their focus needs to be on different parts of
the LACES framework, but we encourage all prison
teams to reflect where they are at now and where they
want to get to next in their UoF practice. 
Centrally, there are efforts to apply an evidence-
based approach to policy and practice development,
and a commitment to support local leadership teams to
develop stronger leadership messaging and extend and
promote good UoF practice. Work is ongoing to
improve the quality of recording and reporting through
greater use of technology. A digital UoF reporting tool
is currently being piloted in two establishments with
promising results; when widely implemented this will
give greater oversight and enable HMPPS to publish
national statistics for UoF as part of our commitment to
transparency and improvement. 
An ambitious programme of evaluation of UoF is
currently underway. For the first time HMPPS are
systematically reviewing UoF committees across the
estate to understand what works and to provide best
practice guidance for our establishments. We are
undertaking primary research including interviews with
staff and prisoners to fill evidence gaps around the
impact of using force in prisons and to become world
leaders in this field. Overall this is an exciting time to be
involved with security in our prisons, there are a raft of
changes happening regarding UoF practices, training
and policy, and world-leading research plans afoot.
30. Lim, H., & Lee, H. (2015).  The effects of supervisor education and training on police use of force.  Criminal Justice Studies, 28(4), 444-
463.)
31. Liebling, A., Price, D. & Shefer, G. (2010). The Prison Officer. Routledge.
32. Prenzler, T., Porter, L., & Alpert, G. P. (2013).  Reducing police use of force: case studies and prospects.  Aggression and Violent
Behaviour, 18, 343-356.)
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This interview was conducted in September 2020.
JB: Could you tell me about your professional
background and experience?
AW: My background is primarily in academia,
much of that in security education which followed from
my research interests, although I also worked in the
private sector for a short while. I’ve specialised in
teaching mature learners who are usually full-time
security practitioners.
Early on, I was based at the University of Leicester
and because that was one of the few institutions to
engage with security, and I was invited to get involved
with the professional community, representing the
educational side. So, I’ve been working closely with the
practitioner community since the end of 2004,
supporting the professional development of the
security sector.
JB: What drew you to the security as a field?
AW: I had an interest in policing, which was how
I had envisaged my career developing. I was a police
cadet before going to university and worked as a
special constable. I’d always planned to go into the
police after graduation. I then decided to change
direction. As I continued to study, I noticed that
private security was a hidden area in terms of
research. That then became the focus of my PhD
research. Following that I found myself in an ideal
position to teach on educational courses, with a niche
that was broader than policing and with much scope
for development. That has enabled me to be in a
position to respond to the evolving educational needs
of the security profession. 
JB: How would you define security? What are
the critical elements? Why are security
professionals important? 
AW: In simple terms it is about the protection of
assets: people, property or information. That
encompasses a whole range of different roles
including people working internationally, nationally
or locally; in the public, private or non-governmental
sector; they could be in management, front-line,
consultancy, investigative or analytical roles; they may
be in specialist, generalist roles or ancillary ones such
as mine as an educator, trainers, recruiters or media.
There are a whole range of people playing a role in
the resilience of governments, commercial
organisations, non-governmental organisations, and
the community. 
Understanding the security profession:
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JB: Your work draws together research in your
academic work, teaching and practice. What is the
significance of research in the practice of security?
AW: as the profession has become more
sophisticated, it has become more methodology-based.
That makes it more accessible to people coming into
the profession — there are established ways of doing
things, generally based around the risk management
cycle. There is a considerable value in experience such
as in working under pressure, and having to engage
with a wide range of people. People working in prisons
will recognise this as their role is amongst the most
challenging. But there is also a wider body of
knowledge in which to ground that experience. We are
living in an increasingly complex
world so there needs to be a
focus on evidence-based
decision-making. You need that
evidence base to justify your
decisions and get senior people
to agree to what you are asking
for, which is often a budget to
take some particular action. The
evidence base includes not only
being able to draw upon other
people’s research, but also
gathering your own data and
establishing metrics to justify
decision-making. 
As the sector has recognised
the value of education, there
have been increasing
expectations that people have
advanced academic and
vocational qualifications. There are also clearer
development pathways, often starting with vocational
qualifications that can take up to a year and attract
recognised prior learning credits towards a university
degree. As well as these routes, there are also a lot of
free online learning materials on issues such a cyber
security, counter terrorism and other aspects of security.
There are many opportunities for those who want to
develop themselves and give themselves the best
chance to secure the most interesting positions.
JB: When I think about security practice in
prisons, it can be quite traditional, more of a craft
based profession where people don’t necessarily
undertake formal training but learn on the job.
The training that they do undertake will be
technical or about current practices rather than
taking a broader perspective, theoretical
perspective that you are describing. I can imagine
some people asking why they would want to
know about theory or learn about private security
firms, when that is not the setting they work in?
What would you say is the value of the
development you are describing?
AW: In any organisation, if everyone comes with
the same experience then you don’t get much change,
improvement or innovation. There is a wealth of
research on the prison setting, for example: — there
are different approaches to prison practice all around
the world. Education gives you access to new ideas that
can be introduced into different contexts. Any setting
needs a good evidence base underpinning how things
are done and a good diversity of staff who can bring
different perspectives. We know that prison work is
extremely challenging, perhaps now more than ever,
where managers are dealing with tight budgets and all
kinds of barriers. Sometimes
what you can control are small
innovations that might not cost
much money. Education is a
route to a wider range of answers
and perspectives in any line of
work. 
JB: Organisations are
measured in many ways
including research, targets,
audits, inspection. How do
organisations know if security
practice is effective?
AW: you need to be
gathering data at every stage.
You need data in order to make
comparisons. The risk
management cycle starts with
understanding the context,
knowing the organisation you are dealing with, the
culture, the aspirations and needs of the organisation.
Then you come to the risk identification stage, which
is the most crucial as if you miss a key risk you create
a cycle that is flawed from the outset. You need to
find ways of analysing the landscape, including issues
internal to the organisation and in the external
environment. What are the vulnerabilities within as
well as the threats on the horizon? You need good
qualitative and quantitative data-gathering techniques
to find out this information. That goes through an
analytical process, which will inform the approaches
that will be taken to mitigate the risks or adverse
incidents. There have to be robust ways of measuring
those incidents so you can evidence whether there is
improvement. Then there is a review process, which
feeds back into the top of the cycle. There is data
gathering and analysis all the way through. That
should produce the evidence that practitioners need
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JB: Your roles involve promoting security
management and leadership. What are the key
elements of security management and leadership?
Are they different in the security context than in
other settings?
AW: Starting with management, we all do this to
ensure that day-to-day activities are happening. In
security, the risk management cycle is at the heart of
professional practice. Some people may mainly be
involved in particular stages of the cycle. For example,
analysts mostly focus on assessing the risks on the
horizon, or business continuity experts are concerned
with preparedness for emergencies. It is all about risk
management. Leadership is about the strategic vision
and objectives, and getting others to engage with them
and work with you to realise those goals. You will be
setting your objectives and
values, such as excellence,
growth, professionalism, ethics,
integrity or inclusion, that you see
as necessary for organisational
success. That is more about
inspiring people and bringing
them with you. 
JB: What is the role of the
Security Institute and how do
you see this developing?
AW: We are a UK-based
professional association for
security practitioners with over
3600 members. We run learning
events, masterclasses and
educational courses, and have
links with universities. We also
have knowledge-sharing and
thought leadership functions, delivered through a
growing number of special interest groups. These
groups represent a wide range of disciplines, including
cyber security, counter terrorism, the built environment,
insider risks and many others. There are increasing
numbers of people within the sector who want that kind
of association to give professional recognition and
support their development.
We are still a small organisation in terms of our
employees; we only have nine employees, but we are
growing. We have a volunteer Board of 15, and
innumerable volunteers running committees and
special interest groups and getting involved in a whole
range of activities. We always say we are run by
members for members. The Institute is now gathering a
lot of momentum and new members. We are widening
our reach and capacity to engage with government and
industry at a senior level. Any revenue is ploughed back
into the organisation as we are a not-for-profit. The
more we grow in numbers and income, the further and
faster we can go along that journey. 
It is very exciting that we have so many people
across the sector coming together to develop our
capacities and services. A lot of the most engaged
members are involved in volunteering and they get a
lot out of it as it can open up new opportunities as you
can show what you can do and work alongside other
people. It is a wonderful way of trying out new areas
and opening up new opportunities. 
JB: The Security Institute nurtures the idea of
a cross-sector security profession. What is the
value of sharing experience and expertise
between such apparently different fields as retail
security, prison management, and private
policing?
AW: In the past they were
very separate areas. The more
that we come together around
common methodologies, which
are simply being applied in
different ways and in different
settings, then the more there is a
knowledge exchange and
opportunities for people to move
around the sector. All of those
areas are becoming more
professionalised and there are
common standards emerging.
There is greater diversity of
thought when people come
together with different
experiences and ways of doing
things. 
You might not think that
someone working in a prison in a security role has
much to do with an IT security professional, but they
are still working within that security risk management
cycle. A lot of IT security is not rocket science, it is based
on the same principles. So we are seeing a distinct
profession coming together, with a distinct identity and
way of doing things. 
We have nurtured cross-sector working. We
instituted a body called the Security Commonwealth,
which is an association of associations that has a
rotating chairmanship so that different organisations
take their turn in leading it. It is bringing bodies
together to discuss areas of shared interest, support
collaboration and establish a common voice. That is
another way in which collaboration is growing. As we
have all become more comfortable with video
conferencing and using it routinely, I expect this will
facilitate even more cross-sector engagement because
it has become so much easier. 
A lot of IT security is
not rocket science,
it is based on the
same principles. So




identity and way of
doing things.
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JB: How do you see technology reshaping
security and the nature of both threats and
countermeasures in the future?
AW: It is becoming something that everyone has to
acknowledge is part of their remit. The world is so
technologically dependent that the distinction between
the digital and physical world is getting more blurred.
We all need to improve our game in terms of
understanding technology and its implications. We are
working in an environment of increasing complexity.
When you are working in a complex context, you face
what are sometimes referred to as ‘cascading threats’
when one things happens and there is a cascade of
unexpected outcomes that generate something
completely different. It’s like the
butterfly effect. To manage in an
increasingly complex world,
people need to adapt their
working styles to a more
network- and partnership-based
approach, and be more
adaptable and agile. The prison
system is an example of
managing complexity at every
level, but more and more
dimensions of today’s world are
characterised by complexity and
that is a bit daunting for
everyone. 
JB: You’ve mentioned the
risk management cycle a




AW: You can use very simple established
frameworks. For example, the SWOT analysis is based
around strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and
threats. Strengths and weaknesses are within the
organisation — what does it do well and where do its
vulnerabilities lie? The opportunities and threats are
external to the organisation — what is on the horizon?
Horizon-scanning is a growing area of analysis, drawing
on intelligence. If you are established in the profession
it might not be possible to retrain in analytical skills, but
you might think about employing a young graduate
who has analytical skills to fulfil that function. Building
a more analytical approach will build resilience, and
getting talented young people into the sector will
improve diversity and encourage innovation. 
Another example is PESTEL analysis. The letters
refer to political, economic, social, technological,
environmental and legal issues on the horizon. It is a
useful checklist about what the challenges might be.
For example, with political risks, if you want to go into
business in another country, what are the particular
bureaucratic obstacles and societal challenges that you
need to be aware of before you decide whether what
you want to do is viable? 
JB: Part of the role of security professionals is
to respond to risks and emergency situations. For
example, the coronavirus pandemic has
highlighted the challenges of preparing and
responding to global threats. What do you see as
the role of security professionals in contingency
planning and management? What are the best
practices in this field?
AW: What it has highlighted is the tendency of
many organisations and
governments to ignore issues
until something happens. The
government was well aware of
the threat from pandemics on the
horizon. It has been on the
National Risk Register in a
prominent position. But actually
getting organisations to invest
sufficiently in the planning is the
challenge. You have a lot of
business continuity and crisis
management professionals or
corporate security managers
fulfilling those roles. 
Planning is key, drawing
upon established methodologies
to put together business
continuity plans. It is similar to
the risk management cycle in
terms of understanding what is on the horizon,
outlining the potential impact of those risks that might
derail the business and stop it functioning. Practitioners
always recommend regular testing and exercising. This
is often what falls by the wayside. You can have an
excellent plan, but if you haven’t tested it, when the
event happens you may struggle to get people to do
what they are supposed to because they haven’t had a
chance to test the issues out and operate under
pressure. Testing is essential. Many consultants will
offer to come in and run these for organisations but
they can also run them themselves. Then there is the
crisis management response when something does
happen. Just like any other aspect of security, this relies
on a lot of knowledge sharing and collaboration. It is an
area that practitioners with frontline experience are
often very good at, as they are good at harnessing
networks and working under pressure. 
JB: The security profession is often presented
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its culture? Has this been your experience? Does
the security profession need to change?
AW: The historic issue is due to the security
function not having initially been placed very high in
the organisational hierarchy. That is changing. The
closer it gets to the Board of an organisation, the more
strategic, professional, and better resourced it becomes.
Then it attracts a broader range of people with a range
of qualifications. In the earlier stages, it was lower
down the organisational hierarchy, budgets were small.
This is still a concern as frontline security workers are
not always well-rewarded and there can be a high
turnover. When a sector isn’t
well—resourced, it is not good at
investing in staff development
and will find shortcuts.
Historically, the sector has relied
upon retired police and military
people to fulfil those roles. It is
not that long ago that people in
those sectors would do thirty year
careers and then come out after
that, while still relatively young. A
lot would go into security, but
not necessarily demand high
salaries because they had a
pension. As the sector has gained
more credibility, it is gradually
changing and becoming more
diverse with people coming in
earlier in their careers and often
through educational routes. Also,
the scope of security has
expanded with the cyber
dimension as well as the physical,
and other areas such as business
continuity, investigative
functions, counter fraud, and health and safety. The
more functions, the more diverse the people taking up
those roles. Having said that, there is still a large market
for physical security, which does still attract more men.
The Security Institute has just launched an Inclusive
Security Special Interest Group whose premise is that
an inclusive profession is more healthy and innovative,
as well as more welcoming. As well as being the right
thing to do from an equal opportunities perspective, it
makes good business sense to attract a broader range
of candidates and remove barriers to the best people
coming into the sector. There is still work to be done
but more and more people are understanding the value
of diversity. 
JB: The killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis
and the revival of the Black Lives Matters
movement has led for calls to reduce our focus on
security measures, for example there have been
widespread calls to defund the police and reinvest
in community services. David Lammy’s report on
the criminal justice system in England and Wales6
also highlighted many ways in which policing and
security is disproportionately directed towards
people from minority ethnic groups. What can the
security profession do to address inequality,
disproportionality and racism?
AW: The police aren’t doing
very well in adhering to Robert
Peel’s founding principle when
establishing the Metropolitan
Service in 1829: ‘the police are
the public and the public are the
police’. At that time he was
trying to deal with public
resistance to the establishment of
the police and emphasised that
the police would be drawn from
the community it served. Today it
clearly isn’t always drawn from
the community it serves. Going
back over 20 years to the
recommendations of the Stephen
Lawrence Inquiry7, there have
been long-standing calls for the
police to recruit from a more
diverse body of people. They
haven’t been successful in doing
that. That has got to be one of
the first measures in order to
build trust with those
communities. That equally
applies to security, particularly frontline security. It needs
to cater to the needs of those being protected. Private
security is more diverse than policing, but the diversity
is not consistent through the hierarchy. 
Everybody needs to play their part in understanding
the barriers that other people face. Many of these are to
do with poverty as well as ethnicity. Education is always
key. It is important to teach frontline practitioners to
think about and engage with the wider issues and
context in which they are operating. We can all educate
ourselves better about issues of equality and diversity.
When it is better understood, it is possible to identify
the right actions required and embed a more positive
culture from top to bottom. Ultimately organisations will
As well as being the
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6. Lammy, D. (2017) The Lammy review: An independent review into the treatment of, and outcomes for, Black, Asian and minority ethnic
individuals in the criminal justice system. Available at
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/643001/lammy-review-final-report.pdf.
7. MacPherson, W. (1999) The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry London: TSO
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be more successful as they will be richer and more
dynamic for the talent and expertise that different types
of people bring.
JB: What are your plans for the future?
AW: I’m relatively new in my job at the University
of West London. I will carry on identifying new areas for
research and teaching as my work takes me in different
directions. When my Security Institute term of office
comes to an end I will want to do some more voluntary
work. I have undertaken voluntary roles since the age of
16 and I have many passions such as improving routes
for young people into security and supporting diversity
and inclusion.
I have just completed a book8 that I will be
promoting next year, which is intended to convey to
any practitioner, no matter where they sit in the grander
puzzle, that we are all part of a common framework. It
looks at security from the international level
downwards. It has a chapter on regional security, taking
a developing world perspective. There are chapters on
national security; local security, primarily around
policing; security from an individual perspective. It also
covers the cyber, corporate and maritime spheres. It
looks at threats ranging from transnational organised
crime to street crime, knife crime, corporate crime and
pandemics, and the common challenges being faced
now and anticipated in the future. The idea is that it
draws together a range of ideas to present a bigger
picture of security that anyone will be able to relate to
and apply to their own work. It will show how security
has become a major organising feature of society.
8. Wakefield, A. (forthcoming) Security and Crime: Converged Perspectives on a Complex World. London: Sage.
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Competing for control: Gangs
and the social order of prisons





Pen Picture: Dr Jamie Bennett is a
Deputy Director in HM Prison and
Probation Service.
Gangs have become one of the
enduring fears of contemporary life.
As I write this review, the headlines
for the day included fears about
rising violent crime and the
undermining of public policy:
‘Profoundly worrying’: Knife-
wielding gang members now
‘aiming to kill rather than frighten’1
Covid loans ‘exploited by crime
gangs’2
There is deep concern about
the impact of gangs in exploiting
vulnerable people through drug
distribution networks known as
‘county lines’3, while a cross
government strategy has been
developed to promote early
intervention and protect those
vulnerable to gang involvement4.
In prisons, there has also been
anxiety about gangs. This has
included the involvement of gangs
in prison violence and the illicit
economy5, as well as the spectre of
‘Muslim gangs’ perceived by some
to be threatening radicalisation
and criminality6.
Inside and outside of prisons in
the UK, therefore, gangs are
particular concern for the public,
media, politicians and practitioners.
It is in this light that David Pyrooz
and Scott Decker’s extensive
research on prison gangs in Texas,
provides a particularly important
exemplar for integrating research,
policy and practice.
This book reports the findings
from The LoneStar Project, Pyrooz
and Decker’s five year long gang
research project in Texas. This was
partly funded by the National
Institute for Justice, an agency of
the agency of the U.S. Department
of Justice. Texas is the largest state
prison system in the US, with a
population of nearly 160,000
inmates, twice the size of the
England and Wales prison
population. The general population
of Texas, at 29 million, is about half
that of England and Wales. Texas
has, in the past experienced high
levels of gang violence in prisons,
although in recent years this has
reduced. There are over 11,000
confirmed gang members in Texan
prisons, from 67 different groups.
The research involved interviews
with over 800 prisoners (368 gang
members and 434 non gang
members), as well as analysis of
inmate records, statewide law
enforcement records. The study
examined a number of questions,
including: how and why do inmates
organise themselves into social
groups like gangs; how do these
groups govern themselves and
maintain external relations inside
and outside of prison; who gets
involved in these groups and how
do they join and leave them, and;
what are the consequences of
group involvement for misconduct
and victimisation in prison. There
was a particular focus on
transitional points, such as entering
and leaving prison as well as joining
and leaving the gangs. 
One of the most obvious
questions is defining what a gang
is. There have been various
definitions proposed, which often a
group of people who see
themselves (and are seen by others)
as a noticeable group, and engage
in a range of criminal activity and
violence. In this study, Pyrooz and
Decker focussed on self-
identification, in others words they
asked people to identify themselves
whether or not they were gang
members. They found that there
was significant overlap between
those that self-identified as gang
members and those that officials
classified as gang members. This
finding suggested that, in contrast
to some work on street gangs7, that
gang membership is not a
stigmatising label, the classification






4. HM Government (2016) Ending gang violence and exploitation available at
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The research findings are
presented in significant detail, with
carefully analysed data. This reveals
some new insights into the
workings of prison gangs in Texas.
This includes that the identity of
‘gang’ or ‘non gang’ member was
not fixed, but could change on
entry into prison, on leaving the
prison, or at other points. Contrary
to popular belief, gang members
were not members for life, but
could opt out and leave. Those that
did could be anxious about
potential repercussions, but in
reality there was rarely any violent
retribution for leaving gangs. Those
that did disengage usually did so
not for positive reasons such as
family, employment or education,
but more often because they
became disillusioned with gang life.
They often sought a sense of
belonging in alternative
communities, including faith. 
The findings also explored the
impact of gangs on prison life.
Inmate behaviour and misconduct
was shaped by gang membership.
Those that were members of gangs
were more likely to both be the
perpetrators and victims of
violence. Most of the violence was
between gangs and the others
forms of misconduct were generally
to do with drug dealing and other
contraband. While there have been
many different explanations offered
for prison violence and misconduct,
Pyrooz and Decker argue rather
than looking to individual
explanations (focussing of factors
such as psychology and socio-
economic background) or ecology
(the prison culture and
environment) that:
‘Prison gang membership is a
leading explanation for misconduct
and victimisation, and ignoring this
fact misrepresents our
understanding of their occurrence
in prison’ (p.180)
In relation to the social world
of prisons, the authors describe that
prison gangs are important in the
production of social order, they do
not hold primacy. The gang culture
and hierarchy plays a significant role
in governing the lives of members,
but is less influential for non-gang
members and these groups
‘operate in different social worlds’
(p.152).
This study has significant
implications for practice. In Texas,
it can certainly be used to inform
management strategies to
promote safety, as well as design
and target interventions at critical
points. For the UK, this really
points to the need for similar large
scale research on prison gangs in
order to inform a more effective
strategy. There are also other
groups that could usefully be the
subject of similar attention,
including peer groups (where the
association is not necessarily linked
to offending or only lower level
non-violent offending) and
organised criminal networks
(involved in persistent criminality
which is causing significant harm
to the community). Pyrooz and
Decker are to be applauded for
producing such an extensive and
illuminating study of prison gangs,
which really cuts through many
assumptions and offers a
grounded, empirical analysis. This
has the potential to shape policy
and practice in Texan prisons. It is
also offers a blueprint for the
exploration of gangs and criminal
networks in UK prisons as well as
being a wider model for
integrating research, policy and
practice. 
